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Something Old, Something New:  
Forecasting Willing Buyer/Willing 
Seller’s Impact on Songwriter Royalties 
Daniel Abowd* 
 
Mechanical royalties payable to songwriters for digital repro-
ductions of their works on services such as Spotify and Apple Music 
are determined through a convoluted quasi-trial in front of an  
administrative body called the Copyright Royalty Board (“CRB”). 
The CRB is itself governed by statutory rate standards that constrain 
the types of evidence and analyses it may consider when setting  
royalty rates. 
In 2018, Congress passed a much-heralded, consensus piece of 
music legislation called the Music Modernization Act (“MMA”). 
The MMA attacked a broad swath of issues across the music indus-
try, including, most visibly, establishing a blanket license for digital 
mechanical licenses, and a statutory entity to administer that li-
cense. But buried within the MMA was a less-celebrated wrinkle: a 
provision that replaced the old 801(b) rate standard used by the 
CRB for mechanical royalties with a new “willing buyer/willing 
seller” rate standard. While the new standard was seen as a victory 
for songwriters, its precise practical effects remain unsettled. Will 
it really increase rates? If so, why? What evidence, arguments, and 
analysis will it allow—and foreclose—relative to the old standard? 
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This Comment seeks to answer these questions through a com-
parative case study of two past CRB proceedings. First, it dissects 
the analyses that shaped the CRB’s Phonorecords III decision—the 
most recent mechanical royalty rate-setting proceeding, and the last 
to use the old 801(b) rate standard. Second, it undertakes a similar 
analysis of the CRB’s Web IV decision, the most recent instance in 
which the CRB applied the willing buyer/willing seller standard to 
a rate-setting proceeding for a different rights type (the digital per-
formance of sound recordings). It then compares and contrasts 
those two proceedings to predict how willing buyer/willing seller 
will operate in the digital mechanical royalty context. From that 
comparison it concludes that, while the change does skew song-
writer-friendly, there is also a significant amount of uncertainty that 
may render the change less significant than copyright owners 
hope—and music licensees fear. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2018, Congress enacted the Music Modernization Act (the 
“MMA”).1 The three-part omnibus bill accomplished quite a bit un-
der a single banner. Title I addressed issues in music publishing, Ti-
tle II addressed pre-1972 sound recordings, and Title III addressed 
producer and engineer compensation.2 
Title I, the “Musical Works Modernization Act,” covered the 
most ground of the three sections. It established a new statutory 
blanket license for the digital reproduction of musical works, in 
place of the longstanding work-by-work or catalog-by-catalog li-
censing default.3 Going forward, digital interactive streaming ser-
vices such as Spotify and Apple Music would be (1) able to avail 
themselves of this license, and (2) assured that they would no longer 
be liable for good faith (and otherwise) failures to secure mechanical 
licenses for each of the millions upon millions of musical works em-
bedded in sound recordings available on their platforms.4 This 
 
1 Orrin G. Hatch—Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 115–264, 132 
Stat. 3676 (2018) [hereinafter “MMA”]. 
2 See id. 
3 See MMA § 102. 
4 See S. REP. NO. 115-339, at 14 (2018). 
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blanket license would be administered by a newly formed Mechan-
ical Licensing Collective, to be controlled and operated by music 
publishers and songwriters while funded by the digital services.5 
Publishers and songwriters would, in theory, benefit from a more 
efficient administrative system allowing them to more quickly and 
effectively collect royalties accrued for streams of their works.6 The 
digital service providers would benefit by no longer waking up to 
nine-figure infringement suits.7 
Buried deep within Title I were a few less-heralded provisions 
that pertained not simply to the procedures designed to process pay-
able royalties, but the substantive underlying royalties themselves. 
Two of these changes related to the federal rate court system through 
which music users and performing rights organizations (“PROs,” in-
cluding BMI and ASCAP) litigate disputes over public performance 
rates.8 Post-MMA, these disputes will now be heard by a rotating 
series of SDNY judges—rather than one assigned judge9—and sub-
ject to fewer evidentiary restrictions.10 
The last of the rate-affecting changes was a seemingly benign 
update to an arcane portion of the Copyright Act: Section 115. Since 
the early 1900s, mechanical reproduction of musical works—or 
“compositions,” as distinguished from the sound recordings embod-
ying those compositions—have been subject to a compulsory 
 
5 See id. at 3. 
6 See Jose Landivar, The Music Modernization Act: A Primer for Copyright Holders, 
JD SUPRA (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-music-modernization-
act-a-primer-61777/ [https://perma.cc/7TR2-2DRH]. 
7 See, e.g., Spotify Settles $1.6bn Lawsuit over Songwriters’ Rights, BBC NEWS (Dec. 
21, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-46646918 [https://perma.cc/R22Z-932D]. 
8 For more on rate courts, see Brontë Lawson Turk, Note, “It’s Been A Hard Day’s 
Night” for Songwriters: Why the ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees Must Undergo Reform, 
26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 493, 512–14 (2016). 
9 See MMA § 104. 
10 Importantly, rate court litigants may now substantiate their proposed royalty rates for 
the public performance of musical works by introducing as evidence royalty rates for the 
public performance of the sound recording embodying those musical works. See id. 
§ 103(a). 
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license:11 with a few cursory restrictions,12 anyone is entitled to a 
license to reproduce any copyrighted musical work.13 Section 115 
governs the terms of this compulsory license, including the statutory 
royalty rates paid by licensees to licensors.14 Under Section 115, 
these royalties are determined in rate-setting litigations presided 
over by an administrative body known as the Copyright Royalty 
Board (“CRB” or the “Board”).15 The MMA did not disrupt this 
basic structure. However, it did make one subtle adjustment: in place 
of the old “public-interest”-oriented16 801(b) rate standard that 
songwriters and publishers had long believed unduly depressed roy-
alty rates by compelling the CRB to weigh a slew of non-market-
based factors, the MMA now instructed the CRB to set rates using a 
new “willing buyer/willing seller” rate standard designed to model 
the rates that would occur naturally in a hypothetical free market.17 
 
11 See Lydia Pallas Loren, The Dual Narratives in the Landscape of Music Copyright, 
52 HOUS. L. REV. 537, 548 (2014) (contextualizing the origins of the compulsory license 
as a safeguard against potential “abusive monopolistic practices” by rightsholders). Under 
a Section 115 compulsory license, anyone who meets certain easily-satisfied criteria can 
automatically obtain a license to make and distribute a record embodying any nondramatic 
(i.e. “not created for use in a motion picture or dramatic work”) musical composition. See 
Compulsory License for Making and Distributing Phonorecords, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE 
(Jan. 2018), https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ73.pdf. 
12 For example, recordings of the work must have “previously been distributed to the 
public in the United States under the authority of the copyright owner of the work.” 17 
U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(A)(i). 
13 See id. § 115. 
14 Id. 
15 See MMA § 102. The CRB is an independent tribunal within the Copyright Office; its 
three judges are appointed to serve six-year terms by the Librarian of Congress. 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 801–803. Its rate determinations are subject to review for “legal error” by the Register 
of Copyrights before being published in the Federal Register by the Librarian of Congress. 
Id. Any “aggrieved” party who “who fully participated in the proceeding and who would 
be bound by the determination” may then bring an appeal in the D.C. Circuit. Id. § 
803(d)(1). 
16 Mark H. Wittow, Katherine L. Staba, & Trevor M. Gates, A Modern Melody for the 
Music Industry: The Music Modernization Act Is Now The Law of the Land, K&L GATES 
HUB (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.klgates.com/A-Modern-Melody-for-the-Music-
Industry-The-Music-Modernization-Act-Is-Now-the-Law-of-the-Land-10-11-2018 
[https://perma.cc/359E-ATVC]. 
17 Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, https://www.copyright.gov/ 
music-modernization/faq.html (last accessed Feb. 13, 2021) (“The new market-based 
willing buyer / willing seller rate setting replaces the policy-oriented 801(b)(1) rate-setting 
standard.”) (emphasis added). 
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While the switch to willing buyer/willing seller has generally 
been considered to be a victory for the copyright community that 
advocated for it, its practical effects remain unsettled. Will it really 
increase royalty rates when it is applied to mechanical royalty rates? 
If so, why? What specific evidence, arguments, and analysis will  
the new rate standard allow—and foreclose—relative to the old 
standard? 
This Comment seeks to answer these questions by comparing 
and contrasting two prior CRB rate determinations in search of  
clues indicating what may happen in the next CRB mechanical  
royalty rate determination: Phonorecords IV. One past proceeding 
(Phonorecords III) occurred in the same market and rights context 
as Phonorecords IV (mechanical royalties for songwriters), but  
applied a different rate standard. The other (Web IV) occurred in  
a different market/rights context but applied the same rate standard  
as Phonorecords IV (willing buyer/willing seller). This Comment 
acknowledges that while neither of these precedents exactly  
replicates the circumstances that will occur in Phonorecords IV,  
each offers insight into how the CRB is likely to apply the willing 
buyer/willing seller standard to mechanical royalties for the  
first time. 
From there, this Comment concludes that while the change  
from 801(b) to willing buyer/willing seller does skew songwriter-
friendly, as many expect, it also incorporates a significant amount 
of uncertainty that widens the variance of possible outcomes in all 
directions. This uncertainty is exacerbated by the reality that pro-
ceedings under either rate structure are decidedly more similar than 
they are different, so any attempt to isolate and project their practical 
distinctions quickly becomes an extraordinarily tangled exercise.  
The Comment attempts to tiptoe through those tangles by pro-
ceeding in four parts. First, Part I explains the underlying structures 
that govern mechanical royalties in the U.S. Second, in search of 
clues as to how the post-MMA CRB will apply the willing 
buyer/willing seller standard to mechanical royalties, Part II under-
takes a comparative case study of two recent CRB rate-determina-
tions: it first (A) unpacks the CRB’s 2018 Phonorecords III deci-
sion, the most recent digital mechanical royalty rate-setting proceed-
ing and the last to use the pre-MMA rate standard; and (B) conducts 
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a similar recounting of the CRB’s 2016 Web IV decision, the most 
recent instance in which the CRB applied the willing buyer/willing 
seller standard in a rate-setting proceeding in a different rights con-
text—the digital performance of sound recordings. Part III then 
compares and contrasts elements from each of the two dissected rate 
determinations to forecast how the willing buyer/willing seller 
standard will operate in the digital mechanical royalty context. Fi-
nally, Part IV argues that the practical differences between the old 
801(b) standard and the new willing buyer/willing seller standard, 
while broadly more friendly to songwriters than digital services, 
may be less significant and less certain than licensors hope—and li-
censees fear. 
 
I. THE MMA AND THE CRB 
A. Mechanical Royalties 
1. 1909-2018 
Under the Copyright Act, songwriters—or music publishers act-
ing on their behalf—are due mechanical royalties any time their 
composition is reproduced in some manner: either via physical sale, 
digital download, or interactive (i.e. on-demand) digital stream.18 
The copyright owner’s exclusive reproduction right dates back to 
the Copyright Act of 1909, when it was enacted in response to the 
music publishing industry’s successful lobbying efforts to secure a 
royalty for the mechanical reproduction of self-playing piano rolls.19 
From the beginning, the reproduction right was subject to a compul-
sory license, granted in exchange for a mechanical royalty payable 
 
18 To avoid confusion: mechanical royalties do not occur when a track is streamed via a 
noninteractive streaming service such as Pandora’s primary internet radio service (as 
distinguished by the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. 
No. 104–39 (1995)). 17 U.S.C § 114(j)(7) (defining an interactive service as “one that 
enables a member of the public to receive a transmission of a program…on request”); see 
also Henry Schoonmaker, The Two Types of Streaming & How You Can Collect Royalties 
For Both, SONGTRUST (May 14, 2020), https://blog.songtrust.com/types-of-streaming-
royalties [https://perma.cc/ASY8-7QZB]; Kevin Zimmerman, Understanding Mechanical 
Royalties, BMI (Mar. 28, 2005), https://www.bmi.com/news/entry/Understanding_ 
Mechanical_Royalties [https://perma.cc/F9U6-DWAC]. 
19 See Zimmerman, supra note 18. 
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at the rate set either directly by statute or as determined by a statu-
tory rate-setting body.20 The inaugural statutory rate of $0.02/copy 
remained in place from 1909 until 1978, by which time the piano 
roll had long since ceded center stage to a recorded music industry 
dominated by physical music sales.21 At the industry’s pre-piracy 
peak in the late 1990s, songwriters were due $0.07 per song per 
sale.22 That rate for downloads and physical sales has plateaued at 
$0.091 per song per download or physical sale since 2006.23 Rates 
for reproduction on digital streaming services are more complicated 
and have naturally taken on greater importance as streaming has be-
come the predominant music consumption format.24 
While mechanical royalties have historically comprised a signif-
icant portion of songwriters’ incomes, their role has diminished over 
the past two decades. Mechanicals achieved peak prominence in the 
1990s, at the height of the physical CD era. At that time, songwriters 
typically earned mechanical royalties in roughly equal proportion to 
performance royalties—fees earned from public performances of 
their works on radio, television, public venues, and businesses.25 
That ratio promptly plummeted in the post-Napster recorded music 
industry collapse.26 Today, even in the midst of the streaming re-
naissance, songwriters barely generate $1 in mechanical royalties 
for every $3 in performance income.27 
 
20 See Jacob Victor, Reconceptualizing Compulsory Copyright Licenses, 72 STAN. L. 
REV. 915, 940 (2020). 
21 See How Much Do Songwriters Make from Mechanical Royalties?, ROYALTY 





24 See Streaming Overtakes U.S. Digital Music Sales for First Time: Nielsen, REUTERS 
(Jan. 5, 2017, 11:23 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-music-streaming/streaming-
overtakes-u-s-digital-music-sales-for-first-time-nielsen-idUSKBN14P1YH 
[perma.cc/3XTR-XKWA]. For a detailed explanation of how streaming rates are 
determined, see infra Part II. 
25 See Peter Alhadeff & Caz McChrystal, Inflation and US Music Mechanicals, 1976–
2010, 13 GLOBAL BUS. & ECON. REV. 1, 2 (2011). 
26 Id. 
27 Tim Ingham, US Publishers Pulled in $3.7BN during 2019—Just Over Half What 
Record Labels Made, MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE (June 11, 2020), 
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2. 2019 and Beyond: Phonorecords III, Phonorecords III-2, 
and Phonorecords IV 
The steady decay of mechanical royalties may finally have hit 
an inflection point in the CRB’s Phonorecords III determination. In 
Phonorecords III, the most recent in a recurring series of adminis-
trative rate-setting procedures undertaken every five years (and the 
last to occur under the pre-MMA 801(b) rate standard), the CRB 
imposed a 44% mechanical royalty rate increase, to be phased in 
gradually over five years.28 As a result, between 2018 and 2019, the 
share of overall music publishing revenue attributable to mechanical 
royalties rose from 17.8% to 18.5%, as overall U.S. publishing rev-
enue grew from $3.34 billion to $3.72 billion.29 This marked the 
“first time since the bottoming out [of the publishing market]” that 
mechanical income grew faster than performance income.30 Indus-
try insiders credited this bump in the share of overall publishing in-
come attributable to mechanical royalties directly to the first stage 
of the gradual mechanical rate increase under Phonorecords III.31 
Not unrelatedly, the Phonorecords III 44% rate increase was 
seen as a “major victory” for songwriters—a substantial step for-
ward on their long road to recovery from the post-Napster mechan-
ical nadir.32 It also prompted several streaming providers to mount 
and win—on procedural grounds only—a controversial appeal and 
remand to the CRB to issue an adjusted rate determination.33 At the 
time this Comment is being finalized, the post-remand adjusted 
 
https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/us-publishers-pulled-in-3-7bn-during-2019-
just-over-half-what-record-labels-made/ [https://perma.cc/6KC4-E8Z2].  
28 See Determination of Royalty Rates and Terms for Making and Distributing 
Phonorecords (Phonorecords III), 84 Fed. Reg. 1918, 1919 (Feb. 5, 2019) (to be codified 
at 37 C.F.R. pt. 385) [hereinafter “Phonorecords III”]. 
29 Ingham, supra note 27. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 See Major Victory for Songwriters as US Streaming Royalty Rates Rise 44%, MUSIC 
BUS. WORLDWIDE (Jan. 27, 2018), https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/major-
victory-songwriters-us-mechanical-rates-will-rise-44-2018/ [https://perma.cc/JY7M-MX 
V7]. 
33    See Dani Deahl, Here’s Why Apple Is Saying Spotify Is Suing Songwriters, THE 
VERGE (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/15/18267288/apple-music-
spotify-suing-songwriters-eu-antitrust [https://perma.cc/5YXC-YE7F]. 
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Phonorecords III (hereinafter “Phonorecords III-2”) determination 
has yet to be issued.34 
Meanwhile, alongside all of this, even as the Phonorecords III 
appellate and remand process is still ongoing, under Section 115’s 
five-year CRB timeline, the next five-year mechanical rate determi-
nation is already looming. With preliminary proceedings officially 
underway as of early 2021,35 Phonorecords IV will be the first CRB 
mechanical rate-setting proceeding to apply the MMA’s new willing 
buyer/willing seller rate standard.36 It will also occur at a time 
when—due to the collision of the most impactful music legislation 
in decades (the MMA), the high-profile 44% Phonorecords III rate 
increase, and rightsholders’ lingering bad blood37 over the services’ 
 
34 This has left the industry in temporary limbo. While stakeholders had initially pushed 
the CRB to issue interim rates to apply until the appeal and remand are fully settled, it has 
yet to do so, leaving services arguing that they are now free to revert to 2012 rates—which 
has only further inflamed tensions between services and rightsholders. See Ed Christman, 
Music Publishers Ask CRB to Set Interim Rates, Saying Further Delay May Lead to 'Free-
for All', BILLBOARD (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/ 
9477565/music-publishers-royalty-board-set-interim-rates-crb-nmpa/ 
[https://perma.cc/87C3-5UGQ]; Stuart Dredge, Arguments over US Songwriter Streaming 
Royalties Kick Off Again, MUSIC ALLY (Nov. 4, 2020), https://musically.com/2020/11/04/ 
arguments-over-us-songwriter-streaming-royalties-kick-off-again/ [https://perma.cc/2JJW 
-A2JL] (quoting NMPA president David Israelite: “[T]hese multi-trillion dollar companies 
are doubling down on their assault against creators….”). In January 2021, in consultation 
with the Copyright Office, the newly operational, publisher- and writer-controlled 
Mechanical Licensing Collective officially endorsed this approach. See Announcement 
Concerning Interim Mechanical Royalty Rates Pending the Outcome of Copyright Royalty 
Board Remand Proceedings in Phonorecords III, MECHANICAL LICENSING COLLECTIVE 
(Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.themlc.com/press/announcement-concerning-interim-
mechanical-royalty-rates-pending-outcome-copyright-royalty (“The CRB is currently 
presiding over [the Phonorecords III] remand proceedings, which are scheduled to run at 
least into the second half of 2021.”). 
35 See Determination of Rates and Terms for Making and Distributing Phonorecords 
(Phonorecords IV), 86 Fed. Reg. 325 (Jan. 5, 2021). 
36 Stuart Dredge, NMPA Boss Promises Big Fight over ‘CRB IV’ Streaming Rates, 
MUSIC ALLY (June 16, 2020), https://musically.com/2020/06/16/nmpa-boss-promises-big-
fight-over-crb-iv-streaming-rates/ [https://perma.cc/AY9R-R388]. 
37 See, e.g., David Israelite, Santa’s Guide to Tech Companies: Who’s Been Naughty 
and Who’s Been Nice to Songwriters This Year, MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE (Dec. 14, 2020), 
https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/santas-guide-to-tech-companies-whos-been-
naughty-and-whos-been-nice-to-songwriters-this-year/ [https://perma.cc/7KEE-8X5C] 
(listing Spotify and Apple music at the top of the “naughty”-to-songwriters list for their 
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appeal—mechanical royalty rates have never been more at the fore-
front of the industry’s consciousness.38 In a Rolling Stone interview, 
NMPA president David Israelite referred to Phonorecords IV (or 
“CRB IV,” as publishers are calling it) as “the most important CRB 
trial we’ve ever had.”39 Rolling Stone’s takeaway was somewhat 
more colorful: “all-out war.”40 
B. A New Rate Standard 
Even as copyright owners and digital services were battling over 
Phonorecords III, they were simultaneously cooperating to push the 
cross-industry “consensus” MMA through Congress.41 Signed into 
law in 2018, the primary focus of the MMA was the mechanism 
through which digital services remit and allocate royalties to song-
writers and publishers—rather than the royalty rates themselves.42 
However, buried among the structural reform was one change that 
stands to substantively affect underlying mechanical royalty rates 
beginning with Phonorecords IV: a new “willing buyer/willing 
 
role in the Phonorecords III appeal); Lars Brandle, U.S. Songwriters Association Blasts 
‘Shameless,’ ‘Brazen’ Spotify and Amazon as Royalties Hike Hits Hurdle, INDUS. 
OBSERVER (Aug. 12, 2020), https://theindustryobserver.thebrag.com/nmpa-songwriters-
association-blasts-shameless-brazen-spotify-royalties/ [https://perma.cc/S4G9-J9SS]; 
David Israelite, NMPA CEO David Israelite to Songwriters: Court Case With Spotify, 
Amazon Has ‘Seismic Implications’ (Guest Column), BILLBOARD (Mar. 9, 2020), 
https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/9330522/nmpa-david-israelite-guest-oped-
spotify-amazon-court-royalties/ [https://perma.cc/EG7Y-EXMJ] [hereinafter “Seismic 
Implications”]; Musicians Have Some Choice Words for Spotify CEO Daniel Ek, Who Says 
They Should Work Harder, MKT. WATCH (Aug. 2, 2020, 8:39 PM) 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/musicians-have-some-choice-words-for-spotify-ceo-
danial-ek-who-says-they-should-work-harder-2020-08-02 [https://perma.cc/2G57EDTQ]. 
38 See Tim Ingham, Songwriters Are Already Fighting for Better Pay. But in 2021, They 
Face an Even Bigger Battle, ROLLING STONE (June 15, 2020), https://www.rolling 
stone.com/pro/features/songwriters-spotify-amazon-crb-royalties-war-1015116/ 
[https://perma.cc/39DK-TFZC]. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. 
41 See Craig Havighurst, The Music Modernization Act Is Law, Marking A Bipartisan, 
Industry-Wide Consensus, WMOT (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.wmot.org/post/music-
modernization-act-law-marking-bipartisan-industry-wide-consensus#stream/0 
[https://perma.cc/DA5Z-ANR5]. 
42 See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text. 
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seller” rate standard for mechanical royalties payable starting in 
2023.43 
Under the old, pre-MMA 801(b) standard, the Board was di-
rected to set “reasonable terms and rates” for mechanical reproduc-
tion to achieve the following objectives: 
(A) To maximize the availability of creative works 
to the public. 
 
(B) To afford the copyright owner a fair return for his 
or her creative work and the copyright user a fair in-
come under existing economic conditions. 
 
(C) To reflect the relative roles of the copyright 
owner and the copyright user in the product made 
available to the public with respect to relative crea-
tive contribution, technological contribution, capital 
investment, cost, risk, and contribution to the open-
ing of new markets for creative expression and media 
for their communication. 
 
(D) To minimize any disruptive impact on the struc-
ture of the industries involved and on generally pre-
vailing industry practices.44 
In addition to this guidance, the Board was permitted to “con-
sider rates and terms under voluntary license agreements.”45 The or-
igins of this standard remain somewhat hazy, but the factors “appear 
to have been planted in Senate hearings in 1967 [during which] 
 
43 While the Phonorecords III saga continues well after the passage of the MMA, the 
Board must determine rates in accordance with the prevailing statutory rate standard at the 
time of the proceeding. Thus, even on appeal and remand, the Phonorecords III 
proceedings remain governed by section 801(b). Johnson v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 969 
F.3d 363, 369 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Meanwhile, at the time this Comment is being finalized, 
preliminary proceedings for Phonorecords IV are already underway. See Determination of 
Rates and Terms for Making and Distributing Phonorecords (Phonorecords IV), 86 Fed. 
Reg. 325 (Jan. 5, 2021). 
44 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (prior to 2018 amendment).  
45 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(3)(D) (prior to 2018 amendment). 
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Congress entertained the notion that music publishers should be reg-
ulated like public utilities.”46 
Under the MMA’s new willing buyer/willing seller standard, the 
Board is now directed to set “reasonable rates and terms…that most 
clearly represent the rates and terms that would have been negotiated 
in the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing seller.”47 
The Board must base its decision upon “economic, competitive, and 
programming information presented by the parties, including… 
(i) whether use of the compulsory licensee’s service 
may substitute for or may promote the sales of 
phonorecords or otherwise may interfere with or may 
enhance the musical work copyright owner’s other 
streams of revenue from its musical works; and 
(ii) the relative roles of the copyright owner and the 
compulsory licensee in the copyrighted work and the 
service made available to the public with respect to 
the relative creative contribution, technological con-
tribution, capital investment, cost, and risk.48 
Although the first CRB mechanical royalty rate-setting proceed-
ing applying this rate standard, Phonorecords IV, is set to begin in 
2021, a nearly identical willing buyer/willing seller standard has 
long governed Section 114 compulsory licenses for the digital pub-
lic performance rights of sound recordings on noninteractive 
streaming services, such as Pandora and iHeart.49 The most recent 
Section 114 CRB proceeding, Web IV, occurred in 2016.50 As of the 
time of this writing, Web V is currently underway.51 
 
46 Victor, supra note 20, at 944 (hunting for the factors’ “difficult to determine” origins 
amid a “sparse” congressional record). The section 801(b) factors date back to the 
Copyright Act of 1976, when Congress created the CRB’s predecessor, the Copyright 
Royalty Tribunal, and for the first-time delegated rate-setting to this administrative entity 
tasked with achieving these “policy-driven” objectives. Id. 
47 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(1)(F). 
48 Id. 
49 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(1)(B). 
50     See infra Section II.B. 
51 Case Details for Web V, COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BD., https://app.crb.gov/case/detail/19-
CRB-0005-WR%20%282021-2025%29 [https://perma.cc/BT9H-CR35]. 
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C. Stakeholders’ Expectations 
The legislative runway leading to the MMA primarily focused 
on structural reform: a new blanket digital mechanical license, and 
a much-ballyhooed organization created to administer that license.52 
Relatively little attention—at least on the legislative record—was 
allotted to the updated rate standard.53 
The discussion that does survive conforms to the ethos driving 
most of Title I of the MMA (the “MWMA”): the notion that song-
writers had long been undercompensated.54 This notion permeated 
the MWMA’s administrative and licensing changes, and so too did 
it inform the adoption of  the willing buyer/willing seller standard. 
Citing the “broad[ly]”55-held view that the 801(b) standard de-
pressed royalty rates, the Copyright Office had long called for the 
adoption of a standard “designed to achieve rates that would be ne-
gotiated in an unconstrained market.”56 This would also, the Copy-
right Office argued, carry the benefit of unifying what were, at the 
 
52 See generally S. REP. NO. 115-339 (2018); H.R. REP. NO. 115-651 (2018); see also 
Dani Deahl, The Music Modernization Act Has Been Signed into Law, THE VERGE (Oct. 
11, 2018, 12:08 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/10/11/17963804/music-moderni 
zation-act-mma-copyright-law-bill-labels-congres [https://perma.cc/8BG6-GSD8]; Jordan 
Bromley, The Music Modernization Act: What Is It & Why Does It Matter? (Guest 
Column), BILLBOARD (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/ 
8216857/music-modernization-act-what-is-it-why-does-it-matter-jordan-bromley [https:// 
perma.cc/N3U6-EMZW]. 
53 The legislative record for the Act is, to be sure, not particularly expansive. See Lydia 
Pallas Loren, Copyright Jumps the Shark: The Music Modernization Act, 99 B.U. L. REV. 
2519, 2550 (2019) (“The inside baseball that drove this massive amendment to the 
Copyright Act did not even leave time for a formal conference committee report detailing 
the reconciliation that occurred between the House- and Senate-passed bills.”). 
54 See S. REP. NO. 115-339, at 1 (citing “inequitable compensation variances for music 
creators”); Protecting and Promoting Music Creation for the 21st Century: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2018) (written testimony of David M. 
Israelite, President and CEO, National Music Publishers’ Association) [hereinafter 
“Israelite Testimony”] (testifying that songwriters’ “livelihood is threatened by a failure of 
the law to keep pace with technology”). 
55 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE 105 (Feb. 
2015), available at https://www.copyright.gov/policy/musiclicensingstudy/copyright-and-
the-music-marketplace.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NMR-A26S] 
(citing copyright owners’ frustration that the pre-MMA Section 115 “acts as a ceiling that 
does not allow them to seek higher royalties through voluntary negotiations,” while 
acknowledging that licensees disagree that the 801(b) standard depressed rates). 
56 See id. at 3. 
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time, several disparate rate standards governing different CRB rate-
setting proceedings.57 The legislative record expressly echoed this 
push for uniformity.58 
Songwriters and publishers also pushed for the change—again, 
as a part of a broader push for higher songwriter compensation. In 
reality, they would have preferred59 legislation abolishing the com-
pulsory mechanical license60 entirely, allowing them to issue me-
chanical licenses on the open market.61 Given political realities, 
however, they were willing to settle for a rate standard that would at 
least endeavor to model an open market.62 In 2018, they got their 
wish: a new rate standard that they believe will yield higher royalty 
rates when tested for the first time in 2021–22. Of course, one 
 
57 See id. (the Copyright Office’s official recommendation that Congress “[a]dopt a 
uniform market-based rate-setting standard for all government rates”); id. at 81–82 
(characterizing the pre-MMA rate standard disparities as “problematic”). Congress was 
presented with the Copyright Office’s viewpoint in committee hearings. See Israelite 
Testimony, supra note 54. 
58 See H.R. REP. NO. 115-1551, at 22 (2018), https://republicans-
judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Music-Modernization-Act.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9L9E-JZNG] (touting the MMA’s creation of a “uniform willing buyer, 
willing seller rate standard” across the various statutory licenses for music) (emphasis 
added); S. REP. NO. 115-339, at 4 (explaining that the MMA “change[s] the current rate-
setting standard [for Section 115 licenses] from that currently found at 801(b) to the 
‘willing buyer/willing seller’ standard now applicable to setting rates for the public 
performance of sound recordings by noninteractive webcasters under…Section 114”); 
H.R. REP. NO. 115-651, at 4 (2018) (same exact language); see also Loren, supra note 53, 
at 2541 (“One of the ways in which the MMA furthered equal treatment was by establishing 
that the Copyright Royalty Judges are to use the same set of criteria for setting compulsory 
royalties for musical works (mechanical copies under § 115) as for the statutory license for 
sound recordings (digital public performances under § 114”). 
59 Per NMPA EVP and General Counsel Danielle Aguirre: “Not everybody agrees with 
the way that…rates are set under Section 115, or the fact that it’s a statutory, compulsory 
license…. Ideally, we would have loved to have a law that got rid of the statutory license 
and allowed everything in a free market. But we wouldn’t all be sitting here today having 
passed a piece of consensus legislation, and we understood that.” MLC, Join Us in 
Supporting The MLC, VIMEO (Oct. 26, 2020), https://vimeo.com/472309284 
[https://perma.cc/8783-T9TA] (public industry panel discussing the MMA). 
60 See supra Section I.A. 
61 See Israelite Testimony, supra note 54, at n. 2 (“I must note here the irony of 
addressing questions regarding whether proper due process protections have been included 
in a 100-year-old statute that establishes a compulsory license and deprives songwriters 
and music publishers of substantive due process protections and control over the licensing 
and administration of their own intellectual property.”). 
62 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 56, at 12. 
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question lingers: will the new rate standard actually increase me-
chanical royalty rates? 
Unsurprisingly, most proponents of the new standard believe 
that it will have this effect.63 Indeed, the rightsholder community has 
already signaled that it now feels empowered to enter the 
Phonorecords IV arena with guns ablaze—to seek “impossibly 
high” rates under the new standard.64 Furthermore, there is evidence 
that many adversely affected stakeholders,65 scholars,66 and legisla-
tors, have long believed the change in rate standards would yield 
higher rates. But few have quite gotten around to explaining exactly 
how that will happen. Most discussion tends to be somewhat con-
clusory: the old standard depressed rates below what would occur in 
a free market,67 while the new standard strives for a free market rate, 
 
63 See id. at 82–83; Israelite Testimony, supra note 54. 
64 Ingham, supra note 38. 
65 See Music Licensing Under Title 17: Hearing Before the H. Sub. Comm. on Courts, 
Intell. Prop., and the Internet of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2014) 
(testimony of Lee Knife, Executive Director, Digital Media Association [DiMa]) (“The 
willing buyer-willing seller standard has led to higher rates than the § 801(b) standard has 
led to.”); Protecting and Promoting Music Creation for the 21st Century: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/ 
meetings/protecting-and-promoting-music-creation-for-the-21st-century [https://perma.cc 
/ST8G-BBV8] (written testimony of David J. Del Beccaro, President and CEO of Music 
Choice) (“[C]hanging the Section 115 rate standard to ‘willing buyer / willing seller’ will 
cause more unreasonable rate increases.”); Spotify Technology S.A., Annual Report (Form 
20-F) (Dec. 31, 2019), available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1639920/ 
000156459020004357/ck0001639920-20f_20191231.htm [https://perma.cc/LVP2-H2PB] 
(“The recently enacted MMA makes a number of significant changes to the legal regime 
governing music licensing in the United States. This legislation could, when fully 
implemented, increase the cost and/or difficulty of obtaining necessary music licenses.”). 
There is also plenty of dissent and (at least publicly expressed) uncertainty among 
adversely affected stakeholders, both as to whether the legislature made the right decision, 
and whether it will actually yield a rate increase. See Protecting and Promoting Music 
Creation for the 21st Century: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 
(2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/protecting-and-promoting-music-creat 
ion-for-the-21st-century [https://perma.cc/XEU9-X3DR]  (statement of Christopher 
Harrison, Chief Executive Officer, DiMa) (“While it remains to be seen whether adoption 
of the WS-WB standard will result in higher royalty rates, digital music providers agreed 
to this change in the rate-setting standard as part of the overall reform of Section 115.”); 
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 56, at 80–81, 107. 
66 See Loren, supra note 53, at 2531. 
67 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 55, at 105. 
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and therefore the new rates will be higher than the old rates.68 At 
best, there is a sense that by removing the discretion to supplant 
market forces with public interest concerns such as public availabil-
ity, arguably better served by lower rates, the new standard cannot 
help but increase rates.69 The remaining sections of this Comment 
attempt to be more specific—going straight to the source to examine 
how the rate standards operate in practice, and thus what practical 
effects may be prompted by applying willing buyer/willing seller in 
the Section 115 context. 
 
 
68 See, e.g., Joint Statement from NMPA President & CEO David Israelite, ASCAP CEO 
Elizabeth Matthews, BMI President & CEO Mike O’Neill, NSAI President Steve Bogard 
and SONA Executive Directors Michelle Lewis and Kay Hanley, ASCAP (Dec. 21, 2017), 
https://www.ascap.com/news-events/articles/2017/12/joint-statement-from-nmpa-ascap-
bmi-nsai-sona [https://perma.cc/SVU4-9NM5] (joint statement from songwriter and 
publisher organizations claiming that the willing buyer/willing seller rate “improves how 
mechanical royalty rates are calculated”); Amy Goldsmith, Musically Inclined: The Music 
Modernization Act of 2018, IP WATCHDOG (Nov. 9, 2018), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/11/09/music-modernization-act-2018/id=102954/ 
[https://perma.cc/62UW-4FXM] (“In a stark change from prior practice, royalty rates will 
be negotiated using the fair market value concept of the ‘willing buyer, willing seller;’ the 
goal is to increase compensation to the music creators….”); Steve Englund, Alison Stein 
& Ava McAlpin, Sweeping Music Modernization Act Transforms Music Licensing for the 
Digital Age, MEDIA L. RESOURCE CTR., at 14 (Oct. 2018), available at 
https://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/18448/original/Englund%20Stein%20McA
plin%20MLRC%20Oct%202018.pdf?1541780643 [https://perma.cc/8GTQ-LHAH] 
(noting that the new rate standard replaces an “older standard that had been interpreted to 
allow below-market rates”); Jem Aswad, Lawmakers Introduce Music Modernization Act, 
Which Simplifies Digital Licensing and Increases Rates, VARIETY (Dec. 21, 2017), 
https://variety.com/2017/biz/news/lawmakers-introduce-music-modernization-act-which-
simplifies-digital-licensing-and-increases-rates-1202647412/ [https://perma.cc/7352-
N424] (listing the new rate standard as among a few other factors aimed at “increase[ing] 
digital rates”); Kathryn O’Leary, Understanding the Music Modernization Act: 5 Things 
You Should Know, ONES TO WATCH (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.onestowatch.com/ 
blog/understanding-the-music-modernization-act-5,  [https://perma.cc/9RNH-Q2E3] 
(“This [801(b)] standard has ensured that rates do not reflect market value, but the MMA 
would…get better rates for songs.”); Kaitlin Chandler, The Times They Are A Changin’: 
The Music Modernization Act and the Future of Music Copyright Law, 21 TUL. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 53, 65 (2019) (“[T]he willing buyer/willing seller standard provides a higher 
royalty rate for owners….”). 
69 See supra notes 44, 63–68 and accompanying text. 
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II. OUT WITH THE OLD/IN WITH THE NEW 
Part II of this Comment conducts two parallel rate structure case 
studies. Part A dissects the Phonorecords III CRB rate determina-
tion under Section 115 of the Copyright Act70—the most recent me-
chanical royalty determination for interactive streaming and the last 
to apply the old 801(b) standard.71 Part B then similarly examines 
the Web IV rate determination for the public performance of sound 
recordings through noninteractive streaming under Section 114 of 
the Copyright Act72—the most recent CRB proceeding to apply the 
willing buyer/willing seller standard which, although only recently 
inserted into Section 115 by the MMA, has long governed Section 
114.73 
Together, these two rate determinations comprise the closest 
thing to relevant precedent for Phonorecords IV. The first, 
Phonorecords III, applied a different rate standard (the old 801(b) 
standard) to the same market and rights type as Phonorecords IV 
(mechanical royalties for the interactive streaming of musical com-
positions). The second, Web IV, applied the same rate standard as 
Phonorecords IV (willing buyer/willing seller) to a different market 
and rights type (public performance royalties for the noninteractive 
streaming of sound recordings). 
A. A Section 801(b) Case Study (Phonorecords III) 
Section 115 rate-setting proceedings determine the statutory 
rates governing the reproduction of musical works.74 Prior to the 
MMA, these Phonorecords proceedings were subject to the old 
801(b) rate standard. However, because the rates determined in 
Phonorecords I and Phonorecords II were both primarily the prod-
uct of settlements between copyright owners and—as the rates per-
tained to digital streaming—streaming services, Phonorecords III 
represented the first fully litigated rate-setting proceeding governing 
 
70 17 U.S.C. § 115. 
71 See Johnson v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 969 F.3d 363, 369 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
72 17 U.S.C. § 114. 
73 See, e.g., Determination of Royalty Rates and Terms for Ephemeral Recording and 
Webcasting Digital Performance of Sound Recordings (Web IV), 81 Fed. Reg. 26316 (May 
2, 2016) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380) [hereinafter “Web IV”]. 
74 See Johnson, 969 F.3d at 367–68. 
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interactive digital streaming.75 Accordingly, it is the only directly 
relevant data point for those interested in observing how the Board 
approaches mechanical rate-setting in the digital streaming context. 
For context: to operate lawfully under the Copyright Act, inter-
active streaming services must obtain licenses for four separate 
rights: the (1) reproduction and (2) public performance of the sound 
recordings distributed through their platforms, as well as the (3) re-
production and (4) public performance of the underlying musical 
works (“compositions”) embodied in those sound recordings.76 Sec-
tion 115 rate-setting proceedings like Phonorecords III deal only 
with the reproduction (i.e. mechanical) license for underlying musi-
cal compositions.77 
Importantly, while the Services have subsequently succeeded in 
petitioning the D.C. Circuit to vacate and remand the Phonorecords 
III determination, and as of this writing the Board has yet to publish 
its revised Phonorecords III-2 rates, the initial Phonorecords III 
opinion still stands as an important insight into the Board’s pro-
cesses, logic, and interpretations of its governing rate standards. The 
D.C. Circuit grounded its decision to vacate firmly in procedural de-
fects.78 Further, it expressly disclaimed that because it was reaching 
its decision on procedural grounds, it “need not at this juncture ad-
dress whether the Board adequately considered [the § 801(b) stand-
ard].”79 Thus, even post-appeal, the initial Phonorecords III opinion 
continues to provide a window into the Board’s fundamental 
 
75 See generally Phonorecords III, supra note 27. 
76 See Michelle Castillo, Spotify IPO Filing Reveals How Insanely Complicated It Is to 
License Music Rights, CNBC (Feb. 28, 2018, 5:44 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2018/02/28/how-spotify-licenses-and-pays-for-music-rights.html [https://perma.cc/ZV2 
L-DA7Z]. 
77 They also indirectly touch on composition public performance rates by virtue of the 
prevailing all-in structure the Phonorecords III Board opted to renew. See infra notes 96–
99 and accompanying text. 
78 Johnson, 969 F.3d at 375–76 (vacating in relevant part because the Board “failed to 
provide adequate notice” for its decision to adopt an uncapped TCC prong and “failed to 
reasonably explain” why it rejected the Phonorecords II settlement as a benchmark). In an 
unrelated, minor substantive quibble, the court also noted that the Board had “failed to 
identify under what authority it substantively redefined” a statutory term relevant to 
royalties for bundled services. Id. 
79 Id. at 389. 
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conceptions of its own authority, discretion, preferences, and inter-
pretation of its statutory mandates. 
Of particular import: because the D.C. Circuit explicitly de-
clined to opine on this portion of the initial determination, 
Phonorecords III continues to represent the clearest indication of the 
ways in which the Board does, and does not, believe itself con-
strained by its governing Section 115 rate standard. 
1. The Previous Mechanical Royalty Rate Scheme 
Prior to Phonorecords III, the industry operated under the 2012 
“flexible,” and incredibly convoluted, rate structure. This rate 
scheme combined various all-in, “greater-of” a percentage total ser-
vice revenue (i.e. the amount of earnings a service generates 
through, among other things, subscriptions and advertising reve-
nue), and Total Content Cost (“TCC,” i.e. the amount that each ser-
vice spends on sound recording and composition rights, total, for 
interactive streaming)80 prongs, broken out by a litany of different 
service types, and subject to per-subscriber rate minimums.81 It was, 
in a word, complicated. 
The scheme for “subscription services accessible through porta-
ble devices such as mobile phones” (e.g. Spotify) looked like this:82 
 
80 See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1923 n. 38. 
81 Id. at 1975 (Strickler, J., dissenting). Overall, streaming services were obligated to 
pay a “maximum of 10.5% of service revenue,” and a minimum royalty rate that varied by 
service type (e.g., categories such as: the “lesser of 22% of service payments for sound 
recording rights and $0.50 per subscriber per month” for “standalone non-portable 
subscription, streaming only” services). Id. The basic categories of services included: 
“‘standalone non-portable subscription—streaming only’ services (i.e., tethered to a 
computer); (b) ‘standalone non-portable subscription—mixed’ (i.e., both streaming and 
limited download) services; (c) ‘standalone portable’ subscription streaming and limited 
download services (i.e., accessible on mobile or other Internet-enabled devices); (d) 
‘bundled subscription services’ which are streaming and limited download services 
bundled with another product or service; and (e) ‘free [to the end user] non-subscription/ 
ad-supported services.’” Id. After deducting the performance portion from this “all-in” rate, 
the resulting putative rate would then be subject to a mechanical-only per-subscriber floor 
that also varied by service type (e.g., “$0.50 per subscriber per month” for “standalone 
portable subscription, mixed use” services). Id. 
82 Standalone Portable Subscriptions, Mixed Use, HARRY FOX AGENCY, 
https://www.harryfox.com/#/rate-charts [https://perma.cc/DXM7-PEKF].  
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Effectively, services were obligated to pay a headline rate of 
10.5% of service revenue to songwriters, subject to a parade of ca-
veats and complications. This rate was an “all-in” rate, meaning it 
covered both the mechanical right and performance right implicated 
by every interactive stream; services could deduct performance roy-
alties paid out to the PROs (which are negotiated and licensed sep-
arately, and beholden to an entirely distinct judicial process in the 
SDNY) from the mechanical royalties they account directly to cop-
yright owners under this rate calculation.83 
When the Phonorecords III scheme is referred to as a “44%” 
increase over these rates, that figure is referring to the new headline 
rate of 15.1% of service revenue that streaming services will now 
have to pay, which is a 43.81% bump from the old 10.5% headline 
rate.84 Under Phonorecords III, the increase will take place 
 
83 See id. 
84 Tim Ingham, Spotify vs. Songwriters: Publishers Remain Confident that Streaming 
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incrementally, rising “by around 1% annually” until it reaches 
15.1% in 2023.85 
2. Procedural History and Overall Structure 
In 2017, after copyright owners and licensees such as record la-
bels had reached a settlement pertaining to rates for physical repro-
duction, digital downloads, and ringtones, the Board presided over 
litigation surrounding the one major context in which stakeholders 
had not managed to settle: interactive streaming.86 The Board’s 
eventual Phonorecords III opinion was split 2-1, with Chief Judge 
Barnett and Judge Feder in the majority, and Judge Strickler offering 
a lengthy dissent and alternative rate structure.87 The dispute effec-
tively split the litigants into two basic groups of parties—the “Cop-
yright Owners” (songwriters, music publishers, and their trade or-
ganizations) and the “Services” (digital streaming services and their 
trade organizations).88 
The Phonorecords III majority opinion proceeded under the fol-
lowing general structure: first, it evaluated the various parties’ rate 
structure proposals, and the general foundational rate structures un-
derpinning each specific proposal, and undertook to choose one of 
these structures—or rather to harvest individual traits from several 
different proposals.89 Second, once it had selected a structure, the 
Board then considered marketplace rate benchmarks and expert 
 
85 Id. 
86 Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1920. 
87 See id. at 1963. Notably, post-appeal, former Chief Judge Barnett’s term has ended, 
former Judge Feder is now Chief Judge Feder, and the Librarian of Congress has appointed 
Judge Steve Ruwe to the Board. See About Us, U.S. COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BD., 
https://www.crb.gov [https://perma.cc/P9HM-LRCC]; Librarian of Congress Names New 
Copyright Royalty Judge, LIBR. OF CONG. (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.loc.gov/item/prn-
19-101/librarian-of-congress-names-new-copyright-royalty-judge/2019-10-18/ 
[https://perma.cc/5QBA-Y83D]. 
88 While CRB rate-setting proceedings, which are technically administrative 
proceedings, in some ways resemble traditional Article III litigation, this is one major point 
of divergence: the “parties” who argue before the CRB are interested stakeholders, not 
specific entities directly bound to act by the tribunals’ decision. The Board’s decision does 
not directly pertain to the parties. Rather, the Board simply promulgates the terms of a 
statutory scheme, and the parties then become subject to, and constrained by, that new 
statutory scheme along with everybody else. 
89 See infra Section II.A.3. 
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analysis using those benchmarks, before ultimately relying upon 
theoretical Shapley economic modeling to determine the numerical 
rates to plug into this structure.90 From three separate Shapley pro-
posals, it derived a “zone of reasonableness” for rates fitting within 
its chosen rate structure, and then chose rates from within that 
range.91 Finally, it verified that these rates were consistent with the 
801(b) factors.92 
3. Rate Structure 
Each of the participating parties in the rate-setting proceeding 
submitted proposed rates and rate structures. The Board distilled 
from each proposal specific features and structural configurations 
that were evaluated separately from the numerical rates each party 
advocated. 
The Board Rejects a Per-Play Rate. Two adversaries, the Copyright 
Owners93 and Apple, each incorporated a per-play prong into their 
rate proposals. Apple’s proposal was comprised entirely of a simple 
flat rate of $0.00091 per (nonfraudulent) stream, while the Copy-
right owners incorporated their $0.0015 per-play proposal into a 
 
90 See infra Section II.A.4.b. Empirical Shapley analysis uses game theory to attempt to 
attribute the relative marginal value contributed by each market participant. See Johnson 
v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 969 F.3d 363, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
91 See infra Section II.A.4. 
92 See infra Section II.A.5. 
93 Here, “Copyright Owners” excluded George Johnson, dba GEO Music Group, a self-
published songwriter and musician who appeared pro se. Phonorecords III, supra note 27, 
at 1924–25. The Board respectfully declined to incorporate his proposals. Id. The 
Copyright Owners incorporated their “per-play” rate in the context of a proposed “greater-
of” structure, wherein the Services would play the “greater of” (1) a “per-play” fee of 
$0.0015 per stream, or (2) a “per-end user fee” of $1.06 per streaming end user. Id. The 
per-user rate was met with additional criticism from the Services, who argued that a per-
user rate would activate for any services who users clocked, on average, fewer than 707 
streams per month (and that, historically, Spotify has averaged fewer than 707 streams per 
month per user)—effectively raising the per-play fee well above $0.0015 per stream. Id. at 
1931. While the Board did not articulate its reasoning specifically for rejecting a per-user 
component, beyond its general assertion that the revenue-based structure was the “most 
efficient” of all the proposals, it appeared to credit this argument from the Services. Id. at 
1931–34. 
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more intricate “greater-of” structure.94 The Board flatly rejected 
both parties’ bid for a per-play rate structure, citing downstream 
competitive (i.e. competition for streaming consumers) concerns: 
the Board maintained that a per-play rate would limit services’ flex-
ibility to cater to wide variance in end user willingness to pay 
(“WTP”) for digital streaming.95 
The Board Adopts an “All-In” Rate. While the Services may have 
split over the per-play issue, all five participating Services unani-
mously advocated continuing the 2012 settlement’s “All-In” fea-
ture.96 Under this structure, the Board is tasked with determining an 
“all-in” rate, inclusive of both the mechanical and performance li-
censes inherent to every interactive stream. Any time a user streams 
a song on a service like Spotify, that stream generates both a me-
chanical and performance royalty. Because only the mechanical por-
tion is subject to Section 115 compulsory licensing, while the per-
formance portion is negotiated with PROs such as ASCAP and BMI, 
the two components could theoretically exist entirely independently 
of each other. However, the 2012 settlement provided an “all-in” 
rate inclusive of both.97 Under this structure, after calculating their 
total “all-in” payable royalty pool, statutory services deduct perfor-
mance fees privately negotiated and paid out to the PROs, and then 
account the remainder directly to rightsholders as mechanical royal-
ties.98 The Board, in electing to renew this “all-in” approach, 
 
94 Id. at 1924 (“[E]ach month the licensee would pay the greater of (a) a per-play fee 
($0.0015) multiplied by the number of interactive streams or limited downloads during the 
month and (b) a per-end user fee ($1.06) multiplied by the number of end users during the 
month.”). 
95 Id. at 1925. The Board agreed with the (non-Apple) Services’ view that a fixed 
upstream per-play rate “would not align” with downstream demand for interactive 
streaming from consumers with wildly divergent willingness to pay (“WTP”) for those 
services. Id. It declined to indulge the Copyright Owner’s argument that a per-play rate 
would vindicate the “inherent value” of a musical work. Id. at 1934 n. 64, 1936, 1946 n. 
110; see also infra Section III.B.2. 
96 Phonorecords III, supra note 27, at 1928. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
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emphasized the “perfect complementarity” of mechanical and per-
formance rights.99 
The Board Imposes a Mechanical Floor. The Copyright Owners 
stressed the importance of preserving some kind of mechanical 
floor—“a rate below which the calculated mechanical license rate 
[can] not fall” regardless of what the headline rate calculation would 
yield.100 They argued that this feature, particularly under a percent-
age-of-revenue structure, protects against songwriter compensation 
becoming artificially depressed relative to songwriters’ actual value 
as a result of streaming service business models, long-term plan-
ning, and creative accounting.101 The Board agreed.102 It adopted a 
per-user mechanical floor in its rate structure,103 justifying it as a 
balancing of the Services’ interest in all-in predictability with the 
Copyright Owners’ “need for a failsafe to ensure that mechanical 
royalties will not vanish either through the actions of the Services” 
or external forces.104 
 
99 Id. at 1934. The Services argued that, because the mechanical and performance 
portions of a stream are “complementary rights—[t]hat is, each right is worthless without 
the other”—the Board must group them together “to prevent exorbitant costs.” Id. at 1928–
29, 1997 (internal quotations omitted). The Services underscored the “recent fragmentation 
and uncertainty in performance rights licensing.” Id. at 1928–29. They also noted the 
prevalence of this feature in direct licenses in the marketplace, as well as in the incumbent 
statutory regime. Id. at 1929. For their part, the Copyright Owners objected, to little avail, 
on jurisdictional and “practical” grounds—that the “upshot” of this structure is to erode 
mechanical royalties, which allows songwriters to access and recoup advances vital to their 
livelihoods. Id. 
100 Id. at 1930. 
101 Id. The Copyright Owners expressed particular concern that when royalties are 
calculated as a percentage of service revenue, they may be artificially driven down by 
services deliberately foregoing revenue in pursuit of other goals: for example, by lowering 
retail subscription prices in order to grow market share in the long-term, or by using 
streaming as a loss-leader to attract users for other services, or by offering streaming as a 
part of a bundle with other goods and then attributing revenue to the non-royalty-generating 
portions of the bundle. See infra Section III.B.5. 
102 Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1930 (discounting the Services’ concerns that this 
could lead to a “windfall” for licensors). 
103 This varies by service offering type. For example, for “standalone portable 
subscription offerings,” if the calculated effective royalties would otherwise fall below “50 
cents per subscriber per month” then the service must nonetheless pay total royalties equal 
to 50 cents/subscriber/month. Id. at 2036. 
104 Id. at 1935. 
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2012 Settlement as Benchmark: Flexible Rate Structure. The par-
ties disagreed on what (if any) role the 2012 (Phonorecords II) set-
tlement should play in the Phonorecords III proceedings. On one 
side, three Services—Amazon, Pandora, and Spotify—submitted 
proposals to renew the uber-complicated 2012 “flexible” rate struc-
ture with some minor adjustments.105 Fundamentally, each of their 
proposals contemplated an “all-in” rate of 10.5 percent of service 
revenue with no mechanical floor.106 On the other side, the Copy-
right Owners, along with one lone service (Apple), advocated jetti-
soning the 2012 structure entirely, in favor of a predominantly “per-
play” rate structure.107 
The parties in favor of continuing the pre-existing rate structure 
argued that the 2012 settlement supplied a helpful benchmark for 
future rates because, they argued, it had been reached in the context 
of the same rights, the same uses, and the same types of market par-
ticipants as still exist now, and that, as a relatively recent negotiated 
agreement, it was reflective of current market forces and consen-
sus.108 The Copyright Owners, naturally, disagreed.109 
Ultimately, the Board sided with the Services in concluding that 
it should adopt a “flexible, revenue-based rate structure” wherein 
streaming companies’ royalty obligations would remain directly tied 
to their overall revenue derived from subscription sales, advertising, 
etc.110 In other words, unlike the fixed rate mechanical royalty 
 
105 Id. at 1923. The 2012 structure distinguished rates based on a number of varied service 
offering types. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 1931–34. 
108 Id. at 1926. They also maintained that, contrary to the Copyright Owners’ contention, 
licensors “ha[d] actually benefitted” from a flexible rate structure that yielded an increase 
in mechanical and performance revenue offsetting the decrease in publisher revenue from 
traditional record sales. Id. at 1927; id. at 1986 (Strickler, J., dissenting). 
109 They argued that the 2012 settlement was not a free-market negotiation reflective of 
market forces, but merely an articulation of the parties’ predictions of litigation outcomes; 
that it had been an “experimental” agreement reached in interactive streaming’s infancy; 
and that in any event it was skewed by the “shadow” of the statutory license. Id. at 1931; 
see also infra Section III.D.3.a. As to the practical effects of the current system, they again 
invoked the business models and incentives that streaming services employ that decrease 
the amount of royalty-generating revenue available to trickle back to songwriters. 
Phonorecords III, supra note 27, at 1931; see supra note 101. 
110 Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1934. 
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generated by, say, an iTunes sale (9.1 cents per song downloaded), 
the royalty generated by a Spotify stream would continue to vary as 
a function of Spotify’s total revenue spread across the total of num-
ber streams in any given accounting period.111 The Board reasoned 
that such a structure would be “the most efficient means of facilitat-
ing beneficial price discrimination” in a downstream market where 
streaming services were competing over consumers with hugely var-
iant willingness to pay (“WTP”) for interactive streaming.112 
However, even as it acknowledged that some kind of “flexible” 
approach was called for, the Board declined to rely upon the 2012 
settlement as a foundational benchmark for the Phonorecords III 
rate structure.113 In doing so, the Board eschewed the complex, gran-
ular, service-type-specific flexibility of the 2012 structure.114 In-
stead, it seized upon a middle ground structural approach proposed 
by Google. 
The Board Adopts Google’s Proposed Structure. After considering 
a number of other structural pitches, the Board adopted Google’s 
proposed structure. Google’s (amended) proposal called for consol-
idating all the individual product types falling under the broad ban-
ner of revenue-generating interactive streaming, and for mechanical 
royalties for all revenue-generating interactive streaming product 
types to be subject to a single rate calculus.115 In other words, where 
the 2012 rates distinguished between streaming medium (e.g. desk-
top vs. mobile), and revenue mechanism (e.g. ad-supported or 
 
111    Id. at 2035. 
112 Id. at 1934. 
113 The Board’s failure to precisely explain this decision was another procedural point 
that the D.C. Circuit relied upon in its decision to vacate the initial Phonorecords III 
determination. Johnson v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 969 F.3d 363, 387 (D.C. Cir. 2020) 
(“Because we cannot discern the basis on which the Board rejected the Phonorecords II 
rates as a benchmark in its analysis, that issue is remanded to the Board for a reasoned 
analysis.”). The court held that, while the Board had critiqued certain Service arguments 
centering around the Phonorecords II structure, it did not explain the wholesale rejection 
of the benchmark. Id. (insisting that arguments included for the first time in the Board’s 
appellate brief defending its own actions, along with “post hoc” justifications offered by 
the Copyright Owners on appeal, “cannot make up for the Board’s failure to adequately 
explain itself in [Phonorecords III]”). 
114 Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1934; see supra Section II.A.1. 
115 Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1923. 
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subscription), among other variables, under Google’s proposal, any 
revenue-generating product116 would be subject to the same rates.117 
The Board enthusiastically adopted this basic structure.118 It 
noted that a number of voluntary marketplace agreements included 
a structure built around the “greater-of” (1) percentage of total ser-
vice revenue, and (2) TCC.119 The fact that these agreements oc-
curred “outside the context of litigation” afforded them additional 
credibility to the Board.120 Additionally, the Board was drawn to the 
(relative) simplicity of Google’s proposal compared to the sprawl-
ing maze of categories in the 2012 settlement.121 
 
116 This includes free-to-the-user, ad-supported streaming wherein the service generates 
revenue from third parties, but not, for example, temporary free trials. See id. at 2036 (“For 
Free Trial Offerings for which the Service receives no monetary consideration, the royalty 
rate is zero.”) (emphasis added). 
117 Id. In Google’s specific proposal, that rate would be the greater of a 10.5% of service 
revenue (subject to certain adjustments) and 15%—with no cap—of TCC. 
118 Id. at 1935. 
119 Id. Individual streaming services and rightsholders are always at liberty to enter into 
voluntary agreements instead of relying upon the statutory license, and in fact often do so. 
See Kristelia A. García, Penalty Default Licenses: A Case for Uncertainty, 89 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1117, 1149 (2014) (arguing that this kind of “private ordering” benefits market 
participants by permitting parties to “tailor[] terms to fit the contemplated content and use, 
thereby alleviating concerns presented by the one-size-fits-all nature of a statutory 
licensing regime”). Parties typically do this in order to allow for a grant of rights that is 
broader than the statutory grant (e.g., additional non-US territories, non-mechanical rights) 
or to provide the rightsholder with additional benefits (e.g., access to proprietary data). See, 
e.g., Anne Steele, Spotify Strikes New Licensing Deal With Universal Music Group, WALL 
ST. J. (July 22, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/spotify-strikes-new-licensing-deal-
with-universal-music-group-11595415603 [https://perma.cc/4VEA-4LKY]. However, the 
underlying rates available under these voluntary licenses are heavily influenced by the rates 
available under the statutory license. See Loren, supra note 11, at 549 (even as “almost no 
one uses the statutory compulsory license to obtain the necessary license to record a 
musical work” the terms and rates available under the statutory license “significantly affect 
the behavior in market transactions”). This statutory “shadow” becomes a major point of 
contention when these agreements, influenced by one set of statutory rates, are then offered 
as “benchmarks” during CRB proceedings determining the next set of statutory rates. See 
infra Section III.D.3.a. 
120 Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1936. The Board noted that agreements that occur 
in the context of the litigation (i.e. settlements) can be skewed by the parties’ desire to 
avoid the cost of litigation, rather than their pure assessment of the pure market value at 
play. Id. 
121 Id. at 1936. 
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Crucially, the Board left the TCC prong uncapped.122 In doing 
so, it allowed the effective all-in rate to increase, without limitation, 
any time the TCC prong exceeds the percentage-of-revenue prong. 
Because TCC is a direct product of fees payable to record labels for 
the right to stream sound recordings (for which there is no compul-
sory license or statutory rate to limit services’ risk), this meant that 
any time a service’s record label royalty obligations increase above 
a certain threshold, its royalty obligations to songwriters could sim-
ilarly increase—with no upper bound.123 
As discussed earlier, interactive streaming services are required 
to obtain licenses spanning public performance and reproduction 
rights from both sound recording owners and composition own-
ers.124 Unlike composition rights, the two sound recording rights—
which are typically bundled into a single license with individual rec-
ord labels, or with entities representing multiple record labels—are 
negotiated in an open market free from the kinds of regulatory forces 
that constrain songwriter compensation.125 
 
122 Id. at 1934. 
123 See Henry Schoonmaker, How Spotify Streams Turn into Royalties, SONGTRUST (July 
20, 2020), https://blog.songtrust.com/how-spotify-streams-turn-into-royalties 
[https://perma.cc/933N-TMZP].  
124 See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text. 
125 For interactive streaming services (unlike noninteractive streaming services, as 
distinguished by the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. 
104–39 (1995), these (1) reproduction and (2) public performance sound recording rights 
are not subject to any compulsory license or statutory rate-setting. 17 U.S.C § 114(j)(7) 
(defining an interactive service as “one that enables a member of the public to receive a 
transmission of a program…on request”). By contrast, interactive streaming services must 
obtain their (3) public performance and (4) reproduction (i.e. mechanical) licenses of the 
underlying compositions from two separate types of entities, neither of which operate in a 
purely free market. Mechanical Royalties vs. Performance Royalties: What’s the 
Difference?, ROYALTY EXCHANGE (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.royaltyexchange.com/ 
blog/mechanical-and-performance-royalties-whats-the-difference#sthash.aKUVcTlo.dpbs 
[https://perma.cc/5YCM-6W2T]. Services typically license public performance rights for 
compositions from PROs such as ASCAP and BMI. Id. These rights are not subject to any 
compulsory license, although they are more constrained than sound recording rights by 
virtue of rate court jurisdiction, as well as ASCAP and BMI’s individual consent decrees 
with the Department of Justice. See Nate Hertweck, What Songwriters Need to Know About 
the DOJ's Review Of Consent Decrees, RECORDING ACAD. (Aug. 15, 2019), 
https://www.grammy.com/advocacy/news/what-songwriters-need-know-about-dojs-
review-consent-decrees [https://perma.cc/Y67A-C7Q5]. Of the four rights interactive 
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The Board’s justification for tying statutory composition rates to 
these free-market sound recording rates was simple: “The ratio of 
sound recording royalties to musical works royalties should be 
lower than it is….”126 An uncapped TCC prong, it explained, al-
lowed the Board to “influence that ratio directly” by tethering (and 
presumably increasing) songwriter rates to sound recording royalty 
rates.127 This decision was among the most controversial aspects of 
Phonorecords III and figured prominently in the D.C. Circuit’s de-
cision to vacate.128 The D.C. Circuit ultimately overturned this point 
 
streaming services must license, only the reproduction license for the composition is 
subject to a compulsory license: the Section 115 compulsory license and statutory 
mechanical rate-setting scheme that is the focus of this Comment. See Loren, supra note 
53, at 2526. 
126 Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1934. 
127 Id. The Board added that this feature also permitted publishers and songwriters to 
benefit from the protections against revenue deferral that record companies have been able 
to negotiate for sound recording rights. While the Services would take umbrage with this 
decision, later in the actual rate-setting portion of the decision, the Board reduced the actual 
TCC percentage value beyond where models suggested it should otherwise be, to protect 
the Services from suffering the effects of the record companies’ oligopoly on both the 
recording and composition side of the equation. Id. at 1953. 
128 The D.C. Circuit struck down the uncapped TCC prong on procedural grounds. 
Johnson v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 969 F.3d 363, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“[B]ecause the 
Copyright Royalty Board failed to provide fair notice of the [uncapped TCC] rate structure 
it adopted, that aspect of its decision must be vacated and remanded for further 
proceedings.”). Importantly, because Google first proffered the uncapped TCC prong in a 
“post-hearing proposal” (and because no other party proposed an uncapped TCC prong), 
the notion of an uncapped TCC prong was not an issue directly litigated during the trial 
stage of Phonorecords III. See id. The Board’s decision to embrace a structure that was 
proposed post-hearing figured prominently in Judge Strickler’s dissent and into the 
Services’ arguments on appeal. See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1963–64 (Strickler, 
J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority erred by plucking two rates from the record, combining 
them post-hearing, and then wrongly declaring that this ‘mash-up’ was actually based on 
the record.”); Public Initial Brief for Appellants/Intervenors Pandora Media, LLC, Google 
LLC, Spotify USA Inc. and Amazon Digital Services LLC at 24, Johnson v. Copyright 
Royalty Bd., 969 F.3d 363 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (No. 19–1028) [hereinafter “Service Brief”] 
(“[T]he uncapped TCC structure was not proposed before or during the hearing, and the 
parties had no opportunity to present evidence demonstrating the flaws in that approach.”). 
Judge Strickler also raised substantive issues with the uncapped TCC prong. First, his 
dissent (and the Services, on appeal) argued that the uncapped TCC prong recklessly 
imports the record companies’ oligopoly market power—which inflates rates on the sound 
recording side—into the rates for musical works, thus surrounding the Services with market 
power. See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1964 (Strickler, J., dissenting) (“[H]ow can 
it be reasonable to ask the Judges to set a rate that does not itself provide for a fair 
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on procedural grounds—because the Board had not given the Ser-
vices sufficient opportunity to litigate the uncapped TCC prong, it 
could not include it in its final determination.129 
4. Royalty Rates 
After devoting significant time to piecing together a rate struc-
ture, the Board then turned its attention to the numerical rates them-
selves. First, the Board evaluated the benchmarks proposed by each 
party and the expert analysis built upon those benchmarks. While it 
ultimately determined each benchmark to be inadequate, it found 
“certain aspects of each” to be instructive.130 Second, it used several 
Shapley economic analyses to establish a “zone of reasonableness” 
from which it plucked its final rates. As a final step, it tested these 
final rates against the 801(b) factors. 
 
return…but simply puts the Copyright Owners’ fair return in the hands of the labels to 
negotiate terms that will adequately protect the publishers and songwriters as well?”); 
Service Brief at 24 (“Setting an uncapped rate tethered to a non-competitive market and 
relying solely on those market forces to evaluate rates is plainly inconsistent with 
Congress’s purpose of lessening the impact of anticompetitive forces.”) (internal quotation 
marks removed). Relatedly, the dissent also characterized as “heroic” and “complacent” 
the assumption that record companies, knowing that musical work royalty rates are now 
subject to uncapped TCC prong, “will recognize that they have no choice but to decrease 
their royalty rates” in order to allow the streaming services “to retain enough revenue to 
survive.” Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1964 (Strickler, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is 
no factual evidence in the record to sustain the Majority’s hypothesis that record labels 
would voluntarily lower their rates.”). Second, per the dissent, the majority failed to 
consider the potential harms to the Copyright Owners under any TCC prong, such as (1) 
the record companies acquiring streaming services and offering them “sweetheart” deals, 
depressing songwriter royalties based on those deals, and (2) for that matter, relying on the 
product of self-interested record company negotiations for protection in the first place. Id. 
(criticizing as naïve the majority’s downplaying the risks associated with an uncapped TCC 
through “trust in the rational self-interest of the market participants”). Id. at 1967. Finally, 
the dissent argued that the majority’s decision to, in effect, “delegate” songwriter royalty 
rates to record companies through an uncapped TCC prong violated the “private 
nondelegation doctrine” proscribing “the delegation of statutory duties to private entities.” 
Id. at 1967. Judge Strickler ultimately advocated continuing the 2012 structure and rates. 
Id. at 1968. Crucially, the D.C. Circuit declined to opine on any of these substantive 
critiques of the uncapped TCC prong. Johnson, 969 F.3d at 383 (“Because we have vacated 
the rate structure devised by the Board for lack of notice, we need not address these 
arguments.”). 
129 Id. 
130 See Public Initial Brief for Appellees at 17–18, Johnson v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 
969 F.3d 363 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (No. 19-1028). 
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a) Proposed Benchmarks 
 To provide benchmarks for the “inherent” value of a musical 
work—the premise underlying its (rejected) per-play proposal—the 
Copyright Owners advocated looking to license terms for interactive 
sound recording rights.131 As discussed in Part II.A.3, these sound 
recording rates, unlike the mechanical rates at issue in Phonorecords 
III, are not subject to a compulsory license. Nonetheless, the Copy-
right Owners’ expert justified this benchmark by noting that inter-
active sound recording licenses (1) covered the same “composite 
good” as the rates being determined in Phonorecords III, meaning 
the sound recordings embodying the musical works at issue here; 
and (2) involved the same licensees, the streaming services.132 Be-
cause, however, the actual rights governed by the sound recording 
licenses native to the benchmark were different from the underlying 
musical work licenses at issue in this proceeding, he conceded that 
certain adjustments would have to be made.133 
In service of these adjustments, the Copyright Owners’ expert 
sought to quantify a general marketplace value ratio between sound 
recording royalty rates and musical work royalty rates.134 To do this, 
he looked to various interfaces in which licensees must license both 
sound recordings and underlying musical works and calculated the 
ratio between payments for each right.135 He derived his range of 
ratios from the following settings: (A) the 2012 settlement statutory 
rates;136 (B) voluntary licenses for interactive streaming, which he 
discounted because, he argued, their rates were depressed by the 
“shadow” of the compulsory license;137 (C) synchronization li-
censes, or licenses for film and television audio-visual placements, 
 





136 He calculated that the TCC prongs under the 2012 rates suggested a sound 
recording/musical work ratio of between 4.55:1 and 4.76:1, which he argued was an “upper 
bound.” Id. For an elaboration on what the 2012 structure entailed, see supra Section 
II.A.1. 
137 Based on real marketplace agreements, he calculated a sound recording/musical work 
ratio of between 4.2:1 and 4.76:1, “closely tracking the regulatory ratios implicit in the 
section 115 TCC.” Id. at 1937. 
2021] SOMETHING OLD/SOMETHING NEW 607 
 
which are typically negotiated in a free market for equivalent  
rates on the sound recording and composition side;138 (D) market-
place YouTube agreements; and (E) marketplace Pandora “opt-out” 
deals. 139 From these ratios, making certain economic assumptions, 
he calculated a (redacted) range with a (redacted) midpoint.140 Pre-
sumably, the Copyright Owners’ final proposed rates fell within  
this range. 
While it ultimately rejected the Copyright Owners’ proposals, 
the Board found the approach of evaluating benchmark ratios be-
tween sound recording and musical work rates to be “a reasonable 
first step.”141 However, it took issue with some of the expert’s data 
and methodology—that his “wide range” of ratios was the result of 
data points that “do not relate to the same products and same uses of 
the two rights,”142 including some that incorporated “inefficiently 
high rates” arising in the “unregulated [for interactive streaming] . . . 
oligopoly” that is the sound recording industry.143 
 
138 Here, he found a sound recording/musical work ratio of 1:1, noting that this was an 
“important” benchmark because it showed that, in an open market, the two rights are often 
“equally valued.” Id. 
139 For these two deal types, the terms, and resultant calculated ratios, have been redacted 
in the public Phonorecords III decision: YouTube’s agreements with publishers and labels, 
as well as Pandora’s agreements for digital performance rights with labels and with certain 
music publishers who had partially withdrawn from the PROS between 2012 and 2016. 
The Board characterized these ratios as falling “in the middle of his range. Id. at 1938. 
Partial withdrawal was disallowed in 2015. See Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y 
Composers, 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, 785 F.3d 73, 77–78 (2d Cir. 
2015). 
140 Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1940. Typically, the Board redacts from its public 
opinions proprietary data that it relies upon for its rate determinations. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. The Board alluded to its reliance in Web IV on noninteractive services’ ability to 
counteract these oligopolistic forces by steering listeners to lower-cost repertoire, and its 
conclusion in that case that no similar function exists in interactive streaming—where, by 
definition, the service must be prepared to serve the listener whichever song the listener 
wishes to hear. See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26343. As a result, the Board expressed 
skepticism that interactive sound recording evidence rates could reliably be used to inform 
an “effectively competitive rate,” as it deemed to be required under section 801(b). Id. 
(citing Web IV for the proposition that a benchmark derived from royalty rates negotiated 
between streaming services and the record label “oligopoly…compromises the value of 
rates set therein as useful benchmarks for an ‘effectively competitive’ market…as required 
by the ‘reasonable rate’ language in section 801(b)(1)”). Nonetheless, the Board still 
entertained sound recording/musical work ratios based on these rates. Id. at 1940–41. 
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Specifically, the Board (A) accepted the ratio derived from the 
2012 settlement rates as a probative benchmark of “a rate the parties 
are willing to accept.”144 It also (B) enthusiastically accepted as pro-
bative the ratio derived from voluntary interactive streaming li-
censes, reiterating that a statutory “shadow” is not disqualifying, 
even as it might affect how the Board ultimately weighs that bench-
mark.145 However, it (C) rejected the 1:1 synchronization ratio as a 
benchmark for interactive streaming rates “because of the large de-
gree of incomparability” between synchronization and mechanical 
licensing.146 It also (D) rejected the sound recording/musical work 
ratio derived from YouTube agreements as a useful benchmark be-
cause of differences between the two service types, and the fact that 
sound recording YouTube rates are depressed by DMCA “safe har-
bor” provisions—while also dismissing as “conclusory” the Copy-
right Owners’ suggestion that “safe harbor” also drives YouTube 
composition rates downward.147 Finally, the Board (E) partially 
 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 1941. For further background surrounding the statutory “shadow,” see sources 
cited supra note 119. While the Board acknowledged that the notion of a statutory 
“shadow” that constrains marketplace agreements is perfectly valid, it also suggested that 
this it may have procompetitive effects: it may help to “offset or mitigate the bargaining 
power of licensors who otherwise have the ability to threaten to ‘walk away’ from 
negotiations and thus decimate the licensees’ businesses.” Phonorecords III, supra note 
28, at 1932–33. 
146 Id. at 1941 (quoting Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate 
Determination Proceeding, 74 Fed. Reg. 4510, 4519 (Jan. 26, 2009) (to be codified at 37 
C.F.R. pt. 385) [hereinafter “Phonorecords I”]). Per the Board, several factors contribute 
to this “incomparability.” First, synchronization licenses arise in situations where film and 
television producers may enter a transaction with “a certain musical work in mind,” and 
the option to re-record that work (which is why “cover songs are quite common in films”), 
deflating the value of any single sound recording of a musical work relative to the work 
itself. Id. Second, the Board concluded that the market for synchronization placements is 
more competitive than other music licensing markets: in the interactive streaming context, 
where the services’ core product is a comprehensive catalog of many songs, each sound 
recording is effectively a “must have” complement for every other sound recording. Id. 
Not so in synchronization—there, the Board noted, sound recordings are substitutes for 
each other, competing for scarce placement opportunities. Id. 
147 Id. at 1942. The Board acknowledged that YouTube does compete directly with the 
audio-only interactive streaming services governed by Section 115, but that, as a video 
service, it is not itself subject to Section 115 (nor its “shadow”); it was swayed by the 
differences between the two service types. Id. Nonetheless, in addition to the perceived 
differences in how “safe harbor” operates for the two copyrights, it emphasized that the 
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accepted the benchmark derived from Pandora’s marketplace deals 
with publishers who had partially withdrawn digital performance 
rights from the PROs prior to 2016.148 
For their part, the Services who advocated renewing the 2012 
structure did not “examine in detail” the rates within their general 
benchmark proposal: the 2012 settlement itself.149 Rather, they ar-
gued that the rates within the 2012 structure were generally reflec-
tive of the relevant market, had “baked in” the relevant economic 
variables, and triggered a reliance interest from various stakeholders 
and new entrants.150 
The Board dismissed both the overall “broad” tack taken by the 
Services, as well as their specific reliance arguments.151 It “categor-
ically rejected” any reliance argument based on the plain language 
of the statute providing that each rate determination is de novo.152 
The Services also introduced the newly extended (by settlement 
between the Copyright Owners and, among others, record labels) 
mechanical rates for physical sales, digital sales, and ringtones as a 
benchmark to substantiate their proposed interactive streaming me-
chanical rates.153 In support of this benchmark, it argued that 
 
addition of video offerings “creates a bundling of value distinguishable from the value of 
interactive streaming alone.” Id. 
148 The Board quibbled with some of the Copyright Owners’ expert’s assumptions, and 
disregarded a purported downward trend in the sound recording/musical work ratio that he 
claimed the agreements supported. Id. (“His change in the ratio…was driven by 
expectations regarding the likelihood of an uncertain change in the legal landscape 
regarding publisher withdrawals from performing rights organizations. Such uncertain 
potential changes are not well-captured by mapping them over a time horizon.”). The Board 
elected to proceed with the ratio derived from just one of his (redacted) data points as a 
useable benchmark. Id. 
149 Id. at 1944. 
150 Id. The Services argued that they had relied upon the 2012 rates continuing in 
“developing their business models,” including choosing to enter the market at all. Id. 
Additionally, they took issue with the Copyright Owners’ construction of “the Services” 
as a monolith, reminding the Board that “not all Digital Services use the same business 
model.” Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Id.  
153 Id. at 1945. Musical works are reproduced within the meaning of the Copyright Act 
in a number of contexts, including physical sales, digital sales, ringtones, and digital 
streaming. Johnson v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 969 F.3d 363, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2020). All of 
 
610 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:387 
 
because the total revenue created by physical and digital sales was, 
at that point, roughly equal to the revenues created through interac-
tive streaming, the two avenues were of “equivalent financial im-
portance to publishers” when negotiating.154 Thus, it provided use-
ful guidance on the “industry’s sense of the market rate” as well as 
the “industry’s sense of how the judges would apply [sec-
tion 801(b)].”155 
The Board accepted this rate as “somewhat useful,” noting that 
it was a recent, voluntary settlement pertaining to the same licensed 
rights, by the same licensors.156 However, it also recognized that the 
“access value” of owning a specific song or album is dwarfed by the 
value of access to the comprehensive repertoires offered by interac-
tive streaming services.157 As a result, the Board concluded that this 
rate was “at best” a useful guidepost for mechanical floors.158 None-
theless, it also accepted portions of the Services’ economic analysis 
using this benchmark and allowed the resulting figure to inform its 
final rate determination for streaming mechanical rates.159 
 
those reproductions are subject to compulsory licensing and statutory rate-setting. Id. at 
368. In the lead-up to Phonorecords III, stakeholders settled regarding the statutory rates 
for physical sales, digital sales, and ringtones. Id. at 371. The Phonorecords III proceedings 
arose only after a similar settlement was not reached for digital streaming. Id. 
154 Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1945. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 1946. 
157 Id. at 1945. The Board acknowledged that the formal distinction between ownership 
and access was insignificant, because “[o]wnership is in essence a more comprehensive 
and unconditional form of access.” Id. The important difference here was the scale of music 
available via access/ownership, not the “access” or “ownership” label itself. Id. 
158 Id. at 1946. 
159 The Services’ experts attempted two economic analyses. Id. First, they applied the 
RIAA’s streams-downloads “equivalence” factor (150 to 1), and an academic study’s 
attempt at the same metric (137 to 1), against Spotify’s streaming data, and the effective 
2012 percentage-of-revenue rate, to calculate an appropriate per-stream benchmark rate, 
which was significantly lower than the per-play rates proposed by both the Copyright 
Owners and by Apple (the latter was derived using a similar methodology). Id. at 1946. 
The Board rejected the first approach out of hand: The Services had neither defined what 
“equivalence” means, nor why this specific construction of “equivalence” would be 
significant in this context. Id. at 1944. However, the Board accepted the Services’ experts’ 
second economic analysis, in which they divided the songwriter royalty rate for downloads 
and CDs from the average retail price for each format, respectively, and applied those 
quotients against streaming service revenues, to find that an equivalent percentage-of-
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b) Shapley Economic Modeling 
Having found the benchmarks derived from real-world agree-
ments each to be inadequate—if occasionally helpful—the Board 
next evaluated several competing, complex Shapley economic mod-
els.160 The Board quoted expert testimony explaining that the Shap-
ley analysis endeavors to model bargaining in a free and “fair” mar-
ket by assigning costs to each party “according to its average con-
tribution to cost” and to assign benefit “according to its average con-
tribution to value.”161 
The extent to which the modeled market should be “fair” or 
“free”—and the extent to which there is an economic difference be-
tween those terms—varied by model.162 In designing her model, the 
Services’ expert, explicitly invoking 801(b) Factor B (requiring a 
fair income for both licensor and licensee) and Factor C (consider-
ation of the parties’ relative roles), chose to “intentionally deviate 
from the market-based distribution of profits” in favor of the ideals 
espoused in those two 801(b) factors.163 By contrast, the Copyright 
 
revenue rate would be between 10.2% and 11.3%—right around the 10.5% percent-of-
revenue figure in the 2012 rates. Id. 
160 “The Shapley methodology is a game theory model that seeks to assign to each market 
player the average marginal value that the player contributes to the market.” Johnson v. 
Copyright Royalty Bd., 969 F.3d 363, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2020). For more on Shapley analyses, 
see Richard Watt, Fair Remuneration for Copyright Holders and the Shapley Value, in 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT 118, 120 (Richard Watt ed., 2014) (“The 
Shapley model of allocation has long been accepted by economists as providing a fair and 
equitable sharing rule.”); Anne Layne-Farrar, A. Jorge Padilla, & Richard Schmalensee, 
Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations: Making Sense of Frand 
Commitments, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 693 (2007) (discussing Shapley modeling in the 
patent licensing context); David Crump, Game Theory, Legislation, and the Multiple 
Meanings of Equality, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 331, 349–52 (2001) (discussing Shapley 
values more broadly, beyond the intellectual property context). 
161 Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1947–48. 
162 Id. While the Copyright Owners’ primary Shapley expert characterized this analysis 
as modeling “bargaining processes in a free market,” the Services’ Shapley expert stressed 
that the analysis “embodies a notion of fairness.” Id. The Copyright Owners’ rebuttal 
Shapley expert’s characterizations fell in between, describing Shapley analysis as 
modeling “the outcome in a hypothetical ‘fair’ market environment…when all bargainers 
are on an equal footing.” Id. 
163 The Services’ expert, unlike the Copyright Owners’ experts, also designed her model 
to “eliminate a separate factor— market power—that she asserts renders a market-based 
Shapley Analysis incompatible with the objectives of Factors B and C of section 
801(b)(1).” Id. at 1950. 
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Owner’s expert attempted to predict the sound recording/musical 
works ratio that would occur “in an unconstrainted market.”164 Un-
surprisingly, the Copyright Owners’ model produced higher royalty 
rates than the Services’ model. Indeed, the Services’ expert con-
cluded that not only should rates be lower than the Copyright Own-
ers’ model suggested, but “the fairness component of § 801(b) fac-
tors suggests that interactive streaming’s mechanical rates should be 
reduced from their current level.”165 
Though they differed in their results, all three Shapley analyses 
concluded that “the ratio of sound recording to musical works roy-
alty rates should decline” from the 2012 ratio of 5.71:1, which was 
based on the 10.5% percentage-of-revenue rate versus approxi-
mately 60% for sound recordings.166 In other words, all analyses re-
jected the reality under the 2012 rates in which sound recording 
owners were paid nearly six times more for streaming activity than 
the creators of the underlying compositions. While they disagreed 
on how much, all three experts agreed that the gap between artist/la-
bel compensation and songwriter/publisher compensation should 
decrease. 
c) Zone of Reasonableness 
Having evaluated each of the parties’ numerical rate proposals, 
the Board proceeded to its next task: assembling a “zone of reason-
ableness,” or a range of valid potential rates from which to select 
final rates. First, the Board converted the three (redacted) ratios de-
rived via Shapley analyses into percentage-of-revenue and TCC fig-
ures in order to fit within the rate structure the Board had previously 
adopted from Google’s structural proposal.167 Then, the Board posi-
tioned two of those three putative rates168 to establish a (redacted) 
 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 1949 (emphasis added). 
166 Id. at 1952. 
167 See id. at 1948–54; supra notes 115–123 and accompanying text. 
168 One of the Copyright Owners’ experts presented his figures in rebuttal testimony; 
because the Services’ expert did not have a chance to rebut these figures, they were not 
included in the zone of reasonableness. See id. at 1954. No benchmark values were 
included because the Board had already rejected each of the proffered benchmarks. See 
supra Section II.A.4.a. 
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“zone of reasonableness” for each of the two prongs.169 Finally, 
“[t]aking into consideration the totality of the evidence presented in 
this proceeding”—without further elaboration170—the Board se-
lected a (redacted) final figure from the zone of reasonableness for 
each prong.171 
5. Applying the 801(b)(1) Factors 
Armed at long last with both a structure and potential numerical 
rates to populate that structure, the Board now engaged directly with 
the guiding 801(b)(1) factors. It noted that these four factors compel 
the Board to use “legislative discretion”172 in determining “reason-
able rates” because the factors “pull in opposing directions,” and the 
Board must therefore choose one rate from a range of reasonable 
rates that may each “serve all these objectives adequately but to dif-
fering degrees.”173 
In the end, the Board found that the rates and structure it had 
already selected passed 801(b) muster and did not warrant further 
adjustment upon express application of the 801(b) factors. 
As a prelude to its discussion of each factor, the Board discussed 
the relationship between the 801(b) standard and market-based rates 
set under the willing buyer/willing seller standard.174 The key dif-
ference: unlike the willing buyer/willing seller standard, “section 
801(b)(1) does not focus on unregulated marketplace rates.”175 
 
169 Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1948–54. 
170 Id. at 1954. The Services seized upon this point in their appeal. See Service Brief, 
supra note 128, at 43 (“[O]nce the Majority established its ‘zone of reasonableness, it set 
the rate by simply choosing the midpoint of the zone. The Final Determination contains no 
explanation whatsoever for that choice or even an acknowledgment that it made such a 
facile split….”). The D.C. Circuit did not rely upon this point in its decision to vacate and 
remand. See generally Johnson v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 969 F.3d 363 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
171 Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1954. 
172 Id. at 1955 (citing SoundExchange, Inc. v. Librarian of Cong., 571 F.3d 1220, 1224 
(D.C. Cir. 2009)). 
173 Id. (citing Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 662 F.2d 1, 
9 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
174 Id. at 1955. Of course, while the pre-MMA Board was still not governed by willing 
buyer/willing seller in the context of mechanical rate-setting under Section 115, it had 
plenty of experience applying willing buyer/willing seller in the Section 114 context. See, 
e.g., infra Section II.B. 
175 Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1955 (emphasis in original). 
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However, the Board clarified, market-based rates are acceptable, 
without adjustment, provided that their underlying market forces 
also satisfy the four itemized factors.176 If they do not, then the 
Board “may adjust the reasonable, market-based rate appropri-
ately.”177 
Factor A. The Board first had to resolve a stark, philosophical dif-
ference in how the two sides interpreted Factor A: “maximiz[ing] 
the availability of creative works to the public.”178 The Services 
urged the Board to view this factor through the demand-focused lens 
of maximizing consumer access to streaming services and therefore 
to the works contained therein.179 The Copyright Owners advocated 
a supply-focused lens: that chronically depressed rates stifle incen-
tives for creators to continue to generate a supply of creative works 
that can then be made available to the public.180 
While it expressed sympathy for the evidence the Copyright 
Owners presented to demonstrate the very real financial difficulties 
faced by the songwriter labor force—and expressly stated that these 
conditions warranted a significant rate increase—the Board opted 
for the Services’ demand-focused interpretation of “availability.”181 
It then concluded that the flexible rate standard it had provisionally 
adopted did, in fact, satisfy the “availability” factor by allowing 
streaming services to more flexibly and comprehensively cater to 
varying willingness to pay (“WTP”) among downstream consum-
ers.182 Therefore, it reasoned, no adjustments to its proposed rate 
structure and numerical rates were warranted under Factor A.183 
Factors B and C. Next, the Board tackled Factors B and C in tan-
dem. Per these factors, the Board was tasked, respectively, with af-
fording a “fair” return to copyright owners and users , while weigh-





179 Id. at 1956. 
180 Id. at 1957. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 1958. 
183 Id. 
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the product made available to the public.”184 It remarked that Con-
gress included these factors to allow the Board to move “[b]eyond a 
strictly market-based analysis,” and that the two could be grouped 
together because, as all parties’ experts agreed, the Shapley value 
“operationaliz[ing] the concept of fair return based on relative con-
tributions” would speak to both.185 Because its proposed rates were 
themselves derived from Shapley analyses, which purported to pro-
vide a “fair allocation of revenue between copyright owners and ser-
vices,” the Board summarily deemed these two factors satisfied 
without any further adjustment.186 
Factor D. The Board opened its discussion of Factor D—avoidance 
of industry disruption—by citing its own test from Phonorecords 
I.187 There, it had held that a rate would need adjustment if it caused 
any “adverse impact that is substantial, immediate and irreversible 
in the short-run.”188 It then noted that it had declined to adopt a per-
stream rate for precisely this reason.189 It added that, while it had not 
granted the Services’ wish to maintain the exact 2012 rate structure, 
it had adopted many of that structure’s attributes in service of this 
same goal.190 
The Board disavowed any responsibility under Factor D to ac-
count for speculative, long-run hypothetical consequences. It reiter-
ated that “it is not the Judges’ role to protect the current players in 
the industry.”191 It acknowledged that, even under the existing rates, 
 
184 Id. at 1958–59. 
185 Id. at 1959. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. (emphasis added). This limited construction of “disruption” was a major point of 
contention on appeal. See Service Brief, supra note 128, at 49 (“These rates could cause a 
significant disruption to the market, including that record labels could adapt by “mov[ing] 
the streaming service in-house.”). The D.C. Circuit did not rule on this point. See Johnson 
v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 969 F.3d 363, 389 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (vacating on procedural 
grounds, and declining to opine on the Board’s interpretation of 801(b) factors B, C,  
and D). 
189 See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1959. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 1953 n.137. The majority shrugged off the dissent’s suggestion that if 
mechanical royalty rate increases forced record companies to reduce their own rates, they 
might one day contemplate the radical step of forming their own streaming services, and 
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interactive streaming services were not profitable, and stated bluntly 
that “nothing the Judges do in this proceeding will change the Ser-
vices’ business models to change that circumstance.”192 Further-
more, the Board continued, while mechanical royalty rates certainly 
have some effect on the bottom-line, even the Services themselves 
acknowledge that the lack of profitability was primarily “a function 
of a lack of scale [because] market share is divided among too many 
competing interactive streaming services.”193 However, the Board 
conceded, while the Services had certainly demonstrated that they 
could absorb short-term losses, there could still be an immediate in-
flection point “beyond which services will be unable to attract cap-
ital and survive until the long run market dénouement.”194 
Thus, while the lack of profitability did nothing to convince the 
Board that it needed to adjust its rate increase in the long run to sat-
isfy Factor D, this last point did prompt one temporal adjustment.195 
In order to avoid the “short-run” disruption that Factor D protects 
 
shutting out third-party services, rather than “docilely accept such a revenue loss.” Id. at 
1953; see also id. at 2028 (Strickler, J., dissenting). The majority contended that the risk 
of the “must-have supplier” record companies walking away from negotiations, effectively 
shuttering the services, would exist under any rate governance, and the fact that they had 
not done so “demonstrates that it is not in their economic interest to do so.” Id. at 1953. 
This was another matter of contention on appeal. See Service Brief, supra note 128, at 49 
(“Eliminating all existing providers of interactive streaming services, and their substitution 
with vertically-integrated providers, would ‘disrupt’ the market under a plain reading of 
that statutory term. Because the Majority wrongly believed that it was required to ignore 
whether its decision may force all existing streaming services from the market, its decision 
should be vacated.”) (emphasis in original). Vacating Phonorecords III on procedural 
grounds, the D.C. Circuit did not rule on this point. Johnson, 969 F.3d at 389 
(acknowledging the Services’ contention that “the Board failed to account for the 
possibility that the new rate structure and heightened rate would eventually result in the 
elimination of all existing providers of interactive streaming services” but that insisting 
that the court “need not at this juncture address whether the Board adequately considered” 
this, and other, 801(b)-based substantive arguments) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
192 Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1959. In any event, it predicted, perennial “chronic 
accounting losses,” had not and would not preclude streaming services from being in 
business, nor new services from entering the market. Id. at 1959–60. The Board had 
previously mused that Spotify’s market value of over $8 billion at the time “suggest[ed] 
perhaps, investors’ expectations regarding future profits.” Id. at 1922. 
193 Id. at 1960. 
194 Id. 
195 See id. 
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against, the Board elected to roll out the 44% rate increase it was 
about to introduce over a five-year period, rather than overnight.196 
6. Final Rates 
In the end, the Board landed on the following “Subpart C”197 
mechanical royalty rates: a nearly 44% increase over the 2012 
)rates.198 The baseline rate is the greater of the following:199 
 
These “all-in” rates are then subject to a deduction of perfor-
mance royalties, typically paid to performing rights organizations, 
and then divided by stream count to generate a per-stream rate.200 If 
that rate falls below the mechanical floor (typically a fixed rate per 
user per month, such as 50 cents per subscriber per month for 
“standalone portable subscription offerings”) then the mechanical 
floor rate will apply instead.201 
B. A Willing Buyer/Willing Seller Case Study (Web IV) 
While the willing buyer/willing seller standard has only gov-
erned mechanical royalties for musical compositions under Section 
 
196 Id. 
197 Beginning after Phonorecords III, “Subpart C” now refers to all streaming services 
“that are revenue bearing,” including ad-supported, subscription, family plans, student 
plans, annual plans, etc. It does not govern mechanical royalties for physical sales, digital 
sales, ringtones, or bundles thereof (“Subpart B”). “Subpart D” governs promotional 
streaming and free trials—streams that are free to the user (including promotional stream, 
free trials, but not ad-supported streams, which fall under “Subpart C”). “Subpart A” 
provides general definitions and terms governing the statutory license. Id. at 1961, 2031–
36. Prior to Phonorecords III, these subparts were organized differently. 
198 Id. at 1958. The 44% increase figure refers to the new 15.1% percent-of-revenue 
prong that is scheduled to arrive in 2022, which is a 43.81% increase from the old 10.5% 
headline percent-of-revenue prong under the 2012 rates, which remained operative through 
2017. Id. at 1960, 2024. 
199 Id. at 2035. 
200 Id. at 2035–36. 
201 Id. 
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115 since the passage of the MMA, Section 114 rate-setting pro-
ceedings, which determine the statutory rates for the public perfor-
mance of sound recordings via noninteractive streaming, have long 
been governed by a willing buyer/willing seller rate standard.202 
Interactive services differ from noninteractive services in two 
important respects. First, although not all services of each type are 
identical, the core distinction between the two categories is that in-
teractive streaming users have full agency in selecting the song they 
wish to listen to, while noninteractive users cannot select specific 
songs (and are also subject to other constraints, such as limited 
skips, song restarts, etc.).203 Second, the compulsory public perfor-
mance license for sound recordings under Section 114 applies only 
to noninteractive streaming services.204 It does not apply to interac-
tive streaming services.205 In this sense, it is the exact mirror image 
of the Section 115 compulsory license, which governs interactive, 
but not noninteractive, streaming.206 
In the Section 114 context, the Board is tasked with establishing 
“rates and terms that most clearly represent the rates and terms that 
would have been negotiated in the marketplace between a willing 
 
202   Web IV, supra note 73, at 26316. 
203 See Wittow et al., supra note 16; see also, e.g., Skips and Replays, PANDORA, 
https://help.pandora.com/s/article/Skips-1519949305278?language=en_US 
[https://perma.cc/MP6S-4DTJ]. Perhaps the most prominent examples of each are, on the 
interactive side, Spotify and Apple Music’s basic interactive services, whose users can 
browse and select among vast libraries of individual songs and albums, as distinguished 
from Pandora’s prominent noninteractive internet radio service, whose users can supply 
artist and genre inputs in order to prompt the service to create a general radio station that 
is responsive to the supplied preferences without ceding actual control over the specific 
songs played. See Schoonmaker, supra note 18. While noninteractive streaming services 
like Pandora rose to prominence in the US before their interactive counterparts, interactive 
services like Spotify and Apple Music have come to dominate the streaming market in 
recent years. See Ashley King, Pandora Is Losing Subscribers—88,000 Left the Service 
Last Quarter, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Feb. 4, 2020), https://www.digitalmusicnews 
.com/2020/02/04/pandora-losing-subscribers-q4-2019 [https://perma.cc/6FJT-G6P8]; 
Stuart Dredge, How Many Users Do Spotify, Apple Music and Other Big Music Streaming 
Services Have?, MUSIC ALLY (Feb. 19, 2020), https://musically.com/2020/02/19/ 
spotify-apple-how-many-users-big-music-streaming-services/ [https://perma.cc/SJY3-
48ZA]. 
204 See 17 U.S.C. §114(d)(2). 
205 17 U.S.C. §114(d)(2)(A)(i). 
206 See supra note 18. 
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buyer and a willing seller.”207 To do so, it must sift through “eco-
nomic, competitive[,] and programming information presented by 
the parties” in order to ascertain the rate structure that they believe 
would occur in a “hypothetical marketplace, free of the influence of 
compulsory, statutory licenses.”208 The statutory language of Sec-
tion 114 explicitly permits the Board to “consider rates and terms of 
comparable services and comparable circumstances under volun-
tary, negotiated license agreements.”209 
1. Overall Structure 
The Board’s 2016210 Web IV decision proceeded by way of a 
relatively simple structure, particularly compared to Phonorecords 
III. First, the Board engaged in a very brief rate structure discussion. 
Second, it evaluated the parties’ submissions for prospective bench-
marks in the rate-setting process and weighed potential adjustments 
to those benchmarks. In this case, the relevant parties were: on the 
licensor side, SoundExchange, the sole performing rights organiza-
tion designated by the Copyright Office to collect and distribute 
public performance royalties for sound recordings; and on the licen-
see side, companies who offer noninteractive internet radio services, 
including Pandora and iHeart, as well as trade organizations like the 
National Association of Broadcasters (the “NAB”).211 
Third, the Board synthesized these adjusted benchmarks to es-
tablish a zone of reasonableness. Finally, it picked a rate from within 
that zone of reasonableness. The decision was unanimous. Notably, 
it was reached by the same three judges who would later split over 
Phonorecords III. 
 
207 Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B)). 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Like Section 115 proceedings, Section 114 rate determinations also occur in five-year 
intervals. 17 U.S.C. § 112(e)(3). And like Section 115, the parties to Section 114 
proceedings are stakeholders whose interest in the litigation is that they will become subject 
to the new statutory regime. See supra note 88. 
211 The Board also briefly disposed of proposals from Sirius XM, the NAB, and pro se 
songwriter/musician George Johnson. Web IV, supra note 73, at 26355. 
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2. Rate Structure 
In contrast to Phonorecords III, the Web IV Board made quick 
work of its primary rate structure decision: it elected to renew the 
basic pre-existing per-play rate structure. It swiftly and summarily 
rejected SoundExchange and Pandora’s separate “greater-of” rate 
structure proposals, whereby a statutory service would pay Sound- 
Exchange the “greater-of” a per-play rate or a percentage of service 
income.212 
Before proceeding to evaluate the parties’ proposed bench-
marks, the Board then dispensed with some other ancillary structural 
matters. First, it declined to adopt differentiated rates depending on 
whether or not a streamed recording was being simulcast from a ter-
restrial radio broadcast.213 Next, the Board briefly addressed the 
 
212 Id. at 26326 (discounting the relevance of the marketplace agreements that had been 
proffered in support of that proposal, and rejecting the notion that record companies should 
be entitled to share in service upside beyond the royalty generated by a properly calibrated 
per-play rate). The Board also referred to past rate determinations that had opted for a 
purely pure-play structure, and cited stare decisis-like directives from the Copyright Act 
that the Board should act in accordance with its own prior decisions. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. 
§ 803). 
213    Many terrestrial broadcast radio stations offer digital simulcasts of their over-the-air 
programming. See, e.g., Listen to Live Radio, IHEARTRADIO, https://www.iheart.com/ 
live/country/US/city/new-york-ny-159/5 [https://perma.cc/JXX6-X2SC]. In support of 
the differentiated rates proposal, the testifying expert for the NAB derived the lower 
bound of the NAB’s proposed “zone of reasonableness” for royalty rates from terrestrial 
radio, where broadcasters are not required to pay royalties for broadcasting sound record-
ings (they do pay for the underlying compositions), and whose promotional effect, in a 
hypothetical market, “would drive down royalty rates, possibly even resulting in negative 
royalty rates if the law permitted record companies to pay broadcasters to play their mu-
sic (i.e. payola).” Web IV, supra note 73, at 26390. The Board was unmoved by the com-
parison to terrestrial radio because, simply, “there is no market for licensing of sound re-
cordings for transmission by terrestrial radio stations, since there is no general public per-
formance right for sound recordings.” Id. at 26391. The Board also dismissed the upper 
bound of the NAB’s “zone of reasonableness” because it was derived from the SDARS II 
CRB rates (governing the public performance of sound recordings via satellite radio), 
which had been promulgated under the § 801(b) standard, not willing buyer/willing 
seller. Id. at 26391. Finally, the Board deemed the NAB’s other arguments irrelevant to 
whether a record company operating in the hypothetical marketplace would be willing to 
accept lower rates: (1) that FCC regulations require terrestrial broadcasters to act “in the 
public interest,” (2) that terrestrial broadcasters tend to have a local and community-
driven focus, and (3) empirical evidence that a significant percentage of (12.2%) simul-
cast listening is attributable not to music, but rather to “hosts, DJs, and other on-air per-
sonalities.” Id. at 26321. The Board did, however, briefly entertain arguments 
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“novel question” of whether it is permitted to establish divergent 
rates for major and indie record companies.214 It noted that while the 
evidence suggested that services entering into voluntary agreements 
in the actual marketplace do tend to pay higher rates to majors than 
indies, no party had proposed such a differentiated rate structure.215 
It elected to refer the matter to the Register of Copyrights, who re-
lied on this lack of relevant proposals by actual parties in determin-
ing that the question “did not meet the statutory criteria for refer-
ral.”216 Without guidance from the Copyright Office, the Board both 
declined to opine on the legal question and elected not to differenti-
ate rates by category of licensor for purposes of the Web IV rate 
structure.217 
Finally, the Board declined to independently value substitution 
(the extent to which revenue and activity from one source crowds 
out revenue and activity from other sources) and promotion (the ex-
tent to which activity and revenue from one source enhances activity 
and revenue from other sources) effects when reviewing putative 
benchmark agreements.218 Instead it proceeded under the presump-
tion that any benchmark agreements already “factor in” any substi-
tution effects and promotion effects.219 
 
surrounding the potential substitution of other sources of record company revenue by 
simulcasts, as well as the promotional benefits of terrestrial radio, and the effect these dy-
namics could have on record labels in a hypothetical marketplace. See id. at 26322 (de-
clining to credit these arguments because of evidentiary deficiencies, rather than rele-
vancy issues). Ultimately the Board relied upon evidence suggesting a “strong indication 
that simulcasters and other commercial webcasters operate in the same, not separate sub-
markets.” Id. at 26323. 
214 Id. at 26319. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. (quoting Memorandum Opinion on Novel Question of Law at 7, Determination of 
Royalty Rates and Terms for Ephemeral Recording and Webcasting Digital Performance 
of Sound Recordings (Web IV), 81 Fed. Reg. 26316 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380) 
(Nov. 24, 2015) (No. 14-CRB-0001-WR) [hereinafter “Register’s Opinion”]). 
217 Id. 
218 Id. at 26321–22. 
219 Id. The Board dismissed SoundExchange’s attempts to offer subjective evidence of 
agreement participants not considering these effects when entering to agreements, as well 
as its claims that the Services’ proffered benchmarks were “too new and untested” for the 
Board to conclude that these effects are “baked” into them. Id. at 26236. It did add, 
however, that for benchmark agreements imported into these noninteractive proceedings 
from other markets (e.g., SoundExchange’s noninteractive benchmark, discussed infra 
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3. Benchmark Proposals 
The Board devoted the bulk of its Web IV opinion to evaluating 
prospective benchmarks. It gave most serious consideration to so-
phisticated rate proposals, anchored in quantitative benchmarks, 
from SoundExchange, Pandora, and iHeart.220 As a non-dispositive 
guide, the Board generally evaluated putative benchmarks using a 
“Four-Part Test” that it stated had been “implicit in the Judges’ prior 
[Web CRB] determinations.”221 First, the Willing Buyer and Seller 
Test: that the benchmark rates are those “that would have been ne-
gotiated in a hypothetical marketplace between a willing buyer and 
a willing seller.”222 Second, the Same Parties Test: that the bench-
mark rates pertained to the same categories of parties that are ap-
pearing in front of the CRB.223 Third, the Statutory License Test: 
that the “hypothetical marketplace” that the benchmark rates purport 
to actualize “is one in which there is no statutory license.”224 And 
fourth, the Same Rights Test: that the benchmark rates apply to the 
same rights that the Board is now presiding over.225 
The Board also held that it is “required by law to set a rate that 
reflects a market that is effectively competitive.”226 In reaching this 
conclusion, it relied upon the statutory language in Section 114 
(which is replicated in the new Section 115) providing that the “Cop-
yright Royalty Judges…shall base their decision on economic, com-
petitive, and programming information presented by the parties,”227 
as well as federal caselaw reinforcing this directive.228 Importantly, 
the Board construed this requirement as permitting it to infer that 
 
Section II.B.3), that the Board would have to “identify and consider any difference in the 
promotional/substitutional effects between these markets” in order to translate them into 
the noninteractive market. Web IV, supra note 73, at 26327. 
220 The Board also swiftly disposed of proposals from Sirius XM, the NAB, and pro se 
songwriter/musician George Johnson. 




225 Id. In this case: “a blanket license for digital transmission of the record companies’ 
complete repertoire of sound recordings.” Id. 
226 See id. at 26382 (emphasis added). 
227 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(B)(i) (emphasis added); 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(1)(F). 
228 See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26332 (citing Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. 
Copyright Royalty Bd., 574 F.3d 748, 753 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). 
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“an excess of market power can preclude a finding that a buyer or 
seller was a ‘willing’ participant.”229 In such a scenario, the Board 
has determined that this requirement allows it to reject a benchmark, 
or adjust it so that it becomes effectively competitive.230 
The Board Partially Adjusts, Partially Limits, and Partially Re-
jects SoundExchange’s Benchmark. SoundExchange’s proposal 
contemplated a rate that would be the “greater-of” (1) 55% of ser-
vice revenue attributable to noninteractive streaming; or (2) an es-
calating per-play rate starting at $0.0025 per play in 2016 and in-
creasing annually up to $0.0029 per play in 2020.231 Its expert de-
rived both figures from a benchmark calculated from “80 agree-
ments between interactive streaming services and record compa-
nies.”232 
As discussed earlier, interactive and noninteractive services of-
fer significantly divergent functionality to their respective users.233 
In spite of these differences, SoundExchange argued that its interac-
tive-based benchmark satisfied the Board’s traditional Four-Part 
Test. 234 In particular, addressing the Statutory License Test, its ex-
pert stressed that of all possible benchmarks, these voluntary mar-
ketplace agreements were least likely to be corrupted by the statu-
tory “shadow”—the notion that the presence of the compulsory li-
cense gives licensees no incentive to offer higher rates than the stat-
utory rates.235 His reasoning: unlike the noninteractive services in 
Web IV,  “interactive services cannot default to the statutory li-
cense.”236 However, addressing the Same Rights Test, he conceded 
that because there are important differences between interactive 
streaming and noninteractive streaming, his proffered benchmarks 
would need to be adjusted to fit into the Section 114 framework.237 
 
229 Id. at 26333. 
230 Id. at 26331–32. 
231 Id. at 26335. 
232 Id. (emphasis added). 
233 See supra notes 203–206 and accompanying text. 
234 Web IV, supra note 73. 
235 See id. at 26330, 26337. 
236 Id. at 26337 (emphasis added). 
237 Id. Addressing the Willing Buyer and Seller Test, SoundExchange’s expert noted that 
unlike noninteractive agreements, these agreements were “were entered into voluntarily 
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Without explicitly responding to SoundExchange’s invocation 
of the Four-Part Test, the Board partially adjusted, partially limited, 
and partially rejected SoundExchange’s proposal based on an inter-
active streaming benchmark. First, it emphasized the need to adjust 
the benchmark in response to its finding that interactive streaming 
is not an “effectively competitive” market.238 Because the business 
model for interactive streaming services is to offer users the ability 
to select from essentially comprehensive music libraries, it ex-
plained, these services “must have” every major label’s repertoire to 
be “commercially viable.”239 The major labels’ repertoires  are thus 
economic “complements”—unable to be substituted for one an-
other—and the resulting dearth of “buyer choice” precludes the mar-
ket from being “effectively competitive.”240 As a result, in order for 
this benchmark to be used in any capacity, the Board would have to 
apply a “steering” adjustment to it.241 
 
between parties who did not have the option of electing the statutory license.” Id. at 26337. 
Finally, addressing the Same Parties Test, he contended that the parties entering into 
interactive streaming agreements (record companies and interactive streaming services) 
were “similar” to the parties in the Web IV proceedings—SoundExchange appearing on 
behalf of record companies, and noninteractive streaming services. Id. 
238 Id. at 26341. The Board rejected SoundExchange’s contention that the mere presence 
of active negotiations between record companies and services indicated that the market 
was “effectively competitive.” Id. at 26344 (“[N]egotiations over price can occur between 
a monopolist and its customers in order to facilitate price discrimination and increase 
monopoly profits.”). 
239 Id. at 26341. 
240 Id. at 26340, 26342. 
241 “Steering” is the process by which noninteractive services direct more listening traffic 
to certain licensors’ catalogs in exchange for those licensors agreeing to accept lower 
royalty rates. See id. at 26341. The Board credited the noninteractive Services’ contention 
that the “must-have,” on-demand nature of interactive streaming makes it impossible for 
the interactive streaming services—unlike the noninteractive streaming services—to foster 
competition through steering. Id. Thus, in order for interactive streaming rates to be helpful 
in the noninteractive streaming context, they must be adjusted to reflect the pro-competitive 
benefits of steering. Id. In imposing this 12% adjustment, the Board cited “hard and 
persuasive evidence” from Pandora and iHeart’s own benchmark agreements that steering 
“has reduced royalty rates in the [actual] noninteractive market and would do so in the 
hypothetical [noninteractive] market as well.” Id. at 26334, 26343–44. The Judges applied 
economic analysis based on these Pandora and iHeart benchmark offerings to reduce the 
SoundExchange benchmark by 12% “to reflect an effectively competitive rate.” Id. at 
26341. This approach featured prominently in SoundExchange’s appeal of the Board’s 
decision; the Circuit Court deferred to the Board’s discretion. See SoundExchange, Inc. v. 
Copyright Royalty Bd., 904 F.3d 41, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
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Second, the Board limited the applicability of the 
SoundExchange benchmark to only noninteractive subscription 
rates (and not the more prominent ad-supported, or “free-to-the-
user” noninteractive rates). While the Board agreed with 
SoundExchange that there was “significant evidence of functional 
convergence”242 between interactive and noninteractive services 
and that interactive and noninteractive services do in fact compete 
with one another for downstream listeners, it relied upon “over-
whelming” evidence that in both interactive and noninteractive set-
tings, the subscription and ad-supported models service entirely dif-
ferent classes of consumers—those who have some “willingness to 
pay” (“WTP”) for a streaming service, and those with a WTP of zero 
(and who are therefore relegated to ad-supported services).243 
The Board Accepts Pandora’s Benchmark. Although similar in 
some respects, Pandora’s benchmark met a different fate. Pandora 
also proposed a “greater-of” structure244 spread across a range of 
possible royalty rates. The low end of the range it argued the Board 
should use to select rates: the greater-of (1) 25% of eligible Service 
revenue, or (2) a per-play royalty that would start at $0.00110 per 
play in 2016 and increase to $0.00118 by 2020.245 The high end: the 
greater-of (1) 25% of eligible Service revenue, or (2) a per-play 
 
242 Web IV, supra note 73, at 26347. SoundExchange had offered evidence detailing the 
many ways in which both types of services increasingly offer features catering to both “lean 
forward” and “lean back” listeners—and that within both types of services, the same user 
often alternates between the two capacities, depending on “the situation and the time of 
day” and “the mood they’re in.” Id. at 26335–36. Notably, the Board took no issue with 
SoundExchange grounding its economic analyses in service revenues, rather than profits. 
It dismissed—“as it pertains to the narrow segment of the market to which the Judges apply 
the interactive benchmark”—the Services’ objections that a noninteractive service buyer 
would base its willingness to enter into a voluntary agreement based on profits, not 
revenues. Id. at 26348. To that end, it reiterated its holding from Web II that it is “not 
obliged to set the statutory rate at a level that permits a noninteractive service to realize 
any particular profit in the market.” Id. 
243 Id. at 26345. The Board also rejected SoundExchange’s attempts to corroborate its 
benchmark with certain noninteractive agreements between record companies and largely 
interactive streaming services. It held that SoundExchange’s expert had “failed to account 
for extra-statutory functionality,” and to properly contextualize these agreements within 
the specific relationships that birthed them. Id. at 26353. 
244 The Board had already rejected this portion of the proposal earlier in its opinion. See 
supra note 93. 
245 Web IV, supra note 73, at 26355. 
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royalty that would start at $0.00120 per play in 2016 and increase to 
$0.00129 by 2020.246 In support of this proposal, Pandora relied 
upon a benchmark derived solely from its 2014 agreement with  
Merlin, a rights agency representing independent record labels.247 
The Board accepted Pandora’s benchmark as probative of the 
rates that a noninteractive service would pay to indie labels in the 
hypothetical markets for both subscription-based and ad-supported 
(“free-to-the-listener”) streaming.248 First, while it did not expressly 
say so, the Board appeared to credit Pandora’s argument that the 
proffered Pandora/Merlin benchmark satisfied a variant of the  
traditional Four-Part Test.249 
Second, unlike the SoundExchange benchmark, the Pan-
dora/Merlin agreement was native to the noninteractive streaming 
context. Relatedly, unlike the SoundExchange benchmark, the par-
ties to the Pandora/Merlin agreement had voluntarily provided for 
pro-competitive “steering,” allowing Pandora to disproportionately 
favor or disfavor certain songs, catalogs, or individual licensors in 
their selection of content to present to users.250 The Board emphati-
cally agreed with Pandora that the threat of steering—which “is syn-
onymous with price competition in this market”—drives rates down, 
mitigating the “effect of complementary oligopoly” that would, if 




248 Id. at 26365–66. 
249 Pandora’s argument: it (1) “constitute[d] a competitive and arms-length direct 
license” between a noninteractive service and individual label members of a collective who 
were each at liberty to either opt into the agreement, or remain subject to the statutory rates; 
and concerned (2) the same rights; (3) the same products (public performance of sound 
recordings via noninteractive streaming); and (4) the same parties as those covered by the 
statutory license. Id. at 26358. 
250 Id. at 26336. 
251 Id. at 26366 (adding that “[t]he nature of price competition is to cause prices to be 
lower than in the absence of competition, through the ever-present ‘threat’ that competing 
sellers [i.e., record labels] will undercut each other in order to sell more goods or services” 
by giving the contracting service a financial incentive to “steer” users towards lower-priced 
songs and catalogs). The Board gave little credence to SoundExchange’s primary criticism: 
that even if steering may have this effect upon specific deals, it could not—“as a matter of 
simple arithmetic”—have the same effect upon the market as a whole. Id. at 26363–66 
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incorporated “steering,” this benchmark satisfied the “effectively 
competitive” requirement.252 
The Board did allow for one caveat: it split the difference be-
tween the parties’ positions on the extent to which the Pandora/Mer-
lin agreement was representative of the entire record industry. Over 
SoundExchange’s objections, the Board held that the agreement was 
sufficiently representative of indie record companies.253  However, 
it credited SoundExchange’s criticism that the Pandora/Merlin was 
not representative of the rates that majors would command in the 
hypothetical marketplace.254 As a result, the Board stated, it would 
consider this benchmark to be “only one guidepost” among others 
in establishing a statutory rate that would apply market-wide, in-
cluding to majors.255 
 
(“[A] webcaster cannot commit to steer to every record company or label because there is 
only a total of 100% subject to steering.”). While it acknowledged this mathematical 
reality, the Board maintained that accounting for steering was necessary to counterbalance 
the many anti-competitive factors tending to inflate rates, including: (1) the “stand-alone 
monopoly value of any one sound recording;” (2) the “firm-specific monopoly value of 
each Major’s repertoire taken as a whole;” and (3) the omnipresent possibility that the 
Majors could “utilize their combined market power to prevent price competition among 
them by virtue of their complementary oligopoly power.” Id. at 26368. 
252 Id. at 26366, 26372.  
253 In support of this position, the Board cited to “compelling” (redacted) statistics 
indicating the percentage of Merlin members who had opted into the agreement as well as 
the lack of evidence showing either coercion or of dissatisfaction among those who had 
opted in, and dismissed as a “classic principal-agency problem” SoundExchange’s 
contention that Merlin—as a collective (the agent)—had prohibitively divergent incentives 
from its member labels (the principals). Id. at 26371. 
254 Id. at 26372. 
255 Id. at 26373. The Board closed its discussion of the Pandora/Merlin benchmark by 
dispensing with a triumvirate of additional SoundExchange critiques. First, it rejected the 
notion that the “mere presence of other items of potential value” beyond what would be 
included in a statutory license constituted grounds to disqualify the Pandora/Merlin 
benchmark. Id. at 26369 (while benchmarks “may be imperfect,” to reject a proposed 
benchmark merely because it includes some extra-statutory features would be “throwing 
out the baby with the bathwater”). These other items included access to Pandora’s 
proprietary data, its concert promotion apparatus, certain marketing opportunities for new 
releases, etc. Id. at 26359–60. Second, the Board dismissed the notion that Pandora’s 
market power was too outsized to allow one of its voluntary agreements to serve as a 
reliable benchmark for statutory rates. Id. at 26371 (the “key variable” for monopsony 
power was the share of Merlin members’ revenue derived from Pandora—a mere 5% 
insufficient to constitute market power—not Pandora’s high listener-share among 
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The Board Accepts Portions of iHeart’s Proposed Benchmarks. 
Noninteractive service iHeart proposed a per-play rate of $0.0005, 
relying on economic analysis centered around a benchmark consist-
ing of an agreement between iHeart and Warner Music, a major la-
bel.256 While the iHeart/Warner agreement featured a “greater-of” 
structure, incorporating a (redacted) per-play rate and a (redacted) 
percentage of iHeart revenue, its formal proposal simply contem-
plated a per-play rate, adjusted using what it called an “incremental” 
approach.257 In addition to the load-bearing iHeart/Warner agree-
ment, iHeart also proffered twenty-seven separate agreements with 
indie labels that it argued supported its rate proposal.258 
While it rejected iHeart’s “incremental” analysis, as well as any 
reliance on the twenty-seven iHeart/indie benchmarks, the Board ac-
cepted the per-play rate actually stated in the iHeart/Warner agree-
ment as probative of the rates that a willing noninteractive service 
 
noninteractive streamers). Finally, it discarded SoundExchange’s contention that the 
Pandora/Merlin agreement was “experimental,” and therefore unfit to guide the Board. Id. 
at 26371–72 (remarking that any agreement is experimental to some degree, insofar as the 
parties are “free to vary the terms of their economic relationship” afterwards). 
256 Id. at 26375. 
257 Id. Its expert explained that the percentage-of-revenue component was not relevant 
because the parties did not believe that the “greater-of” threshold would be met: “So they 
have a number that both parties looked at and said that number would never actually be 
used in the real world, so who cares what the number is….” Id. at 26377. iHeart’s 
“incremental” rate was derived from, but also differing from, the effective rates under the 
iHeart/Warner agreement. Its expert explained that the average rate under the 
iHeart/Warner agreement “does not necessarily reflect the rate…that a willing buyer and 
willing seller would have reached in a marketplace” because the agreement actually 
covered two bundles of plays: (1) the number of Warner repertoire plays that would occur 
absent the agreement (i.e. if Warner’s repertoire were subject to the statutory license and 
rate); and (2) the number of additional Warner repertoire plays that would not occur if the 
iHeart/Warner agreement did not exist. Id. at 26376. Under the (redacted) terms of the 
iHeart/Warner agreement iHeart apparently had the opportunity to steer additional plays to 
Warner repertoire, and an incentive to do so under the (redacted, but apparently) sub-
statutory rates provided therein. Id. Thus, iHeart argued that projections based on the 
effective rate provided in the iHeart/Warner agreement, which of course applied to both 
bundles, were “tainted by the upward influence of the statutory rate.” Id. at 26376–77. 
iHeart’s expert applied the same approach to the 27 iHeart/indie agreements, and used these 
results to justify its $0.0005 proposed per-play rate. Id. 
258 Id. at 26377. Although these agreements applied to a “relatively small percentage of 
plays” relative to the iHeart/Warner agreement, iHeart argued that they were probative of 
what willing buyers and willing sellers would agree to. Id. 
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would pay to a willing major label.259 It agreed with iHeart that the 
benchmark—when used correctly—satisfied its traditional Four-
Part Test.260 Notably, the Board dismissed SoundExchange’s objec-
tions that this agreement’s rates were too skewed by the statutory 
“shadow” to satisfy the Statutory License Test.261 It reasoned that 
the iHeart/Warner benchmark was a voluntary agreement that its 
signatories had executed at a time when iHeart was already obli-
gated to pay statutory rates, and that Warner had nonetheless agreed 
to an effective rate that was less than the statutory rate.262 
Additionally, the Board held that the benchmark satisfied the 
Same Rights Test because, like the statutory license, it covered the 
noninteractive digital transmission of a record company’s full rep-
ertoire of sound recordings.263 To that end, while acknowledging 
 
259 Id. at 26389. The Board agreed with SoundExchange’s criticism that iHeart’s 
“incremental” approach based on the two separate “bundles” of streams under the 
agreement effectively and erroneously treated the price of half of a “buy one, get one free” 
transaction as zero, it “intentionally attribute[ing] no market value to the rate and revenue 
paid for” one of its conceptual bundles. Id. at 26379–82 (“If a vendor offered an ice cream 
cone…for $1.00, but offered two ice cream cones for $1.06, it would be absurd to conclude 
that the true market price of an ice cream cone is the incremental six cents. Rather, this 
offer indicates a market price of $0.53, the average price for the two ice cream cones.”). 
Accordingly, in accepting the iHeart/Warner deal as a valid benchmark, the Board insisted 
upon using the “effective average rate contained in that agreement.” Id. at 26384 (emphasis 
in original). 
260 Id. at 26389. The Board further noted the role that steering had played in satisfying 
another statutory test: the “effective competitive” requirement—here, price competition 
leading to an agreement in which a licensor accepted “an increase in quantity (more 
performances) in exchange for a lower price (a lower rate).” Id. at 26383. 
261 Id. at 26330.  
262 Id. at 26331. This issue featured prominently in SoundExchange’s ill-fated appeal of 
the Board’s decision. SoundExchange unsuccessfully contended that the Board “arbitrarily 
failed to account for the impact of the statutory license on the rates negotiated in the 
Pandora and iHeart benchmark agreements,” each of which were negotiated with the 
Service comfortably knowing “that they can simply fall back on the statutory rate if they 
fail to strike a bargain.” SoundExchange, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 904 F.3d 41, 50 
(D.C. Cir. 2018) (affirming the Board’s decision in its entirety, under the deferential 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard). SoundExchange went on to argue—also 
unsuccessfully—that the Board “arbitrarily ignored how the statutory license generally 
prevents parties from negotiating rates above the statutory royalty.” Id. at 51. 
263 Web IV, supra note 73, at 26383–84. Addressing the other two parts of the test, the 
Board held that the agreement satisfied (1) the Willing Buyer and Seller Test, because each 
party was sophisticated and “under to compulsion to enter into [it];” and (2) the Same 
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that the iHeart/Warner agreement contained extra-statutory terms—
terms present in the marketplace agreement that would not be repli-
cated in the statutory license—it declined to adjust the benchmark 
rate to reflect these elements.264  In discussing “whether and how, if 
at all, to value these non-statutory items,” it noted that the parties 
each had an obvious interest, as litigants, in establishing values to 
assign to the items that would support their position, and in substan-
tiating those values with data and internal analyses.265 For that rea-
son, it ruled that it is the burden of the party claiming monetary value 
for a non-monetary term to prove up that value. Because it deemed 
that neither party had done so here, it elected to “disregard these 
unvalued items: not because [as iHeart’s experts asserted] they 
should be presumed to have a net value of zero” but rather due to a 
“failure of proof of value by sophisticated parties.”266 
4. Zone of Reasonableness and Rate Selection 
Thus, the Board emerged from its benchmark assessment and 
adjustment steps with three “usable” benchmarks that it could use to 
establish “zones of reasonableness” for commercial subscription 
and commercial ad-supported rates. For commercial subscription 
rates, it synthesized (1) the steering-adjusted SoundExchange 
benchmark ($0.0021 per performance) and (2) the subscription rate 
from the Pandora/Merlin agreement ($0.0022 per performance, 
“which already incorporates a steering adjustment”) into an “ex-
tremely tight” zone of reasonableness spanning from $0.0021 to 
$0.0022 per performance.267 From that range, without offering any 
 
Parties Test because, as in the hypothetical marketplace, the buyer was a noninteractive 
streaming service and the seller was a record company. Id. at 26383. 
264 Id. at 26384–87. These “non-statutory items” included promotional opportunities 
“allow[ing] Warner’s artists to benefit from particular advertising on iHeart’s [platforms],” 
other (redacted) promotional opportunities, guaranteed payments, etc. Id. 
265 Id. at 26384 (“[T]he Judges would anticipate that the record companies and 
SoundExchange would present specific evidence of the monetary value for the non-
statutory consideration they received under the contract that must be added to the stated 
(‘headline’) rate on a per-play basis…. Reciprocally, the Judges would also expect to 
receive evidence from the webcasters/licensees with regard to their contemporaneous 
calculation of the monetary value of contractual consideration they allege to have received 
in addition to the basic right to play sound recordings.”). 
266 Id. at 26387. 
267 Id. at 26405. 
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additional explanation, it selected a commercial subscription rate of 
$0.0022 per performance for the year 2016, adjusted only for infla-
tion over the subsequent four years.268 
For commercial ad-supported rates, it derived its zone of reason-
ableness from two (redacted) benchmark rates: (1) the ad-supported 
portion of the Pandora/Merlin benchmark, and (2) the “adjusted, ef-
fective average” rate from the iHeart/Warner benchmark.269 From 
this (redacted) zone of reasonableness, it selected a commercial ad-
supported rate of $0.0017 per performance.270 
 
III. NEW BOSS: SAME AS THE OLD BOSS? APPLYING WILLING BUYER/WILLING 
SELLER TO SECTION 115 
Part III of this Comment compares and contrasts the 
Phonorecords III and Web IV decisions explored in Part II. It then 
uses this comparison to predict how the willing buyer/willing seller 
rate standard, which has long governed Section 114 proceedings for 
the noninteractive streaming performance of sound recordings, will 
now operate under Section 115 proceedings dictating mechanical 
rates for the interactive streaming of musical compositions. 
Phonorecords IV will be the first mechanical rate-setting proceeding 
to occur after the MMA, and therefore will be the first to apply the 
new standard. It is set to begin in 2021 and conclude in 2022 with a 
new rate schedule for the five-year period beginning in 2023.271 
In particular, Part III seeks to analyze various aspects of the two 
rate determinations explored in Part II in order to distill discrete in-
dicators for how the Phonorecords IV Board is likely to approach a 
number of impactful issues. Part III.A begins by comparing the stat-





271 See Mary Ellen Egan, Pryor Cashman Partners Take on Streaming Music Providers, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 25, 2020, 1:05 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-
week/pryor-cashman-partners-take-on-streaming-music-providers 
[https://perma.cc/ZWT4-XXMF]. It is worth noting that at least one of the Judges who 
presided over Web IV and Phonorecords—former Chief Judge Barnett—has been replaced 
in the tribunal by Judge Steve Ruwe; now-Chief Judge Feder’s term is set to expire in 2020, 
while Judge Strickler’s term expires in 2022. See Phonorecords III, supra note 28.  
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standard to the new willing buyer/willing seller standard, as well as 
the subtle but conspicuous differences between the Section 114 and 
Section 115 willing buyer/willing seller statutory texts. Next, Part 
III.B compares and contrasts the Phonorecords III and Web IV 
Boards’ discussion surrounding several core value and principles. 
Part III.C then compares the structures and procedural emphases 
employed in each rate determination. Finally, Part III.D contrasts 
the role of benchmarks in Phonorecords III and Web IV, as well as 
several key arguments raised by the parties in the benchmark con-
text. 
A. Comparing the Statutory Rate Standards 
1. 801(b) vs. Willing Buyer/Willing Seller (Section 115) 
The MMA struck Section 115’s 801(b) rate standard in its en-
tirety. Under the pre-MMA statute, the Board was directed to use 
the four 801(b)(1) factors—(A) maximize the public availability of 
copyrighted works; (B) afford a fair return for the copyright owner 
and user; (C) reflect the relative roles of the copyright owner and 
user; and (D) minimize industry disruption—to determine “reason-
able” rates.272 The Board was also permitted to “consider rates and 
terms under voluntary license agreements” in determining its own 
rates and terms.273 
Post-MMA, the Board must now “establish rates and terms that 
most clearly represent the rates and terms that would have been ne-
gotiated in the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing 
seller.”274 In doing so, it is to consider “economic, competitive, and 
programming information presented by the parties,” including two 
specific elements.275 First, it must consider the extent to which the 
compulsory use may “substitute for or may promote” recorded mu-
sic sales or otherwise boost or depress revenue the copyright owner 
may earn from other uses of its musical works.276 Second—the lone 
holdover from 801(b)—the Board must look to “the relative roles of 
 
272 See 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (prior to 2018 amendment). 
273 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(3)(D) (prior to 2018 amendment). 
274 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(1)(F). 
275 Id. 
276 Id. 
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the copyright owner and the compulsory licensee in the copyrighted 
work and the service made available to the public with respect to the 
relative creative contribution, technological contribution, capital in-
vestment, cost, and risk.”277 
Almost of all of the other pre-MMA rate guidance is gone. The 
other three 801(b) factors have disappeared. So too—conspicu-
ously—has the language permitting the Board to “consider rates and 
terms under voluntary license agreements.”278 
2. Willing Buyer/Willing Seller (Section 114) vs. Willing 
Buyer/Willing Seller (Section 115) 
The statutory text articulating the willing buyer/willing seller 
standards in Sections 114 and 115 governing, respectively, statutory 
rates for digital performances of sound recordings (Web IV), and 
mechanical royalty rates for musical works (Phonorecords III)  
are nearly identical. In fact, they track each other essentially word- 
for-word except for the clause in Section 114 permitting the  
Board to “consider rates and terms under voluntary license agree-
ments.”279 This clause—again, conspicuously—is not mirrored in 
Section 115.280 
3. 801(b) vs. Willing Buyer/Willing Seller (Section 114) 
In Phonorecords III, the Board devoted some effort to broadly 
contrasting the 801(b) standard from the willing buyer/willing seller 
standard that was, at that time, employed only in Section 114 pro-
ceedings. The key difference, it explained, was that unlike willing 
buyer/willing seller, 801(b)(1) “does not focus on unregulated mar-
ketplace rates.”281 However, the Board was quick to make clear that 
801(b) rates could be market-based, provided that those market-
based rates also satisfied the 801(b) factors.282 Only if the Board 
were to produce putative market-based rates, and then discover that 
 
277 Id. 
278 See id; compare id. with § 115(c)(3)(D) (prior to 2018 amendment). 
279 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(1)(B)(ii). 
280 See 17 U.S.C. § 115. 
281 See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1955 (emphasis removed). 
282 See id. 
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these rates failed to satisfy any of the 801(b) factors, would further 
adjustments be necessary.283 
Furthermore, the Board emphasized, it was entirely possible that 
divergent rate proposals could each satisfy all of the 801(b) factors 
“adequately but to differing degrees,” in which case the “legislative 
discretion” to choose among differing qualifying rates lay with  
the Board itself.284 In short, the Board’s view was that, while not  
all rates set under the Board’s broad “legislative discretion” in an 
801(b) setting would satisfy the willing buyer/willing seller stand-
ard, any market rate set under willing buyer/willing seller could  
pass 801(b) muster as long as it satisfied each of the factors to  
some degree.285 
4. The Board’s Discretion under Each Standard 
The Phonorecords III and Web IV Boards operated under differ-
ing statutory guidance. Although both were tasked with determining 
“reasonable”286 and “effective[ly] compete[tive]”287 rates, they were 
ultimately subject to divergent rate standards.288 
While the 801(b) factors colored the entire proceeding, the 
Phonorecords III majority’s written opinion explicitly invoked them 
quite sparingly, at least until after it had already derived prospective 
rates from the parties’ submitted Shapley analyses.289 Only as a final 
step did the Board test its provisional rates and structure against 
801(b) to ensure they did indeed satisfy each of the factors.290  The 
Board then applied its own “legislative discretion” in support of its 
declaration that it was permitted to choose among any number of 
divergent rates, provided that each potential rate satisfied the 801(b) 
factors to some degree.291 
 
283 See id. 
284 Id. 
285 See id. 
286 See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text. 
287 See supra notes 143, 226–230 and accompanying text. 
288 See generally supra Section II. 
289 See supra Section II.A.4–5. 
290 See supra Section II.A.5. 
291 See supra notes 284–285 and accompanying text. 
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The Web IV Board claimed no such legislative role. It interpreted 
its mandate, under willing buyer/willing seller, as determining  
the rates that would actually have been negotiated in a “hypothe-
tical marketplace, free of the influence of compulsory, statutory  
licenses.”292 
This view will likely guide the Phonorecords IV Board as well, 
as it applies willing buyer/willing seller to Section 115  
proceedings for the first time. The Phonorecords III Board’s discus-
sion of “legislative discretion” was strictly confined to the balancing 
of the various 801(b) factors. Outside of the presence of those fac-
tors, as the Web IV Board demonstrated, the Phonorecords IV Board 
will not—at least expressly—construe its role as involving public 
interest, public policy, or “legislative” judgments, beyond whatever 
judgments are embedded in the Board’s analysis of what a willing 
buyer would pay, and what a willing seller would accept, in a hypo-
thetical competitive market. 
Importantly, there is good reason to suspect that the 
Phonorecords IV Board will do its best to conform to the Web IV 
Board’s construction of the willing buyer/willing seller standard. 
Past Boards have consistently emphasized their stare decisis-esque 
mandate under the Copyright Act. Although the Board is an admin-
istrative body, not an Article III court formally bound by stare deci-
sis, Section 803 provides that it “shall act in accordance with…prior 
determinations and interpretations of…the Copyright Royalty 
Judges.”293 The Board is well aware of this provision: it expressly 
relied on it in electing to continue the existing per-play structure in 
Web IV.294 And just two years later, Judge Strickler (whose term 
continues until 2022) cited it in his Phonorecords III dissent.295 
 
292 See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26316 (citing Digital Performance Right in Sound 
Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 72 Fed. Reg. 24084, 24087 (to be codified at 37 
C.F.R. pt. 380) (May 1, 2007) [hereinafter “Web II”]). 
293 17 U.S.C. § 803. 
294 See Web IV, supra note 73 at 26326 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 803). 
295 See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1980 (Stricker, J., dissenting) (citing 17 
U.S.C. § 803). 
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5. Statutory Implications for Phonorecords IV 
Together, Web IV and Phonorecords III establish that the move 
from 801(b) to willing buyer/willing seller is—formally, at least—a 
restrictive change. It removes certain discretion from the Board 
without, at least expressly, adding any discretion. Under 801(b), the 
Board was already permitted to establish free-market-analogous 
rates, provided that those rates also satisfied the 801(b) factors. 
However, it was also free to establish rates that were not intended to 
mimic a free market, again provided that those rates also satisfied 
the 801(b) factors. 
Under willing buyer/willing seller, the Board perceives its role 
to be more constrained: it must simply approximate the rates that 
would occur in a free market, unconstrained by statutory licenses. 
Thus, it is now required to do something that before it was merely 
permitted—subject to the 801(b) factors—to do. It may wield no 
“legislative discretion” and consider no factors that do not expressly 
fall within the purview of this narrow task. 
The precise implications of this change remain uncertain. They 
depend, of course, on whether the 801(b) factors, which did not nec-
essarily preclude free-market rates, tended to nonetheless compel 
the Board to arrive at below-market or above-market rates. There is 
a general consensus, particularly among the rightsholder commu-
nity, that the net effect of the 801(b) factors was to depress rates 
below what would have been achieved in an open market.296 And 
while there is certainly evidence to support this view scattered 
throughout the Web IV and Phonorecords III determinations, those 
cases also highlight ways in which the elimination of the 801(b) fac-
tors may foreclose certain protections for copyright owners.297 
B. Values and Principles 
The Phonorecords III and Web IV Boards confronted many 
overlapping concepts. The similarities, and differences, in their dis-
positions may presage the Phonorecords IV Board’s approach. 
 
296 See supra notes 57–68 and accompanying text. 
297 For further discussion, see infra Section III.B.4.c. 
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1. The Board’s Own Authority and Discretion 
The Phonorecords III Board wielded broad authority and discre-
tion in its rate-setting role. First, it exercised the a la carte freedom 
to build its own rate structure using ingredients distilled from several 
different party proposals—an approach the D.C. Circuit broadly 
condoned on appeal, even as it relied on related procedural defects 
in its decision to vacate the Board’s results.298 Second, the Board 
emphatically denied that it was at all beholden to stakeholders’ reli-
ance interests in continuity from one rate-setting period to the next: 
“The statute is plain in its requirement that the rates be established 
de novo each rate period.”299 
Third, the Phonorecords III Board expressly asserted the author-
ity to condition rates on forces outside of its jurisdiction. It adopted 
a TCC prong that expressly tied mechanical rates to the rates inde-
pendently negotiated by streaming services and third-party record 
labels for sound recording rights.300 It also rejected the Copyright 
Owners’ “jurisdictional argument” opposing the all-in rate configu-
ration.301 Because, the Copyright Owners had argued, performance 
rates are ultimately the province of rate court proceedings in the 
Southern District of New York, and because the Copyright Act takes 
great pains to establish separate mechanical and performance rights, 
an administrative tribunal charged only with establishing rates for 
mechanical licenses does not have the authority to make decisions 
encompassing performance rights.302 The Phonorecords III Board 
was unmoved by this logic. It was unequivocal in its authority to 
impose an “all-in” rate structure, and elected to do so, crediting the 
 
298 See Johnson v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 969 F.3d 363, 381–82 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (while 
“some degree of deviation and combination [among parties’ proposals] is permissible,” in 
this case the Services were crucially “deprived of the opportunity to voice their objections” 
to the uncapped TCC prong because it was first raised in a post-hearing proposal). 
299 Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1944. 
300 See supra notes 118–129 and accompanying text. 
301 See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text. While the D.C. Circuit struck down 
the uncapped TCC prong on procedural grounds, nothing in its decision foreclosed future 
Boards from allowing these kinds of external forces to influence rates, provided that they 
provide the parties adequate notice and explanation. See supra note 128. 
302 Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1929. 
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Services’ emphasis on the “perfect complementarity” of mechanical 
and performance rights.303 
While the Web IV Board’s statement of its own authority was 
not quite so ambitious, this difference was likely more a product of 
context than of restraint. It gave no indication that its rationales for 
adopting a per-play rate—a structure plucked directly from party 
proposals, in continuation of the existing rate structure—had any-
thing to do with limited authority to adopt other structures.304 Like-
wise, while it elected to adopt a pure per-play rate, rather than any 
structure expressly contingent on third-party forces, the Board did 
not suggest that this was the product of a lack of authority to do 
otherwise.305 Nor did it give any indication that its earnest reliance 
on third-party benchmarks—which included SoundExchange’s 
benchmark derived from the unregulated interactive streaming 
sound recording market—was informed by a need for caution re-
garding the effect of extra-jurisdictional forces on statutory royalty 
rates.306 
Looking forward, neither Web IV, nor the statutory changes, are 
likely to foreclose the Phonorecords IV Board from echoing the au-
thority and discretion it flexed in Phonorecords III. As a result, it is 
likely to continue the all-in rate configuration, leaving mechanical 
rates tethered to third-party rate court jurisdiction. And while the 
D.C. Circuit’s procedural rebuke may give the Board pause as it 
considers whether to reprise some version of the controversial TCC 
prong, there continues to be no substantive authority precluding the 
Board from tying songwriter earnings to the unregulated negotia-
tions between interactive streaming services and record companies. 
 
303 Id. at 1934. The Board stressed that nothing in its decision actively regulated 
performance rates. Id. Rather, an “all-in” deduction was just that: a deduction. Id. In his 
dissent, Judge Strickler agreed with the majority, and stated further that, contrary to the 
Copyright Owner’s view, it would be a dereliction of duty not to establish an “all-in” rate 
—“the perfect complementarity of the two licenses would be ignored, and the interactive 
streaming services would pay two times for the same economic right…to stream the 
musical work embodied in the sound recording.” Id. at 1997 (Strickler, J., dissenting). 
304 Rather, the Board rejected the proposed “per-play” alternatives for substantive 
reasons. See supra Section II.B.2. 
305 See generally id. 
306 See generally supra Section II.B.3. 
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2. Downstream Competitive Effects 
Both the Phonorecords III and Web IV Boards placed significant 
emphasis on competitive forces. In addition to inferring an “effec-
tive competition” requirement from the statutory language govern-
ing both rate standards,307 both Boards considered downstream com-
petitive effects (i.e. competition among individual services for end 
users) to be relevant to the upstream royalty rates each Board was 
tasked with determining. 
Phonorecords III: Per-Play Rate Structure? In Phonorecords III, 
the effects on downstream competition played a central role in the 
Board’s choice of upstream rate structure. Two adversaries (the 
Copyright Owners308 and Apple) each incorporated a fixed per-play 
prong into their rate proposals and justified that proposed structure 
by way of its downstream competitive effects. Although their pro-
posals differed greatly in execution, the two parties agreed that a 
uniform per-play rate of some kind would level the downstream 
competitive playing field.309 By aligning the Services’ content costs 
with “actual demand for and consumption of their content,” they ar-
gued, a per-play structure would forge a baseline “level of equality” 
among all streaming services competing for end users “without re-
gard to business models” (i.e. free/ad-supported services, paid sub-
scription services, bundled services, etc.).310 Conversely, they 
 
307 See Phonorecords III, supra note 28 at 1940; Web IV, supra note 73, at 26332. 
308 Here, “Copyright Owners” excluded George Johnson, dba GEO Music Group, a self-
published songwriter and musician who appeared pro se. Phonorecords III, supra note 28, 
at 1924–25. The Board respectfully declined to incorporate his proposals. Id. 
309 Id. 
310 Id. Interactive music streaming configurations continue to proliferate. Some music 
streaming services are offered in bundles alongside video streaming services. See, e.g., 
Premium with Hulu, SPOTIFY, https://support.spotify.com/us/article/premium-and-hulu/ 
[https://perma.cc/4E2C-6M4D]. Others are bundled with cellular data or broadband plans. 
See, e.g., AT&T and Spotify Bring Customers More Options, AT&T (Aug. 05, 2019), 
https://about.att.com/story/2019/att_spotify_more_options.html. [https://perma.cc/GQR5-
X4R6]. Still others are bundled with other offerings from the same company. See, e.g., 
YouTube Premium, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/premium/ [https://perma.cc/ 
T6YS-KMSJ]. Even among standalone, non-bundled offerings, there is an ever-increasing 
variety of offering types, spanning from “free” ad-supported services where the consumer 
pays no monetary fee, to “premium” subscriptions where the consumer pays a recurring 
subscription fee in exchange for increased functionality, flexibility, repertoire, audio 
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argued, the current scheme of upstream rate complexities311 was  
not necessary to facilitate any particular downstream streaming 
model.312 
The Board agreed that downstream competitive effects were of 
vital importance, but disagreed that a nominally level “per-play” 
playing field was the right way to manifest these concerns. Instead, 
it prioritized maximizing service flexibility to meet diverse down-
stream consumer willingness to pay (“WTP”) for interactive stream-
ing.313 Because downstream users vary greatly in their willingness 
and ability to pay for interactive streaming, the Board reasoned, a 
fixed per-play rate could limit the Services’ ability to effectively 
compete for low-WTP (and especially no-WTP) users, who may not 
generate sufficient revenue to cover fixed content costs.314 By con-
trast, it reasoned, a flexible, percentage-of-revenue structure would 
enable the price discrimination necessary to allow both existing ser-
vices and potential new entrants to compete for as many of those 
downstream users as possible, while also deriving (and passing 
along to songwriters) greater value from high-WTP consumers.315 
 
quality, and other benefits. See, e.g., What are the Differences Between the Amazon Music 
Subscriptions?, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?node 
Id=GW3PHAUCZM8L7W9L [https://perma.cc/C24E-YNQW] (disaggregating 
Amazon’s three different standalone streaming tiers—a free-to-the-user, ad-supported tier; 
a paid subscription tier; and a more expensive, high definition, paid subscription tier—as 
well as its Amazon Prime bundled service). Many services also offer multiple pricing tiers 
within certain offering types, such as student discounts, family plans, and other promotional 
discounts. See, e.g., Matthew Lynley, Spotify Plays the Long Game with Family and 
Student Plans Even as Revenue Per User Drops, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 28, 2018), 
https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/28/spotifys-family-and-student-plans-are-reducing-some-
revenue-per-user-but-they-are-sticking-around-longer/./ [https://perma.cc/7337-9DKN]. 
311 See supra Section II.A.1. 
312 Id. 
313 See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1934. The Board appeared to credit the non-
Apple Services’ arguments that rate flexibility was essential to accommodate the broad 
spectrum of downstream WTP, as evidenced by an increase in interactive streaming 
consumers, interactive streams, interactive streaming services, and “companies providing 
those services” that had occurred under the 2012 rate structure. See id. at 1926. The non-
Apple Services had emphasized that “an upstream per-play rate would not align with the 
downstream demand for ‘all-you-can-eat’ streaming services.” Id. at 1925. Despite 
appearing to credit these views, the Board still declined to extend the full, granular, service-
type-specific flexibility of the 2012 structure. Id. at 1934. 
314 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
315 See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1934. 
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Notably, the Board first articulated this decision without refer-
ence to the 801(b) factors.316 However, much of this material resur-
faced when it tested its proposed rates and rate structure against 
801(b)(1) Factor A—maximizing the availability of works to the 
public.317 The Services had contended that the 2012 settlement rates 
best satisfied Factor A because, once again, increased rate flexibility 
would ensure more downstream price discrimination, which in turn 
would allow more members of the public to access interactive 
streaming services (and, therefore, the creative works offered 
therein).318 For their part, the Copyright Owners urged the Board to 
view Factor A through the lens of maximizing the supply of future 
works—by spurring creation through higher rates for songwriters 
who “would see low rates as a disincentive.”319 
The Board embraced the Services’ interpretation of Factor A.320 
It acknowledged that the term “availability” could plausibly take on 
multiple meanings: (1) incentivizing songwriters (upstream) to cre-
ate more through higher rates, or (2) maximizing options for con-
sumers (downstream) and therefore, presumably, consumption.321 In 
opting for this second construction, the Board contended that not 
only does price discrimination facilitate consumption by low-WTP 
end users, but that this in turn actually benefits copyright owners by 
maximizing service revenue.322 Thus, the Board construed Factor A 
as requiring it to favor an upstream rate structure that facilitated 
downstream price discrimination—which supported its choice to 
adopt a flexible revenue-based rate structure.323 
Web IV: Evaluating Benchmarks. In Web IV, the Board considered 
similar dynamics, in the same market, in a different procedural con-
text: evaluating parties’ proposed benchmarks. SoundExchange jus-
tified its proposed per-play royalty rate for the noninteractive, ad-
supported (i.e. free-to-the-user) streaming performance of its sound 
 
316 Id. 
317 See supra Section II.A.5.  
318 See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1956. 
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recordings using a benchmark derived from 80 interactive, subscrip-
tion (i.e. not free-to-the-user) marketplace agreements between rec-
ord companies and interactive streaming services.324 
While it allowed this benchmark to be considered for certain 
limited purposes,325 the Web IV Board rejected its validity as a 
benchmark for noninteractive ad-supported rates—the most conse-
quential rates on the Web IV docket. It did so not because of the 
differences in the upstream rights licensed, but rather because the 
divergence in WTP between the downstream consumers of each ser-
vice type.326 It cited “overwhelming” evidence in the record of a 
“sharp dichotomy” between listeners with a positive WTP for 
streaming, and those with a WTP of zero.327 In other words: because 
people who are willing to pay for streaming subscriptions comprise 
such a distinct class of consumers from those who are unwilling  
to pay for streaming subscriptions, it would not be “reasonable”  
to use subscription-derived benchmarks to determine ad-supported 
rates.328 
Notably, the Web IV Board concluded that—in one context, at 
least—downstream competitive considerations took a backseat to 
other competitive forces. The Web IV Board did provisionally accept 
interactive subscription benchmarks (to be considered when setting 
statutory noninteractive subscription rates only, but not ad-sup-
ported rates), but it took care to apply adjustments to the rates in 
order to render them “effectively competitive.”329 In doing so, the 
Board credited the testimony of the Services’ experts that, because 
of the major record labels’ outsized market power, the upstream in-
teractive streaming market is not “effectively competitive.”330 Ac-
cordingly, rates negotiated in that market tend to skew higher than 
 
324 Web IV, supra note 73, at 26337. For an overview of the various streaming 
configurations available to consumers, see supra note 310. 
325 The Board did accept interactive streaming benchmark subscription rates as a 
benchmark for noninteractive subscription rates, in part because functional convergence of 
the two service types had led to competition for the same downstream listeners between 
interactive and noninteractive services, see Web IV, supra note 73, at 26347. 
326 See supra notes 242–243 and accompanying text. 
327 See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26345. 
328 See id. at 26346. 
329 See supra notes 238–241241 and accompanying text. 
330 See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26341. 
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would occur in a hypothetical “effectively competitive” market. 331 
Thus, those rates would have to be adjusted downwards in order to 
serve as a fair benchmark in this market.332  In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Board acknowledged that interactive streaming services 
compete for downstream listeners,333 but nonetheless disregarded 
SoundExchange’s argument that downstream competition for 
streaming consumers—between interactive streaming services and 
the threat of piracy, and as well as free-to-the-user services like 
YouTube—could offset the effects of the upstream record company 
oligopoly.334 
Projecting Phonorecords IV: Per-Play Rate Structure? While the 
Phonorecords IV will no longer have access to 801(b) Factor A, the 
Web IV Board’s discussion of downstream competition in a willing 
buyer/willing seller context demonstrates that the absence of Factor 
A is unlikely to stop the future Boards from weighing downstream 
competitive effects in general—even as it may sometimes deem 
other competitive forces to be more powerful. Under both rate stand-
ards, the Board clearly considers downstream consumer WTP rele-
vant to determining upstream rates. 
However, without 801(b) Factor A in the mix, the Phonorecords 
IV Board may be more likely to adopt a per-play rate structure. With-
out Factor A, the Board cannot prioritize the “availability” of copy-
righted works simply for “availability’s” sake. Had the 
Phonorecords III Board been swayed by the Copyright Owners’ 
supply-side interpretation of “availability,” this change could have 
been detrimental to songwriters. But the Board was not so swayed. 
Instead, it sided with the Services on this point, construing the 
“availability” factor as consistent with its decision to proceed with 
a revenue-based rate structure to encourage more varied, flexible 
service offerings that would be accessible to a broader range of con-
sumers.335 The Phonorecords IV Board will no longer be permitted 
to factor in “availability” in this way, which may prompt it to prior-
itize other forces above downstream competitive forces—as it did in 
 
331 See id. 
332 See id. 
333 Id. at 26347. 
334 See id. at 26343–47. 
335 See supra Section III.B.2.  
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Web IV—and, thus, look more favorably on the per-play rate struc-
ture that the Copyright Owners have long sought. 
3. Simplicity: Per-Play Rate Structure? 
The Board may also have given per-play advocates fresh ammu-
nition for Phonorecords IV in the text of the Phonorecords III deci-
sion itself. The Board justified its decision to do away with the ten-
category 2012 settlement structure in favor of a uniform, two-
pronged approach by contending that for rate structures, absent au-
thority or arguments to the contrary, “simpler is better.”336 It re-
marked that, compared to the “Rube-Goldberg-esque complexity 
and impenetrability” of the 2012 settlement, a single two-pronged 
rate calculus for all revenue-generating streaming activity would 
help avoid “confusion and conflict,” particularly for new entrants 
that might not fit into any of the 2012 settlement’s ten separate rate 
categories.337 Admittedly, the Board did not find the “simpler is bet-
ter” adage quite compelling enough to embrace the simplest pro-
posal it heard: the per-play rate structure that its proponents pro-
fessed would promote simplicity and transparency by transforming 
royalty accounting into a simple multiplication problem.338 
Conversely, while the Web IV Board did not make statements 
suggesting express reliance on simplicity for simplicity’s sake, it did 
opt for a straight-ahead per-play structure—which also happened to 
be the simplest structure proposed by any of the parties in that pro-
ceeding.339 
 
336 Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1935. 
337 Id. The dissent took issue with this. See id. at 1967 (Strickler, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that because “the issue of regulatory complexity is not a factor or objective in the rate-
setting process under section 801(b)(1),” the majority erred in favoring simplicity for 
simplicity’s sake). The D.C. Circuit did not invoke this point in its decision to vacate. See 
generally Johnson v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 969 F.3d 363 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
338 Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1925. This would have been a far cry from the 
current rate complexities that continue to make it onerous for publishers and songwriters 
to verify the accuracy of accounting data that streaming services remit to them. See, e.g., 
Ed Christman, NMPA Questions Whether Spotify & Amazon Have Miscalculated, 




339 See supra Section II.B.2.  
2021] SOMETHING OLD/SOMETHING NEW 645 
 
Ultimately, the “simplicity” argument may be more useful to the 
Board as extra padding for other, meatier arguments. Still, because 
the Phonorecords III Board did not invoke this point in the context 
of any of the 801(b) factors—and because there is nothing in Web 
IV suggesting that “simplicity” is incompatible with willing 
buyer/willing seller—Copyright Owners once again shooting for a 
per-play rate in Phonorecords IV are likely to parrot the Board’s 
words back to itself, assuming those words (which the D.C. Circuit 
did not take issue with)340 are not negated in the Board’s revised 
determination.341 
4. The Extent of the Board’s Obligation to Protect 
Stakeholders 
Streaming Services’ Business Models. The Phonorecords III and 
Web IV Boards each stated, unequivocally, that the Board has no 
obligation to protect streaming services’ businesses. In 
Phonorecords III, the Board’s declaration that it “cannot and will 
not set rates to protect any particular … business model”342 echoed 
its insistence in Web IV that it was “not obliged to set the statutory 
rate at a level that permits a … service to realize any particular profit 
in the market.”343 Crucially, the Phonorecords III Board made this 
statement even while constrained by 801(b) Factor D—the “avoid-
ance of disruption” prong.344 
Creators’ Livelihoods and the “Inherent Value” of their Crea-
tions. In Phonorecords III, the Board was, at times, sympathetic to 
certain evidence of economic hardship among the songwriter labor 
force. While it ultimately preferred the Services’ consumer-centric 
interpretation of 801(b) Factor A—maximizing availability of 
works to the public—to the Copyright Owners’ supply-incentivizing 
view, it did devote a portion of its Factor A discussion to songwriter 
 
340 See generally Johnson, 969 F.3d. 
341 See supra note 339 and accompanying text. 
342 See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1945. 
343 See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26348. 
344 See supra Section II.A.5. The Board was not entirely dismissive of the relationship 
between overall industry “disruption” and individual stakeholders’ positions, which is why 
it elected to roll its rate increase out over five years, rather than immediately. See id. 
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livelihoods.345 Even in adopting the Services’ interpretation of Fac-
tor A, the Board brushed aside the Services’ suggestion that, under 
a decade of this basic rate structure, “there is no evidence that song-
writers as a group have diminished their supply of musical works to 
the public” under the existing rate structure.346 Instead, while it 
acknowledged that no party had submitted empirical evidence on 
this precise question, it countered that the record reflected “uncon-
troverted testimony” that songwriters’ mechanical royalty rates had 
undergone a “marked decline” over the prior two decades.347 Fur-
ther, it acknowledged the “critical role” mechanical royalties play in 
allowing professional songwriters to earn a living as professional 
songwriters, particularly through all-important publisher ad-
vances,348 which it noted had recently become significantly less 
available to songwriters, leading to a decrease in songwriters enter-
ing the profession to begin with.349 It cited testimony estimating that 
the number of songwriters in Nashville—dubbed the “Songwriting 
Capital of the World”350—had decreased by over 75% in the prior 
 
345 See id.   
346 See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1957. 
347 See id. 
348 Advances are lump sums paid out by publishers to their songwriter clients, which are 
then recoupable against future royalties: in other words, rather than remitting to songwriters 
their share of earnings as they trickle in over time, the publisher pays the writer up front 
(or in a period of installments) and then retains the writer’s share of earnings until the value 
of the advance has been recouped. See Benom Plumb, The Songwriter & Music Publisher 
Relationship: Part II, ROYALTY EXCHANGE (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.royalty 
exchange.com/blog/the-songwriter-and-music-publisher-relationship-pt-2#sthash.X4Top 
eh7.dpbs. [https://perma.cc/37MD-5BVP]. Traditionally, advances have represented one 
of the relatively few ways in which songwriters have access to large amounts of capital at 
once, allowing them to sustain themselves as they create new works. See Frances Katz, The 
Truth about Advances in the Music Business, SONGTRUST (Apr. 9, 2020), 
https://blog.songtrust.com/the-truth-about-advances# [https://perma.cc/FT55-ZMR6] 
(explaining that advances, while certainly not “free money” for songwriters, help writers 
with “cash flow problems” and represent “additional financing to keep the lights on”). 
349 See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1957. 
350 See Margaret Littman, Nashville Songwriting Community Spotlighted in New Web 
Series, ROLLING STONE (July 23, 2014), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-
country/nashville-songwriting-community-spotlighted-in-new-web-series-176343 
[https://perma.cc/47JM-ABZQ]; The Story of Music City, VISIT MUSIC CITY, 
https://www.visitmusiccity.com/explore-nashville/music-and-entertainment/story-music-
city [https://perma.cc/K3D9-S976]. 
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decade.351 From this evidence, the Board soberly concluded that the 
existing rate structure for interactive streaming had contributed to 
“the decline in songwriter income,” which, in turn, had “led to fewer 
songwriters.”352 Thus, even though the plight of songwriters was  
not directly relevant to the Board’s consumer-centric construction 
of the 801(b) “availability” factor, the Board insisted that it should 
“not go unheeded,” and indeed that it warranted a significant rate  
increase.353 
Furthermore, although it did not do so in the context of 801(b) 
Factor A, the Phonorecords III Board cited many of these same con-
cerns in the context of its adoption of a mechanical floor.354 It held 
that the mechanical floor operates as a “failsafe to ensure that me-
chanical royalties will not vanish.”355 It credited testimony again 
demonstrating the “critical role that mechanical royalties play in 
making songwriting a viable profession,” including through the 
funding and recouping of advances (an “important source of liquid-
ity to songwriters”).356 
By contrast, the Phonorecords III Board gave little credence 
whatsoever to one of the centerpieces of the Copyright Owners’ pro-
posals: the “inherent value” of a musical work.357 The Copyright 
Owners emphasized that the incumbent percentage-of-revenue ap-
proach counterintuitively permitted a “decreasing effective per play 
 
351 See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1957. 
352 See id. 
353 See id. 
354 See supra notes 100–104 and accompanying text. 
355 See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1935. 
356 See id. at 1934–35. Performance income cannot fund songwriter advances from 
publishers in the same way, because—unlike mechanical income—songwriters typically 
receive performance income directly from performing rights organizations. See Education, 
SONA, https://www.wearesona.com/education [https://perma.cc/LS6T-NPH6]; see also 
Assignment of Royalties, BMI, https://www.bmi.com/creators/royalty/miscellaneous_ 
royalty_rules [https://perma.cc/484Q-78V4] (articulating the hoops BMI requires its 
songwriter members to jump through in order to assign the writer share of their 
performance royalties to third parties such as music publishers). Thus, without a 
mechanical floor, if the performance portion “substantially reduces or fully eliminates the 
mechanical portion of [the all-in rate], the pool of funds available for advances and 
recoupments would be reduced.” Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1997 (Strickler, J., 
dissenting) (“Liquidity funding for songwriters is a necessity, just as heat is a necessity—
and the complementary nature of the rights to the Services is of no relevance”). Id. at 1935. 
357 See supra note 95.  
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rate” even as increases in consumption outpaced increases in service 
revenue (and, consequently, royalties).358 Thus, they argued, a per-
play rate would better reflect the “inherent value” of a musical 
work.359 The Board disagreed. In opting for a revenue-based struc-
ture as, again, “the most efficient means of facilitating beneficial 
price discrimination in the downstream market,”360 it declined to 
formalize any underlying “inherent value” to copyrighted works.361 
Conspicuously, the Web IV Board did not engage in any discus-
sion centered around creators’ well-being whatsoever.362 To be sure, 
it may be the case that SoundExchange and record companies 
simply do not invoke such arguments as frequently as songwriter 
organizations do.363 But it may also be the case that the Board does 
not consider these points relevant to an impassive, market-driven 
analysis under the willing buyer/willing seller standard. 
The Web IV Board also made no mention of any “inherent value” 
of copyright argument; if anything, the Board was more sympathetic 
to value inherently attributable to the Services. In its refusal to adopt 
a “greater-of” structure with a percentage-of-revenue prong, the 
Web IV Board effectively suggested that because a proper per-play 
rate (under the willing buyer/willing seller standard) already pur-
ports to fully compensate rightsholders for the full value of their 
works, “[a]bsent proof that the per-play prong had been set too low, 
there is no justification for assuming that the record companies 
 
358 Id. (emphasis removed).  
359 Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1982 (Strickler, J., dissenting). 
360 Id. at 1934. 
361 See id. at 1931 n. 64. 
362 See generally Web IV, supra note 73. 
363 See, e.g., Billboard: At Annual Mtg, Music Publishers Lament ‘Criminal’ Returns 
From Digital Services, NMPA,  https://nmpa.org/billboard-at-annual-meeting-music-
publishers-lament-criminal-returns-from-digital-services-call-for-industry-to-expand-the-
pie/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2021) [https://perma.cc/2Q73-Q2KW]; NMPA Statement on 
Senate Introduction of the Songwriter Equity Act, NMPA (May 12, 2014), 
http://nmpa.org/press_release/nmpa-statement-on-senate-introduction-of-the-songwriter-
equity-act/ [https://perma.cc/F5ZC-9593]; Tim Ingham, Martin Bandier: ‘Songwriters’ 
Livelihoods are under Threat Like Never Before’, MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE (Feb. 8, 2015), 
https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/martin-bandier-songwriters-livelihoods-
threat-like-never/ [https://perma.cc/9DT6-VPPG]. 
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should share” in any additional value the services generate.364 In 
other words: if per-play rates are properly calibrated, then any addi-
tional Service upside is attributable to the Service’s own inherent 
ingenuity, not to its musical repertoire, and therefore there is no call 
for record companies to share in that upside.365 
Protecting Stakeholders in Phonorecords IV. The Boards’ stances 
on protecting stakeholders tend to cut both ways when projected 
onto Phonorecords IV. On the one hand, the Phonorecords IV Board 
certainly seems likely to continue the view that it is in no way be-
holden to the Services’ bottom lines and indeed to wield that per-
spective even more freely without 801(b) Factor D (“disruption”) to 
navigate. This is a huge win for the Copyright Owners, who can rest 
easier knowing that they will not have to fend off rhetoric surround-
ing overall service profitability (or lack thereof).366 However, it is 
also unchanged from before: the Copyright Owners already enjoyed 
this benefit prior to the MMA, so it is unclear whether the senti-
ment’s survival will help them cover any additional ground under 
willing buyer/willing seller. 
On the other hand, the Web IV Board’s avoidance of the kinds 
of creator-wellbeing themes that expressly informed the 44% rate 
increase in Phonorecords III could have significant pro-Service im-
plications for Phonorecords IV.367 It suggests that Copyright Own-
ers will have a harder time convincing the Phonorecords IV Board 
to consider these pro-songwriter policy considerations. While song-
writer advocates may, on the whole, rejoice in the fact that the 
801(b) factors are gone, this may be one drawback. Copyright Own-
ers can no longer look to Factor A—the context in which the 
Phonorecords III Board considered the songwriter livelihood argu-
ments368—nor Factor B’s “fair income” language—the other natural 
 
364 See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26326. It also noted that “none of the percentage-of-
revenue prongs in the greater-of agreements in the record has been triggered.” Id. at 26325. 
365 See id. at 26326. 
366 See supra notes 191–192 and accompanying text; see also Tim Ingham, Loss-Making 
Spotify Will Continue to Put Growth Ahead of Profit for ‘Next Few Years’, MUSIC BUS. 
WORLDWIDE (May 6, 2020), https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/loss-making-
spotify-will-continue-to-focus-on-growth-over-profit-for-next-few-years/ 
[https://perma.cc/D69B-72U6]. 
367 See supra notes 362–363 and accompanying text.  
368 See supra notes 345–346 and accompanying text. 
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context for advocacy grounded in well-being and equity369—to 
make this case. The lone holdover is Factor C, the “relative roles” 
of copyright owner and user prong, which played a fairly minor role 
in Phonorecords III.370 And in any event, the Web IV Board’s pre-
sumption that any excess service upside is attributable solely to 
streaming services’ inherent value suggests that this factor is just as 
likely to weigh in the Services’ favor as it is to weigh in the Copy-
right Owners’ favor.371 Certainly, there is little reason to believe the 
Phonorecords IV Board will be any more sympathetic to arguments 
centered around the “inherent value” of a musical work than was its 
forebearer.372 
These points highlight perhaps the greatest liability to songwrit-
ers posed by the MMA’s new willing buyer/willing seller rate stand-
ard for mechanical royalties. The songwriter-wellbeing arguments 
were expressly tied to the dramatic rate increases secured for song-
writers in Phonorecords III.373 They also directly informed an im-
portant safeguard for songwriters: the mechanical floor.374 If the 
Phonorecords IV Board no longer feels they are germane—or at 
least as germane—to its task, then both future equity-drive rate in-
creases and the mechanical floor could be more difficult for the Cop-
yright Owners to secure in Phonorecords IV.375 
5. Dissecting Streaming Services’ Business Models: Deferral, 
Displacement, “Loss Leader” 
One key dynamic to Phonorecords III that was effectively ab-
sent from Web IV was a fierce debate surrounding the interaction 
between the streaming services’ business models and creator com-
pensation. The Phonorecords III Board considered, in multiple 
 
369 See supra Section II.A.5. 
370 See supra notes 44, 48 and accompanying text. 
371 See supra notes 364–365 and accompanying text. 
372 See supra notes 358–361 and accompanying text. 
373 See supra notes 345–353 and accompanying text. 
374 See supra Section II.A.5.  
375 This is of particular importance in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has 
had a disastrous impact on many areas of the music industry, including for songwriters. 
See Global Creators' Royalties Expected to Decline by up to €3.5 Billion in 2020, CISAC, 
https://www.cisac.org/Newsroom/news-releases/global-creators-royalties-expected-
decline-eu35-billion-2020 [https://perma.cc/9WAT-W35D]. 
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contexts, the Copyright Owners’ argument that linking service rev-
enue to royalty rates tended to depress songwriter compensation 
through (1) revenue deferral, (2) “loss leading”, and (3) revenue dis-
placement. 
First, the Copyright Owners argued that, while streaming ser-
vices warring for turf sacrifice present revenues in an effort to grow 
market share (for example, through extended free trials, discounted 
student and family plans, promotional bundles, etc.)376 may hope to 
reap the benefits of future profits, songwriters currently subsisting 
on royalties calculated as a percentage basis of those deflated reve-
nues suffer immediate consequences without the hope of a future 
windfall.377 Second, they suggested that some streaming services 
may intentionally operate as “loss-leaders,” sacrificing streaming 
revenue (and therefore mechanical royalties) to capture consumers 
for their other products (which do not generate mechanical royal-
ties).378 Finally, services offering interactive streaming as a part of 
a larger product bundle have every incentive to attribute as little of 
the bundled revenue pie to the royalty-generating interactive stream-
ing slice.379 
The Phonorecords III Board was generally receptive to the un-
derlying premises of these arguments, but not necessarily to the con-
clusions the Copyrights Owners drew from them. Indeed, while 
even the Services conceded that these dynamics could occur, and the 
Phonorecords III Board found further support in the record that at 
least some do occur, the Board concluded that this configuration was 
a sensible allocation of risk to facilitate the development of the in-
teractive streaming market.380 Because of “the reliance on scaling 
for success,” and the resulting “competition [among streaming ser-
vices] for the market rather than simply competition in the market,” 
the Board emphasized that for the Services to sacrifice current rev-
enue for market share was no mere exercise in vanity: it was 
 
376 See supra note 310. 
377 See supra note 101. 
378 Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1927. 
379 See id. 
380 See id. at 1927–28 (concluding that the record does support revenue deferral among 
streaming services, but that “there is no support for any sweeping inference that cross-
selling [i.e. intentional revenue displacement] has diminished the revenue base”). 
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“rational.”381 For the Services, maximizing immediate revenue 
could be “inconsistent [with] competing for the market long-
term.”382 Thus, the Board reasoned, by absorbing some of the effects 
of the immediate revenue deferral, songwriters are simply assuming 
some of the risk inherent to streaming services continuing to com-
pete, exist, and grow—and are thus helping to safeguard “the ulti-
mate existence of that future revenue.”383 
In effect, per the Phonorecords III Board, this configuration 
helps songwriters help themselves: it is in songwriters’ interest for 
streaming services to thrive so that streaming revenue can continue 
to be available to songwriters in the future, and therefore it is appro-
priate for them to bear some of the risk that allows the services to 
compete for viability.384 After all, there can be no future royalty-
generating streaming revenue without future streaming services.385 
The Board also stressed that it had found no evidence of services 
intentionally displacing bundled revenue from streaming to other 
products.386 However, the Board did tip its hat to these same con-
cerns when it justified a mechanical floor as a failsafe against me-
chanical royalties (and the liquidity they provide songwriters) “van-
ish[ing]”  due to these same deferral and displacement concerns.387 
Because the Web IV Board did not confront these issues—per-
haps because these arguments are more relevant in a percentage-of-
revenue context, which is a structure the Web IV board quickly dis-
missed for other reasons388—recent CRB proceedings provide scant 
evidence for how these arguments will play in a willing buyer/will-
ing seller world. Still, the Phonorecords III Board avoided using 
801(b)-driven language in this context, instead favoring logic driven 
by the respective parties’ self-interests. There is little reason to think 
that this approach will be dramatically different under a market-
driven standard in Phonorecords IV. As a result, an ongoing matter 
 
381 Id. (emphasis in original). 
382 Id. at 1928. 
383 Id. 
384 Id. at 1927–28. 
385 See id. 
386 See id. at 1928. 
387 See supra notes 100–104 and accompanying text. 
388 See supra Section II.B.2. 
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of frustration for rightsholders will likely continue to be a matter of 
frustration under the new rate standard. 
6. Industry Disruption 
The role of potential industry disruption varied significantly be-
tween Phonorecords III and Web IV. In fact, it was not discussed in 
Web IV at all—the word “disrupt” literally does not appear even 
once in the Web IV decision.389 This is intuitive enough. The 
Phonorecords III Board was still governed by the 801(b) standard, 
which expressly contemplated “minimiz[ing] any disruptive im-
pact;” by contrast, Web IV applied willing buyer/willing seller, 
which incorporates no such provision.390 
Despite its statutory mandate, however, the Phonorecords III 
Board took a fairly hands-off view of what would constitute undue 
disruption. Per Phonorecords III, even a 44% increase in headline 
royalty rates need not run afoul of 801(b) Factor D.391 Factor D 
merely prompted the Board to adjust the timing of the rate in-
crease—spaced out over a half-decade, rather than overnight.392 
This was, to be sure, not an unimpactful adjustment. Still, it demon-
strated that the Board was less inclined to allow Factor D to trump 
its other analysis than to smooth over the effects of that analysis. 
However, there was one significant exception: the Board in-
voked Factor D as expressly supporting its decision not to adopt a 
per-play rate.393 While it also offered other rationales that—at least 
on their face—did not relate to Factor D, its linking of Factor D to 
its denial of the central feature of the Copyright Owners’ proposed 
structure is conspicuous in a post-MMA world in which Factor D no 
longer exists. 
This link suggests one of the two major implications for the new 
role (or lack thereof) of “disruption” analysis in Phonorecords IV. 
The first implication: every individual piece of armor that is re-
moved from the current service-revenue-driven rate structure 
 
389 See generally Web IV, supra note 73. 
390    See id. 
391 See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
392 See supra notes 195–197 and accompanying text. 
393 See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
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increases the chances that future Copyright Owners will manage to 
land meaningful per-play jabs in future Phonorecords proceedings. 
The per-play goal was central to their approach in Phonorecords III, 
and—as frustrations surrounding having rates tied to loss-leading 
and non-revenue-maximizing services linger394—it figures to play a 
starring role again in Phonorecords IV. 
The second implication is more neutral, and yet still impactful 
in spite of its neutrality. Other than the per-play issue (which, of 
course, is a massive caveat) it is unclear that the absence of Factor 
D will cut in either side’s favor in Phonorecords IV. The Board was 
already primed to make significant rate changes while still con-
strained by a disruption-avoidance governor. Thus, Phonorecords 
III offers no reason to think the absence of Factor D will unlock any 
further willingness to make impactful change, in either direction, in 
Phonorecords IV (nor does the Web IV Board’s silence on the mat-
ter). The Services can hardly have emerged from Phonorecords III 
imagining that either their disruption arguments, their reliance argu-
ments, or their profitability arguments would have constituted a sil-
ver bullet, even under the policy-driven 801(b) standard. Accord-
ingly, there is no reason to think that willing buyer/willing seller will 
have cost them any leverage on these points. However, the absence 
of Factor D does ensure one thing: whatever changes the 
Phonorecords IV does yield, there will no longer be any statutory 
force to dissuade the Board from imposing them immediately. This 
should raise already-heightened stakes even higher, since any rate 
changes imposed are less likely to be staggered across a full five-
year CRB term, a la Phonorecords III. Among other effects, this 
may all but guarantee another appeal next time around. 
C. Structure 
The Phonorecords III and Web IV Boards structured their ap-
proaches differently. The overall frameworks were similar: consider 
one-off rate structure elements, then look to benchmarks and eco-
nomic analysis to establish a zone of reasonableness, and then pick 
rates from that zone.395 But navigation within that framework 
 
394 See supra Section I.B.5. 
395 See generally supra Sections II.A–B. 
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diverged significantly. In Web IV, the initial rate structure discussion 
served as a prologue to an opinion devoted primarily to marketplace 
benchmarks under a per-play structure that seemed almost inevita-
ble.396 By contrast, in Phonorecords III, the various rate structure 
proposals were the primary battleground, while the marketplace 
benchmarks became an afterthought to rates arrived at via Shapley 
models.397 
1. The Significance of Benchmarks 
In Web IV, the benchmarks were the ballgame. The Board de-
voted the majority of its energy to sifting through the various mar-
ketplace-derived benchmark proposals, accepting, adjusting, or re-
jecting them.398 It then positioned those accepted and adjusted 
benchmarks—and only those accepted and adjusted benchmarks—
to form a zone of reasonableness, before ultimately selecting its final 
rate from that zone.399 
The Phonorecords III Board took a very different approach. Be-
fore even considering the individual benchmarks, it adjudicated var-
ious rate structures distilled from the party proposals; while those 
proposals were themselves informed by, and justified using, bench-
marks, the Board’s scope of inquiry was far broader than the bench-
mark-specific analysis employed in Web IV.400 Even where it relied 
upon principles embedded in the 2012 Settlement benchmark, or 
where it adopted structures from Google’s benchmark, the 
Phonorecords III Board did so by distilling and discussing the vir-
tues (or vices) of the benchmark’s structure, not simply by evaluat-
ing the benchmark on its own terms.401 Only after considering these 
discrete structural issues did the Phonorecords III Board proceed to 
evaluate specific benchmark rate proposals. Then, while it found 
some of the benchmarks to be helpful, it ultimately declined to rely 
upon any of them.402 
 
396 See generally supra Section II.B. 
397 See generally supra Section II.A. 
398 See supra Section II.B.3. 
399 See supra Sections II.B.3–4. 
400 See supra Section II.A.3. 
401 See supra Sections I.A.3–4. 
402 See supra Section I.A.4. 
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2. Shapley Analysis and 801(b) Verification 
Instead, just a few years after publishing a Web IV decision that 
did not include any mention of Shapley analysis, the Phonorecords 
III Board (which consisted of the same three judges) relied exclu-
sively upon Shapley analyses to establish the zone of reasonableness 
from which it selected its final rates.403 It construed them both as 
valid reflections of the 801(b) guidance, as well as instructive mod-
els of free market forces.404 It permitted models to adjust for market 
power or to proceed under real-world competitive conditions.405 It 
then used these models to triangulate a range of appropriate sound 
recording/musical work ratios, which it converted into ranges of rea-
sonableness for both prongs of the structure it had already decided 
to adopt—percentage of revenue and TCC—and selected provi-
sional rates from the middle of those ranges.406 After vetting those 
provisional rates against the 801(b) factors—its first concerted ap-
plication of those factors, aside from a few passing references—it 
adopted them as final.407 
3. Projected Structure of Phonorecords IV 
It is difficult to predict precisely how much the new rate standard 
will compel the Board to rejigger its Section 115 (i.e. Phonorecords) 
approach to more closely resemble its Section 114 (i.e. Web) ap-
proach. Much will depend on the Board’s interpretation of its new 
statutory marching orders in Section 115—particularly the conspic-
uous absence of language permitting it to consider voluntary agree-
ments—and how this informs its approach to using benchmarks.408 
Much will also depend on how instructive the Board finds 
Phonorecords III as a benchmark.409 If the Board concludes that its 
hands are tied on benchmarks, it may have to afford them even less 
emphasis than it did in Phonorecords III, moving even further away 
 
403 See supra Section II.A.4.b. 
404 See supra notes 161–166 and accompanying text. 
405 See supra notes 163–164 and accompanying text. 
406  See supra Section II.A.4.c.  
407 See supra Sections II.A.5–6. 
408 See infra Section III.D.1. 
409 See infra Section III.D.2. 
2021] SOMETHING OLD/SOMETHING NEW 657 
 
from its approach in Web IV. This would be an odd result, in light 
of the supposedly unified rate standards.410 
Regardless of how the benchmark issues pan out, there is little 
reason to believe that the new rate standard will preclude the 
Phonorecords IV Board from continuing to entertain Shapley anal-
yses. Although it did not do so in its most recent willing buyer/will-
ing seller proceeding, nothing in the Web IV decision suggests that 
it was foreclosed from doing so. While the Services’ Shapley mod-
els and analyses were informed by the 801(b) standard, the Copy-
right Owners’ primary Shapley expert was transparent in his efforts 
to model a free market result.411 The Board was unequivocal in stat-
ing that satisfying the 801(b) standard was not, by definition, anti-
thetical to market-based rates.412 Thus, the transition from 801(b) to 
willing buyer/willing seller is more likely to constrain how Shapley 
models are used than whether they are used.413 As a blanket senti-
ment, this favors neither the Copyright Owners, nor the Services. 
However, Copyright Owners are likely to embrace it. First, they 
will be happy to see the Board focusing on any inputs other than 
voluntary agreement benchmarks—at least any that come within 
shouting distance of a compulsory license—which they almost al-
ways criticize as distorted by the statutory “shadow.”414 Second, 
while the Services’ experts will no doubt find other means of pro-
ducing models favorable to their clients, the removal of the 801(b) 
factors as available Shapley inputs will preclude tools that, in the 
past, allowed their Shapley models to produce lower rate pro-
posals.415 
Furthermore, while the remaining structural makeup of 
Phonorecords IV will likely resemble the commonalities between 
 
410 See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
411 See supra notes 163–164 and accompanying text. 
412 See supra notes 174–177. 
413 One potential argument against continuing the use of Shapley analyses in the willing 
buyer/willing seller context, should someone choose to make it: Shapley models purport to 
determine “fair and equitable” outcomes. See Watt, supra note 160. While a “fair and 
equitable” outcome may overlap with the free-market outcome sought under willing 
buyer/willing seller, there is certainly no reason to assume that those two outcomes must 
overlap. See supra notes 160–162 and accompanying text. 
414 See supra notes 137, 235 and accompanying text. 
415 See supra note 163. 
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Phonorecords III and Web IV, there is of course one additional 
change that the Copyright Owners are sure to welcome. As in 
Phonorecords III and Web IV, there will likely be a discussion of 
one-off rate structure issues, followed by a review of the parties’ rate 
proposals, by way of benchmarks and/or Shapley analysis. From 
there, as in Phonorecords III and Web IV, the Board will likely de-
rive a zone of reasonableness and then cull final rates from that zone. 
And as in Phonorecords III, the Board may choose to combine as-
pects of different proposals into its ultimate structural and numeric 
decisions.416 The upshot of all this structural continuity is almost 
certainly neutral. However, crucially, after doing all that work, the 
Phonorecords IV Board—unlike its Phonorecords III predeces-
sor—will no longer be compelled (or allowed) to check those final 
rates against the 801(b) factors. For songwriters and publishers who 
have long believed 801(b) to be a royalty albatross, this is cause for 
celebration. 
D. Benchmarks 
1. Marketplace Benchmarks? 
The Web IV and Phonorecords III Boards’ differing approaches 
to benchmarks occurred in spite of points of statutory overlap be-
tween the pre-MMA Section 114 and Section 115 that no longer ex-
ist post-MMA. Prior to the MMA, Section 115 provided that—in 
addition to the 801(b) factors—the Board could “consider rates and 
terms under voluntary license agreements.”417 That language is ech-
oed in both pre- and post-MMA Section 114.418 However, it is no-
tably absent from the post-MMA Section 115 willing buyer/willing 
 
416 The D.C. Circuit agreed that the Board possesses the flexibility to adopt one party’s 
proposal as presented, adjust party proposals, or select features a la carte from multiple 
proposals. Johnson v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 969 F.3d 363, 381–82 (D.C. Cir. 2020). The 
only constraint: “[T]he ultimate proposal adopted by the Board has to be within a 
reasonable range of contemplated outcomes.” Id. at 382. Per the D.C. Circuit, the 
Phonorecords III Board ran afoul of this requirement when it adopted an uncapped TCC 
prong without giving parties sufficient notice to litigate the issue. Id. at 381–82. Thus, 
assuming future Boards offer litigants proper notice and adequate explanations, nothing in 
the D.C. Circuit’s opinion precludes them from once again stitching together elements from 
separate proposals. 
417 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(3)(D) (prior to 2018 amendment). 
418 See 17 U.S.C. § 114. 
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seller standard, which is otherwise identical to the Section 114 will-
ing buyer/willing seller standard.419 
The Phonorecords IV Board will have the opportunity to use 
these discrepancies to conduct a masterclass in textualism and stat-
utory construction. It will be difficult for any judicial or quasi-judi-
cial body to ignore the absence of this term from the post-MMA 
Section 115, particularly given its presence in both the pre-MMA 
Section 115 (meaning Congress had to actively strike the language) 
as well as in the otherwise identical Section 114 (meaning Congress 
had to actively choose not to precisely duplicate a rate standard that 
it was otherwise seeking to unify). 
The clause’s absence poses something of a mystery. While the 
House, Senate, and Conference Reports are all silent as to the pre-
cise intent behind removing this language, each emphasizes that the 
MMA’s goal was to align the rate standards governing Sections 114 
and 115.420 This congressional push for uniform rate standards and 
equal treatment jibed with the Copyright Office’s recommendation 
that “all music users should operate under a common standard, and 
that standard should aim to achieve market rates to the greatest ex-
tent possible.”421 
However, this push for uniformity makes the absence of actual 
uniformity all the more striking. The textualist argument writes it-
self: Congress knew how to write the clause, because it appears else-
where in the statute—and in fact, Congress already included the 
clause in this same section, and then erased it. Therefore, its absence 
must be significant. It will be difficult for any court, or administra-
tive adjudicator such as the CRB, to ignore that argument. 
There is some possibility that the Board could formally refer the 
question to the Copyright Office, as the Web IV board did when con-
sidering whether it could differentiate rates between major and indie 
labels.422 Here, unlike in that instance, it is improbable that the 
Phonorecords IV parties’ presumably divergent benchmark 
 
419 See supra Sections III.A.1–2.  
420 See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
421 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 55, at 172. 
422 See supra notes 214–217 and accompanying text.  
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approaches would give the Copyright Office an opening to deem the 
issue moot. 
If the Copyright Office were to rule on the issue, there is prece-
dent suggesting it would seek to allow the use of marketplace bench-
marks. In the past, it has issued guidance in favor of the practice. In 
a study cited throughout the legislative process that birthed the 
MMA—and was therefore, of course, published prior to the enact-
ment of the new Section 115 language—it recommended the use of 
marketplace benchmarks, even as it recognized that using market-
place benchmarks can be “an elusive enterprise, since there are no 
freely negotiated licenses to inform the tribunal.”423 In spite of the 
awkwardness, “[e]ven where rates remain subject to government 
oversight,” it opined that “copyright policy—and specifically the 
desire to fairly compensate creators—will be better served by a 
greater opportunity to establish rates with reference to real market 
transactions.”424 Of course, if the Copyright Office were to issue a 
ruling consistent with this opinion, and the Board were to act on it, 
the textualist counter would still be available to the D.C. Circuit on 
appeal. 
If the Board does allow marketplace agreements to serve as 
benchmarks, it is likely to review similar agreements to those of-
fered by the parties in Phonorecords III, as well as other voluntary 
streaming agreements, both for interactive streaming, noninteractive 
streaming, and new service types arising after Phonorecords III.425 
Finally, even if it does not allow them to directly establish bench-
marks, it could greenlight their influence in other, less direct ways—
perhaps as an input for expert economist analysis,426 or by limiting 
their application to structure, but not numerical rates. 
 
423 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 55, at 172. 
424 See id. 
425 See, e.g., Colin Stutz, Time’s Up, TikTok:  Labels, Publishers Eye Better Licensing 
Deals with the Buzz-Making App, BILLBOARD (May 9, 2019), https://www.billboard.com/ 
articles/business/8510825/tiktok-music-licensing-deals-major-labels-publishers 
[https://perma.cc/SP5A-JCLD]; Todd Spanger, Peloton Settles Legal Fight with Music 
Publishers, VARIETY (Feb. 27, 2020, 6:46 AM), https://variety.com/2020/digital/news/ 
peloton-settles-music-publishers-lawsuit-1203517495/ [https://perma.cc/SN4N-H68B]. 
426 Though obviously an administrative tribunal, not an Article III court, the Board could 
model its approach after Federal Rule of Evidence 703—allowing experts to rely upon 
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Fundamentally, the Copyright Owners are likely to view any de-
emphasis of voluntary marketplace benchmarks hailing from highly 
regulated, compulsory-license-beholden markets as a victory. Their 
position that it is effectively impossible for voluntary agreements to 
escape the statutory “shadow” is unlikely to have changed in the few 
years since Phonorecords III—indeed, it may have been reinforced 
by the reality that the Phonorecords III Board itself opted to place 
greater weight on Shapley analyses than voluntary benchmarks, and 
after doing so, promptly handed songwriters a 44% rate increase. 
2. Other Benchmarks? 
If the Phonorecords IV Board were to disallow, or limit its con-
sideration of, marketplace benchmarks, it would—in addition to 
placing greater weight on Shapley analyses—thrust other bench-
marks into greater prominence. For that matter, even if voluntary 
agreements are permitted to serve as benchmarks, other benchmarks 
are likely to play a role. 
Phonorecords IV will test the limits of CRB precedent as bench-
mark. On the one hand, the Board is typically open to benchmark 
proposals built around past CRB settlements and decisions. In 
Phonorecords III, the Board ruled that the 2012 Rates Settlement 
(Phonorecords II) was instructive, even as it elected not to rely on 
it.427 On the other hand, the Web IV Board’s decision not to allow an 
earlier CRB determination—SDARS II, which covered satellite 
rates, not the noninteractive digital streaming rates it was being of-
fered as a benchmark for—to serve as a benchmark because it was 
governed by 801(b), not willing buyer/willing seller, has obvious 
implications for Phonorecords IV.428 Were either party to propose 
using Phonorecords III as a benchmark, the Phonorecords IV 
Board, bound by Section 803’s stare decisis-esque guidance, would 
have to navigate around this Web IV/SDARS II decision in order to 
permit it.429 
 
otherwise inadmissible evidence where “experts in the particular field would reasonably 
rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject.” See FED. R. EVID. 
703. 
427 See supra notes 105–114 and accompanying text. 
428 See supra note 213. 
429 See supra notes 293–295 and accompanying text. 
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If it were motivated to do so, the Phonorecords IV Board could 
offer a few points in favor of permitting a Phonorecords III bench-
mark. First, it could argue that Phonorecords III is distinguishable 
because, unlike SDARS II it applied to the exact same rights and 
parties: it was a member of the Phonorecords family. Second, it 
could attempt to limit its applicability—perhaps by only relying on 
portions of the determination that did not touch on 801(b) whatso-
ever. At the very least, at some point the Phonorecords IV Board is 
presumably going to have to actually quantify the difference be-
tween 801(b) and willing buyer/willing seller. How better to do so 
than by utilizing Phonorecords III—a benchmark involving the 
same rights, the same parties, the same market, and thereby allowing 
the Board to control for almost every variable other than rate stand-
ard? 
In addition to past CRB authority, parties may also attempt to 
use voluntary opt-in settlements as benchmarks. The National Music 
Publishers Association (“NMPA”) routinely negotiates opt-in settle-
ments on behalf of its members—which include the vast majority of 
the U.S. music publishing community, including all of the major 
publishers and many indies.430 The Web IV Board laid the founda-
tion for them to be deemed relevant and representative. Over 
SoundExchange’s objections, it found that the Pandora/Merlin opt-
in agreements were representative of the larger indie label 
 
430 See, e.g., Ed Christman, Vast Majority Join Royalties Settlement Between Spotify and 
Publishing Group, BILLBOARD (July 11, 2016), https://www.billboard.com/articles/ 
business/7431272/nmpa-spotify-settlement-most-members-join [https://perma.cc/C2B7-
JQF6]; NMPA and YouTube Reach Agreement to Distribute Unclaimed Royalties, NMPA 
(Dec. 8, 2016), http://nmpa.org/press_release/nmpa-and-youtube-reach-agreement-to-
distribute-unclaimed-royalties/ [https://perma.cc/C554-ZJSZ]; see also Robert Levin, How 
the NMPA Fights For Music Publisher—With Help From Sting, Steven Tyler, Bon Jovi and 
More, BILLBOARD (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/7662334/ 
national-music-publishers-association-100th-anniversary [https://perma.cc/5X5U4QDK]. 
Of course, in the event that the Board chooses not to consider voluntary agreements, 
opponents of these benchmarks would presumably argue that opt-in settlements are 
voluntary agreements. However, proponents might then counter by echoing the Board’s 
own language back to itself: the Phonorecords III Board distinguished Google’s 
benchmark agreements, reached in the marketplace, from the 2012 Rate Settlement 
benchmark because the parties to the latter were potentially motivated by the “context of 
litigation.” Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1935. A motivated litigant could construe 
the Board as having suggested that the settlement was, effectively, a less “voluntary” 
voluntary agreement. 
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community, in spite of the fact that not all indie publishers are Mer-
lin members, not all Merlin members opted in, and the agreement 
was negotiated by the agent (Merlin) rather than the principals (its 
members).431 Additionally, while the Web IV Board was not con-
vinced that the Pandora/Merlin agreements were representative of 
major labels, this will be of little comfort to opponents of the NMPA 
opt-in benchmarks: the NMPA represents majors and indies alike.432 
Although the full extent to which the Phonorecords IV Board’s 
reliance on other benchmarks aside from voluntary marketplace 
agreements would skew songwriter- or service-friendly is unclear, 
it is likely a practice the Services would view more favorably. Fun-
damentally, tethering rates to any pre-existing data point—particu-
larly those that are, at least in the Copyright Owners’ view, de-
pressed by the statutory “shadow”—would tend to make dramatic 
rate increases less likely. 
3. Evaluating Individual Benchmarks 
In addition to providing guidance on which benchmarks will be 
allowed to shape the Phonorecords IV proceedings, the Web IV and 
Phonorecords III determinations also provide guidance on how the 
Board will evaluate each of those individual benchmarks. 
a) Four-Part Test 
Benchmarks tossed into the Phonorecords IV gauntlet will pre-
sumably be routed through the Board’s traditional Four-Part test for 
willing buyer/willing seller benchmarks.433 While the Web IV Board 
did entertain, and rely upon, proffered benchmarks that did not fully 
 
431 See supra notes 253–255 and accompanying text. The Board did rely in part on the 
fact that a “compelling” (but redacted) number of Merlin members had in fact opted in. See 
id. 
432 Notably, however, the major publishers often license independently from other 
NMPA members, and therefore are presumably less likely to actually avail themselves of 
general NMPA-negotiated opt-ins. See, e.g., Frank D’Angelo & Mariah Volk, Downtown 
Music Publishing LLC v. Peloton Interactive, Inc., LOEB & LOEB, LLP (Jan. 29, 2020), 
https://www.loeb.com/en/insights/publications/2020/01/downtown-music-publishing-llc-
v-peloton-interactive-inc. [https://perma.cc/Q8KA-58H3]. 
433 See supra Section II.B.3. 
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satisfy this test,434 it tended to look more favorably upon those that 
came the closest.435 The four prongs are: 
(1) The Willing Buyer and Seller Test—were the parties sophis-
ticated and “under no compulsion” to enter the agreement?436 
(2) The Same Parties Test—did the agreement govern the same, 
or similar, parties?437 
(3) The Statutory License Test: to what extent is the benchmark 
probative of the Platonic “hypothetical marketplace…in which there 
is no statutory license?”438 
(4) The Same Rights Test: does the proffered benchmark apply 
to the same rights that the Board is currently assigning rates for?439 
“Shadow” of the Statutory Rate? One issue that is sure to figure 
every bit as prominently in Phonorecords IV as it did in Web IV and 
Phonorecords III is the alleged statutory “shadow”—the notion that 
even voluntary rates set in a marketplace governed by the compul-
sory license yield depressed rates because licensees have no incen-
tive to agree to any rate that exceeds the statutory fallback.440 Be-
cause almost every possible benchmark agreement—including mar-
ketplace agreements, settlements, past CRB rate determinations, and 
beyond—will have occurred in a regulated market, almost every 
proffered benchmark will be subject to this attack.441 The discussion 
will likely occur, as in Web IV, in the context of the Four-Part-Test’s 
third prong: the Statutory License Test.442 
Unfortunately for Copyright Owners hoping to invoke the 
“shadow” against benchmarks that they feel reflect depressed roy-
alty rates, neither the Web IV nor Phonorecords III boards were par-
ticularly sympathetic to this argument. In Phonorecords III, the 
Copyright Owners argued that the pre-existing rates—along with 
 
434 See id. 
435 See id. 
436 See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26383. 
437 See id. 
438 See id. 
439 See id.  
440 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 55, at 5. 
441 Id. at 172. 
442 See supra Section II.B.3. 
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other Service benchmarks—were “inherently suspect” because they 
were formed under the “shadow” of the statutory license.443 Because 
any licensee understands that it can simply walk away from the bar-
gaining table and accept a compulsory license, they argued, licen-
sors have no leverage to deviate from statutory rates.444 Thus, it 
would be perversely circular to use “voluntary” negotiations influ-
enced by the statutory license to then influence the next statutory 
license.445 
The Phonorecords III Board did acknowledge that the statutory 
“shadow” is not a myth, but it maintained that a “shadow”-ed bench-
mark is neither disqualified, nor even “per se inferior,” but rather a 
dynamic for the Board to consider when weighing any particular 
benchmark.446 Even more ominously for Copyright Owners, it 
mused that the “shadow” might actually have pro-competitive ef-
fects: a “countervailing” power to offset the oligopolistic licensors’ 
ability to threaten to walk away from any negotiation.447 
The Phonorecords IV Copyright Owners may find some solace 
in the fact that the Phonorecords III Board’s analysis of the statutory 
“shadow” relied on two pieces of pre-MMA authority. First, it jus-
tified its decision to accept the arguably “shadow”-ed 2012 rates as 
a viable benchmark by citing the D.C. Circuit’s holding in a 2014 
appeal of a SDARS determination promulgated under the 801(b) 
standard that “the Judges may ‘use[ ] the prevailing rate as the start-
ing point of their Section 801(b) analysis.’”448 Second, it invoked 
the provision in (the old) Section 115 providing that “in addition to 
the objectives set forth in section 801(b)(1), in establishing such 
 
443 Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1932. 
444 See id. The Copyright Owners argued that this “shadow” can be cast in two directions: 
(1) prior statutory rates shaping parties’ expectations for subsequent rates, and (2) 
upcoming proceedings affecting parties’ motivations to enter into voluntary agreements. 
Id. 
445 See id. at 1932–33. 
446 See id. at 1933, 1941. The Board contended that there may very well be some 
marketplace benchmark agreements that are “unaffected by the shadow” but perhaps 
“subject to their own imperfections.” Id. at 1933. 
447 See id. at 1933. 
448 See id. at 1933 (quoting Music Choice v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 774 F.3d 1000, 1012 
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that it is permissible for the Board to conclude that the prevailing 
market rate was “reasonable given the Section 801(b) factors”)). 
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rates and terms, the Copyright Royalty Judges may consider rates 
and terms under voluntary license agreements.”449 Thus, the two 
pieces of authority the Phonorecords III Board relied on in down-
playing the “shadow” argument were (1) language from an appeal 
of an 801(b) determination—a rate standard which no longer applies 
to Section 115450—and (2) statutory language directing the Board to 
consider voluntary agreements—language which no longer exists in 
Section 115.451 
For its part, the Web IV Board acknowledged a consensus view 
among experts for both parties that the statutory rate operated as a 
“ceiling.” 452 Even so, it signaled that, in a willing buyer/willing 
seller context, it was perfectly content to hold one marketplace li-
censor’s voluntary decision to grant rights below the statutory rate 
against statutory licensors. Over SoundExchange’s objections, the 
Web IV Board relied upon the fact that the iHeart/Warner bench-
mark—which provided for sub-statutory rates—was a direct agree-
ment executed at a time when iHeart was already obligated to pay 
statutory rates, but that Warner had nevertheless accepted rates that 
“[were] not statutory rates.”453 It reasoned, simply enough, that be-
cause the effective rate under the iHeart/Warner agreement was less 
than the statutory rate, and because Warner was under no obligation 
to opt for a rate decrease instead of “default[ing] to the higher” stat-
utory rate, the agreement satisfied the Statutory License Test.454 
For the Web IV Board, this theory of meaningful voluntary di-
vergence from the statutory rates was apparently a one-way street. 
Despite holding that Warner’s voluntary decision to accept sub-stat-
utory rates did not disqualify that benchmark, the Board held that 
Apple’s decision to acquire rights above the statutory rate suggested 
 
449 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(3)(D) (prior to 2018 amendment); Phonorecords III, supra note 
28, at 1932–33 (emphasizing, under the pre-MMA statutory scheme that “it is beyond 
dispute that Congress has authorized the Judges, in their discretion, to consider such 
agreements as evidence, notwithstanding the argument that the compulsory license may 
cast a shadow over those agreements”). 
450 See supra Section III.A.1. 
451 See supra Section III.A.2. 
452 See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26352. 
453 Id. at 26383. 
454 Id. (declining to credit SoundExchange’s contention that its rates were “too heavily 
influenced by the ‘shadow’ of the statutory rates” to satisfy this test). 
2021] SOMETHING OLD/SOMETHING NEW 667 
 
something was too “amiss” to allow that agreement to serve as a 
reliable benchmark.455 
This bodes ill for Copyright Owners in Phonorecords IV. If the 
Board allows voluntary agreements to serve as benchmarks, Apple 
agreements may play a similar role as they did in Web IV. Apple has 
positioned itself as the one streaming service that is a “friend of art-
ists.”456 As part of this effort, it has made a point of sitting out the 
Phonorecords III appeal being brought by its competitors Spotify, 
Amazon, Google, and Pandora (although it certainly still stands to 
benefit if the rate increases are curtailed).457 Furthermore, its will-
ingness—even eagerness—to pay above the statutory rate is not 
confined only to the sound recording agreement the Web IV board 
disregarded, but has also occurred on the publishing side, perhaps as 
a larger part of its “friend of artists” strategy.458 And of course in 
Phonorecords III, it was the lone Service to join the Copyright Own-
ers’ push for a (much lower, naturally) per-play rate.459 These efforts 
have earned Apple the public praise of the NMPA for “tak[ing] a 
different approach and treat[ing] songwriters more like business 
partners.”460 To the extent that these efforts have filtered into 
 
455 See id. at 26352 (because “economists for both licensors and licensees agreed that the 
statutory rate effectively sets a ceiling on rates for statutory services,” the fact that “that 
the effective rates under the Apple agreements are substantially higher than the statutory 
rates strongly suggests that something is amiss”). 
456 Dani Deahl, Here’s Why Apple is Saying Spotify is Suing Songwriters, VERGE (Mar. 
15, 2019, 2:51 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/15/18267288/apple-music-spotify-
suing-songwriters-eu-antitrust [https://perma.cc/2SKX-RJTT]. 
457 Jem Aswad & Shirley Halperin, Apple Is the Real Winner in Spotify’s Battle Against 
Songwriters’ Rate Hike, VARIETY (Apr. 9, 2019, 7:07 AM), https://variety.com/2019/ 
music/news/spotify-rate-hike-apple-real-winner-1203183647/ [https://perma.cc/SEP3-4A 
Y3]. 
458 Tim Ingham, Apple Wanted to Improve Songwriter Pay to $0.00091 Per Stream. 
Spotify and Google Weren’t Keen, MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE (Sept. 9, 2019), 
https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/apple-wanted-to-improve-songwriter-pay-to-
0-00091-per-stream-spotify-and-google-werent-keen/ [https://perma.cc/8BDE-LFTQ]; 
But see What is Apple Music Up to with the MLC?, TRICHORDIST (Dec. 10, 2020), 
https://thetrichordist.com/2020/12/10/what-is-apple-music-up-to-with-the-mlc/ 
[https://perma.cc/PVK2-GC3C] (reporting that Apple may be positioning itself to abandon 
its above-statutory agreements and revert to statutory rates administered by the MLC).  
459 See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text. 
460 Compare Seismic Implications, supra note 37, with Spotify Defends Its CRB-Rates 
Appeal—but NMPA Boss Isn’t Impressed, MUSIC ALLY (Mar. 12, 2019), 
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voluntary agreements proffered as benchmarks in Phonorecords IV, 
it  
will do Copyright Owners little good if the Board once again dis-
cards these above-stat data points as “amiss” and unreliable—par-
ticularly if, as it did in Web IV, the Board then takes no issue with 
any marketplace licensors’ decision to voluntarily license at sub-
statutory rates. 
Taken together, Web IV and Phonorecords III provide little rea-
son for Copyright Owners to feel hopeful that their “shadow” argu-
ments will enjoy a warmer welcome in Phonorecords IV. Of course, 
if the role of marketplace benchmarks themselves is diminished, 
then it is also possible that there will be less occasion to make this 
argument in the first place.461 
Licenses for Related Rights? Another issue that featured heavily in 
Phonorecords III that will now, newly, be subject to the Board’s 
Four-Part test for willing buyer/willing seller benchmark agree-
ments is the probative value of licenses for related rights. These will 
likely be argued in the context of the fourth prong of the Four-Part 
test: the Same Rights test.462 In Phonorecords III, while the Copy-
right Owners did not convince the Board to consider as many related 
rights as they had hoped, they did manage to score a few points in 
this arena. The Board accepted as at least somewhat helpful several 
benchmarks derived from rights other than interactive streaming 
mechanical rights. These included digital performance rights for 
noninteractive streaming (offered by the Copyright Owners), sound 
recording rights for interactive streaming (at least insofar as it em-
braced the Copyright Owners’ sound recording/musical work ratio 
approach relative to those rights), and mechanical rates for physical 
and digital sales (offered by the Services).463 However, the Board 
rejected the Copyright Owners’ most ambitious benchmark—the 
1:1 sound recording/musical work ratio in synchronization li-




461 See supra Section III.D.1.  
462 See supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
463 See supra Section II.A.4.a. 
464 See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
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dismissed another songwriter-friendly sound recording/musical 
work ratio benchmark derived from YouTube agreements, this time 
due to the depressing effect of Section 512 “safe harbor” on sound 
recording YouTube rates.465 
Ultimately, the Phonorecords III Board expressly linked me-
chanical rates to rates for other rights, both directly and inversely. 
In adopting a TCC prong, it directly tied mechanical rates to sound 
recording interactive streaming rates: as sound recording rates in-
crease, so too do mechanical royalty rates (beginning when the TCC 
prong exceeds the percentage-of-revenue prong).466 And by adopt-
ing an all-in rate, the Board expressly created an inverse relationship 
between mechanical rates and the rates payable for the complemen-
tary performance right.467 
Rates for related rights also played a (less prominent) role in 
Web IV. There, the Board rejected the NAB’s bid for a bifurcated 
rate structure for terrestrial/web simulcasters that the NAB justified 
in part using the royalty rate for sound recordings performed on ter-
restrial radio (which just so happens to be zero).468 The Board 
roundly refused to consider as probative a right for which “there is 
no market” because “there is no general public performance right” 
for sound recordings on terrestrial radio.469 However, the Web IV 
Board quickly clarified that this decision was more a product of the 
NAB’s somewhat extreme approach than of a wholesale aversion to 
considering related rights: it accepted (with a steering adjustment) 
SoundExchange’s benchmark derived from unregulated interactive 
streaming sound recording rates.470 
Together, the Phonorecords III and Web IV decisions augur that, 
with some limitations along the outer flank, the Phonorecords IV 
Board is likely to be receptive to benchmarks derived from licenses 
 
465 See supra note 147; 17 U.S.C. 512. 
466 See supra notes 122–129 and accompanying text. 
467 See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text. Importantly, while neither of these 
rate structures were new, prior to Phonorecords III they had been the product of settlement, 
so the Phonorecords III Board was the first to impose them in the context of a fully-litigated 
rate-setting proceeding. See supra Section II.A.1–2. 
468 See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26390. 
469 See id. at 26391. 
470 See supra notes 238–241 and accompanying text. 
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for rights other than mechanical streaming. The limitations are as 
follows: first, NAB’s Web IV whiff stands for the unremarkable 
proposition that the Phonorecords IV Services will probably not be 
allowed to rely upon rates for rights for which there is no right at 
all.471 Second, the Copyright Owners will likely continue to have a 
tough time convincing the Board that synchronization sound record-
ing/musical work ratios are probative of “reasonable” mechanical 
royalty rates.472 Even as Copyright Owners continue to harp on the 
reality that synchronization is the one significant songwriter income 
source that is negotiated in the free market,473 and even as 
Phonorecords IV will be the first mechanical rate-setting proceeding 
that is mandated by statute to approximate the free market, the 
Phonorecords III and Web IV Boards gave little reason to think that 
a new rate standard will trump the upstream competitive concerns 
the Board has relied upon in the past—concerns that so often shape 
the Board’s analysis under any rate standard.474 As long as songs 
continue to be substitutes in competition with one another in the 
synchronization setting and “must have” complements for one an-
other in the interactive streaming setting, the Phonorecords III 
Board’s disregard for the synchronization market—which did not 
rely at all upon 801(b) factors—will likely survive the change in  
rate standards.475 
Setting these limitations aside, the Phonorecords IV Board 
should continue to be receptive to the related rights it considered in 
Phonorecords III. Additionally, the Phonorecords III Copyright 
Owners were put on notice that, absent factual support, their “con-
clusory” allegations regarding the effect of “safe harbor” provisions 
 
471 See supra notes 468–469 and accompanying text. 
472 See supra note 146. 
473 See, e.g., Ingham, supra note 38 (“The music publishers’ [Phonorecords IV] plan, 
quite deliberately, is to go in impossibly high. As [NMPA president David] Israelite tells 
it, in the world of synchronization, licensing fees in the US are broadly split 50/50 between 
publishers (and songwriters) and record labels (and artists)”); Ed Christman, NMPA: David 
Israelite, RIAA’s Cary Sherman Work to Mend Fences Between Publishers, Labels, 
BILLBOARD (June 13, 2013), https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/1566903/nmpa-
david-israelite-riaas-cary-sherman-work-to-mend-fences-between 
[https://perma.cc/PH2F-NWKA]. 
474 See infra Section III.D.3.b.  
475 See supra note 146. 
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on YouTube composition rates were insufficient to compel the 
Board to consider that benchmark.476 Assuming they heed this warn-
ing, they will arrive at Phonorecords IV armed with evidence to sup-
port their contention that “safe harbor” depresses YouTube compo-
sition rates every bit as much as it depresses YouTube sound record-
ing rates. And assuming their evidence is convincing, this will un-
lock an additional related right benchmark for the Phonorecords IV 
Board to consider—likely a win for songwriters.477 
b)  “Effective Competition” and the Influence of Market 
Power 
There is perhaps no greater unifier between the 801(b)-governed 
Phonorecords III determination and the willing buyer/willing seller-
governed Web IV determination than the two Boards’ respective def-
erence to competitive concerns. Both Boards concluded that inher-
ent to each respective rate standard was an “effective competition” 
requirement.478 Both Boards agreed that benchmarks skewed by 
anti-competitive, oligopolistic market power—notably, in the view 
of both Boards, among the major record companies—could not, as 
a rule, satisfy this requirement.479 However, both Boards also agreed 
that marketplace rates reached in such an environment could still be 
useful if handled prudently.480 More generally, both Boards consist-
ently grounded their analysis of any issue (including benchmarks, 
rate structure, Shapley analysis, etc.) in competitive concerns. There 
 
476 See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
477 Again, this is assuming the Board considers marketplace benchmarks at all. See supra 
Section III.D.1. However, this discussion introduces another avenue through which the 
Board could formally honor the textually-significant absence of language permitting it to 
consider voluntary agreements, while also shrinking the scope of this limitation. See id. 
The Board could construe this limitation as applying only to voluntary licenses for the same 
rights (mechanical reproduction rights for interactive streaming) or only to rights subject 
to compulsory licensing (which would add noninteractive digital sound recording rights to 
the mix). See id. This interpretation would still permit the Board to consider benchmarks 
for many of the related rights it deemed helpful in Web IV and Phonorecords III. See supra 
Sections II.A.4.a, II.B.3.  
478 See supra notes 143, 226–230 and accompanying text. 
479 See supra notes 143, 238–241 and accompanying text. The mere presence of 
negotiation is not enough to qualify a benchmark as “effectively competitive.” See Web IV, 
supra note 73, at 26344. 
480 See supra notes 143, 238–241 and accompanying text. 
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is no reason to think that Phonorecords IV will be any different, par-
ticularly as tensions between record labels and major streaming ser-
vices continue to foment.481 
While the effects of this renewed priority are too sprawling to 
cleanly isolate, the Phonorecords IV Services will certainly use it as 
a shield against one recurring Copyright Owner argument: that me-
chanical rates for interactive streaming should more closely resem-
ble sound recording rates for interactive streaming. Both the 
Phonorecords III and Web IV Boards fully adopted the view that the 
market for interactive streaming rights of sound recordings is heav-
ily slanted by the oligopoly power of the record company. That view 
makes it difficult for the Copyright Owners to use those sound re-
cording rates to convince the Board to do much of anything. This is 
unlikely to escape the Services’ attention. 
 
481 The competition concerns could also ratchet up at any time if there is a renewal in 
record company consolidation, or if the trend towards streaming services acquiring 
interests in record labels continues. See, e.g., Shan Li & Mauro Orrù, Tencent Buys 10% 
Stake in Record Label of Billie Eilish, Drake, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 31, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/tencent-buys-10-stake-in-record-label-of-billie-eilish-
drake-11577793085 [https://perma.cc/ETQ4-RLMQ]; Mergers: Commission Clears 
Universal’s Acquisition of EMI’s Recorded Music Business, Subject to Conditions, EUR. 
COMM’N (Sept. 21, 2012), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_ 
12_999 [https://perma.cc/7JRM-PG27]. As it is, there are a myriad of tension points. See, 
e.g., Ben Sisario, A New Spotify Initiative Makes the Big Record Labels Nervous, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/06/business/media/spotify-
music-industry-record-labels.html; [https://perma.cc/8459-JS3G]; Lucas Shaw, The 
Tension is Building Between Spotify and the Music Industry, STAR (Sept. 6, 2018, 7:00 
AM), https://www.thestar.com.my/tech/tech-news/2018/09/06/the-tension-is-building-
between-spotify-and-the-music-industry [https://perma.cc/RRG8-AK58]; Lucas Shaw, 
Spotify’s Newest Pitch to Labels and Musicians: Now You Pay Us, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 2, 
2010, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-02/spotify-s-newest-
pitch-to-labels-and-musicians-now-you-pay-us [https://perma.cc/QUV9-HVT5]; Stuart 
Dredge, Are Spotify, Apple Music and YouTube the New Record Labels?, MUSIC ALLY 
(June 4, 2019), https://musically.com/2019/06/04/are-spotify-apple-music-and-youtube-
the-new-record-labels/ [https://perma.cc/25DE-93DU]; Tim Ingham, Who Are the Two 
‘Major Labels’ that Have Signed New Deals with Spotify? Clue: Not Universal or Warner., 




2021] SOMETHING OLD/SOMETHING NEW 673 
 
c) Analysis of Individual Benchmarks 
Substitution and Promotional Value. The statutory definition of the 
willing buyer/willing seller rate standard includes a requirement that 
the Board consider substitution and promotional effects. “Substitu-
tion” effects refer to the extent to which revenue from one type of 
copyright use replaces revenue from other types of copyright uses, 
while promotion effects refer to the extent to which one type of cop-
yright use encourages revenue from other types of copyright uses.482 
The exact statutory text compels the Board to consider “whether use 
of the compulsory licensee’s service may substitute for or may pro-
mote the sales of phonorecords or otherwise may interfere with or 
may enhance the musical work copyright owner’s other streams of 
revenue from its musical works.” 483 This guidance is included in 
both Section 114, and the post-MMA Section 115, but was not a part 
of the pre-MMA Section 115 801(b) standard.484 
Given that reality, it is perhaps unsurprising that substitution and 
promotion effects figured more prominently in Web IV than in 
Phonorecords III. While the Phonorecords III Board barely dis-
cussed either,485 the Web IV Board engaged deeply with both phe-
nomena. First, it made the impactful choice not to consider the sub-
stitution effects and promotion effects separately from any of the 
benchmark agreements it reviewed, but rather to deem them “baked 
into” those agreements.486  However, this approach only extended to 
same-market benchmarks; the Board held that for benchmarks im-
ported from other markets (e.g. interactive streaming), the Board 
would have to “identify and consider any difference in the promo-
tional/substitutional effects” between the two markets in order to 
properly quantify the imported benchmark.487 Furthermore, the 
Board signaled that it could be sympathetic to arguments that 
 
482 See supra notes 218–219 and accompanying text. 
483 17 U.S.C. § 115. 
484 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 114–15; 17 U.S.C. §§ 115, 801 (prior to 2018 amendment). 
485 Outside of a passing reference to one Shapley model’s accounting for substitution 
(Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1948), and the Services’ argument that the 2012 
Settlement suggested an “implicit consensus on such issues as substitutional effects” (id. 
at 1926), the Phonorecords III Board’s only reference to either force was actually through 
an inconsequential citation to Web IV. See id. at 1933 n. 68. 
486 See Web IV, supra note 28, at 26326. 
487 See id. at 26327. 
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licensors are willing to accept lower rates when a licensed use does 
not cannibalize other revenue, or when a licensed use generates 
enough promotional value.488 
Now equipped with the same statutory directive that spurred its 
Web IV analysis, the Phonorecords IV Board is certain to entertain 
substantial substitution and promotion discussion from both sides—
both inside and outside of the benchmark context. Under Section 
803’s stare decisis-esque guidance, the Board will likely consider 
both effects to be “baked into” any intra-market voluntary bench-
marks, as it did in Web IV. However, for benchmarks summoned 
from beyond the interactive streaming mechanical space, and for  
arguments outside of the benchmark context entirely, it will be open 
season. 
The tacks taken by each party will greatly depend on how prom-
inent a role benchmarks play in the proceedings. Indeed, the parties’ 
strategies inside of the benchmark context will be diametrically  
opposed to their strategies outside of the benchmark context. 
For Copyright Owners, the value of any marketplace agreement 
is equal to the royalty rate, plus the promotional benefit, and minus  
the revenue earned under the benchmark agreement that substitutes 
for revenue that would otherwise have been earned elsewhere. For 
example, if interactive streaming decreases consumers’ demand for 
CDs, then interactive streaming revenue has, to some extent, substi-
tuted for CD sales revenue—presumably prompting the licensor to 
demand a higher royalty rate than it would otherwise agree to in or-
der to make up for the lost CD revenue. Conversely, if interactive 
streaming activity encourages a movie producer to place a song in 
an upcoming film, then the interactive streaming license has pro-
moted synchronization revenue—presumably encouraging the li-
censor to be open to a lower royalty rate than it would otherwise 
agree to, because it is motivated by its ability to generate extra value 
 
488 See supra note 212. The Web IV Board declined to adopt these arguments due to 
underlying evidentiary deficiencies, even as it accepted that the phenomena were plausible. 
See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26322–23 (“Assuming for the sake of argument that a 
promotional impact could justify a discounted royalty rate for simulcasters, the NAB would 
be required to demonstrate that such promotional effect is greater for simulcasting than for 
other forms of commercial webcasting to an extent that would justify a lower rate for 
simulcasters. The NAB has not done so.”). 
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elsewhere. Thus, when discussing the rate included in that interac-
tive streaming license as a potential benchmark, the licensor has an 
incentive to claim that the promotional effect was more  
significant than the substitution effect, to show that the benchmark 
agreement rate is actually lower than it would otherwise have been, 
absent the extra benefit granted under that marketplace license that 
is not transferring over to this statutory license. The licensee, of 
course, has the exact opposite incentive. 
Outside of the benchmark context, the calculus flips. In a Shap-
ley analysis, for example, the licensor has an incentive to argue that 
the promotional effect under this statutory license for interactive 
streaming is minuscule, and the substitution effect gargantuan. For 
the purposes of rate-setting, the licensor does not want to concede 
that under this interactive streaming license it will be generating any 
value other than the royalty—willing sellers, of course, are willing 
to sell for less if they are getting something extra on the side. And 
for the purposes of rate-setting, the licensor will want to claim that 
interactive streaming is gutting physical and digital sales such that a 
willing seller of interactive streaming would demand extra royalties 
to make up for the decimation of the rest of its business. 
In Web IV, iHeart’s expert attempted to straddle these two diver-
gent goals in a manner that may be instructive. Tasked with devalu-
ing a prospective Spotify interactive benchmark being applied in a 
noninteractive rate-setting proceeding, he presented expert testi-
mony purporting to show that “noninteractive services are 15 times 
more promotional than interactive services.”489 If the Board had 
credited this testimony (it did not),490 it would have supported the 
proposition that the statutory rates currently being set should be 
lower than the marketplace benchmark would otherwise indicate, 
because all else equal, licensors would be willing to accept a lower 
noninteractive rate (along with its huge promotional benefits) than 
the interactive benchmark (with its lack of promotional benefits) 
would otherwise suggest. 
 
489 See id. at 26328. 
490 See id. 
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Given the questionable statutory standing of marketplace bench-
marks in Phonorecords IV,491 the Web IV Board’s limitations on  
independent consideration of substitution and promotion values,492 
and the Phonorecords III Board’s favoring of Shapley analysis,493  
it seems most likely that these arguments will have a greater impact 
outside of the marketplace benchmark context. Thus, Copyright 
Owners will likely come prepared to quantify the many ways  
in which interactive streaming appears to have harmed other sources 
of music revenue.494 Their adversaries, the Services, will be pre-
pared to discuss the many promotional benefits of interactive 
streaming.495 The projected outcome of those efforts remains 
 
491 See supra Section III.D.1. 
492 See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26321–22.  
493 See supra Section II.A.4.b.  
494 See, e.g., Ben Sisario & Karl Russell, In Shift to Streaming, Music Business Has Lost 
Billions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/25/business/ 
media/music-sales-remain-steady-but-lucrative-cd-sales-decline.html [https://perma.cc/ 
Z55N-T74K]; Ashley King, Spotify Will Overtake Pandora’s Total U.S. Listener Count by 
2021, Report Predicts, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.digital 
musicnews.com/2019/03/25/spotify-pandoras-listeners/ [https://perma.cc/5492-GMBM]; 
Amy X. Wang, Album Sales Are Dying as Fast as Streaming Services Are Rising, ROLLING 
STONE (Jan. 3, 2019, 5:11 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/album-
sales-dying-as-fast-as-streaming-services-rising-774563/ [https://perma.cc/VZG7-7R3V]. 
But see Tim Ingham, Global Recorded Music Industry Revenues Topped $20BN Last 
Year—But Streaming Growth Slowed, MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE (May 4, 2020), 
https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/the-global-recorded-music-industry-
generated-over-20bn-last-year-but-streaming-growth-slowed/ [https://perma.cc/ATT8-
S9W6]. The Copyright Owners may even arrive equipped with visual aids. See, e.g., 
SONA, Gently Down the Stream, YOUTUBE (Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.you 
tube.com/watch?v=OllDCF_llHc&feature=emb_title. [https://perma.cc/6BUW-THG5]. 
495 See, e.g., Peter Robinson, Streams Ahead: The Artists Who Made It Huge Without 
Radio Support, GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2016, 11:32 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
music/2016/dec/01/artists-made-it-huge-streaming-spotify-apple-music [https://perma.cc/ 
A9C2-A3BG]; Patrick McGuire, How Streaming Platforms Are Changing Music 
Promotion and Discovery, TUNECORE (Feb 13, 2018), https://www.tune 
core.com/blog/2018/02/streaming-platforms-changing-music-promotion-discovery.html 
[https://perma.cc/WZS7-FNLD]; Lisa Robinson, Why Chance the Rapper Makes Music for 
Free (and How He Actually Makes Money), VANITY FAIR (Feb. 9, 2017), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2017/02/why-chance-the-rapper-music-is-free-
and-how-he-makes-money [https://perma.cc/D46W-WMFZ]. But see What Is the Value of 
Exposure When Exposure is All There Is?, MIDIA: MUSIC INDUS. BLOG (May 6, 2020), 
https://musicindustryblog.wordpress.com/2020/05/06/what-is-the-value-of-exposure-
when-exposure-is-all-there-is/ [https://perma.cc/RHH2-2TSQ]. The Services have their 
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uncertain: it will likely depend on which experts the Board finds  
most compelling. 
Extra-Statutory Terms and Functionality. A very similar dynamic 
occurs when discussing extra-statutory terms and functionality. In 
the benchmark setting, Copyright Owners have every incentive to 
exaggerate the extra benefits received by licensors in a marketplace 
setting that would not be received by the licensors in this statutory 
setting, to show that the benchmark licensors agreed to artificially 
low monetary rates because they were also receiving additional ben-
efits. Thus, they would argue, those benchmark monetary rates need 
to be increased if they are being applied in a setting devoid of those 
extra benefits that are not available under the statutory license—
such as access to proprietary data, or promotional services, as were 
discussed in the Web IV Pandora/Merlin and iHeart/Warner bench-
mark agreements.496 As before, the Services have the opposite in-
centive, or indeed an incentive to highlight the extra-statutory ben-
efits the licensees received in those benchmark transactions (such as 
additional rights or favorable indemnification terms) that would not 
be available to statutory licensees.497 
In Web IV, the Board considered several extra-statutory terms in 
benchmark agreements but rarely found them dispositive. While it 
did dismiss some of SoundExchange’s noninteractive benchmarks 
for failing to account for extra-statutory functionality,498 it did not 
do the same for either the Pandora or iHeart benchmarks. In both of 
those instances, the Board acknowledged the presence of statutory 
terms, but declined to adjust for them because it was not convinced 
that the parties had actually ascribed to these terms any value that 
would have affected the monetary royalty rates.499 
Importantly, the Board made two important rulings that could 
factor into Phonorecords IV. First, extra-statutory terms do not 
 
own visuals. See, e.g., Promoting Your Work, SPOTIFY, https://artists.spotify.com/videos/ 
the-game-plan/promoting-your-work [https://perma.cc/CR7D-KKGW]. 
496 See supra notes 264–265 and accompanying text; supra note 255. 
497 See, e.g., Steele, supra note 119 (outlining a marketplace agreement in which Spotify 
received, among other things, the right to charge Universal’s artists for promotional tools 
and opportunities). 
498 See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26353. 
499 See supra notes 264–265 and accompanying text; supra note 255. 
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disqualify a prospective benchmark.500 Second, recognizing that a 
party claiming extra-statutory terms has an incentive to quantify 
those terms, it held that the burden to establish an extra-statutory 
term’s quantifiable value lies with the party claiming that the term 
has value.501 
Because the Phonorecords III Board did not engage with this 
issue, the Web IV Board’s guidance remains intact heading into 
Phonorecords IV. As with promotional and substitution effects, the 
parties’ arguments will depend upon whether they are characterizing 
a benchmark marketplace license, or the statutory license itself. Of 
course, by definition, the statutory agreement itself cannot contain 
non-statutory terms. However, where streaming services are provid-
ing publicly available benefits to rightsholders, they may attempt to 
argue that lower rates are warranted, just as if these benefits were 
available under the statutory license. For example, Spotify—per-
haps to strengthen its testy relationship with songwriters502—has 
been rolling out a series of songwriter- and publisher-facing tools. 
These have included proprietary analytic insights for publishers, vis-
ible songwriter credits, songwriter playlists, and songwriter promo-
tional landing pages.503 
Presumably, in a hypothetical marketplace, some licensors 
might ascribe enough value to some of these features to be willing 
 
500 See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26369. 
501 See id. at 26387. 
502 See, e.g., Elias Leight, Threats, Bullying and Misinformation: Inside Spotify’s Battle 
With Songwriters, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 19, 2019, 12:15 PM), https://www.rolling 
stone.com/music/music-features/threats-bullying-misinformation-spotify-battle-
songwriters-820969/ [https://perma.cc/FG9T-6LKW]; Spotify’s Relationship with 
Publishers Hits the Rocks—Again, MUSIC ALLY (June 24, 2019), 
https://musically.com/2019/06/24/spotifys-relationship-with-publishers-hits-the-rocks-
again/ [https://perma.cc/A34F-BQET]. 
503 See Introducing Spotify Publishing Analytics in Beta, SPOTIFY (Nov. 8, 2018), 
https://newsroom.spotify.com/2018-11-08/introducing-spotify-publishing-analytics-in-
beta/ [https://perma.cc/9V3D-LLEJ]; Dani Deahl, Spotify Now Lets You Search by 
Songwriter With Clickable Credits, VERGE (Feb. 12, 2020, 11:45 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2020/2/12/21134557/spotify-search-songwriter-pages-
clickable-credits [https://perma.cc/MMA8-Y72U]; Murray Stassen, A Year After Trying 
To Cut Songwriters’ Pay, Spotify Boosts Writer Visibility With Launch of Pages Features, 
MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/a-
year-after-trying-to-cut-songwriters-pay-spotify-boosts-writer-visibility-with-launch-of-
pages-feature/ [https://perma.cc/ZFS6-S8FM]. 
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to lower their royalty rates in order to access them. Crucially, then, 
if Spotify were to include these benefits as a part of individual li-
censing agreements, they could pose a rate-setting liability: were 
those agreements to be offered as a benchmark, the Copyright Own-
ers would argue that the presence of these valuable extra-statutory 
benefits led to artificially low royalty rates because licensors were 
willing to sell for less in order to secure the extra benefits that would 
not be available under the statutory license. However, by making 
these features publicly available, Spotify has not only foreclosed that 
benchmark argument, but it has also opened the door for the Ser-
vices to argue that the statutory rates should be lower because com-
panies like Spotify are providing extra value to the entire publisher 
and songwriter communities at large. Should the Services attempt 
such an argument, per Web IV, they will bear the hefty burden to 
prove the quantifiable presence of a market-wide benefit.504 
As with substitution and promotional value, the net effect of this 
variable is difficult to project and will likely also boil down to a 
battle of the experts. 
Prevalence of a Feature in the Marketplace. The Board’s review 
of individual benchmark terms is not confined only to extra-statu-
tory features. Both the Phonorecords III and Web IV Boards sig-
naled the relevance of a structural term’s ubiquity in the market-
place—irrespective of any purported self-fulfilling statutory 
“shadow.” The Phonorecords III Board noted the prevalence of its 
core rate structural elements on its way to adopting each of them: 
all-in,505 “greater-of” percentage-of-revenue and TCC structures506 
all apparently predominate in the voluntary marketplace.507 Simi-
larly, the Web IV Board relied upon the lack of effective marketplace 
prevalence in its primary structural choice: declining to adopt a 
“greater-of” rate structure.508 
To the extent it considers marketplace benchmarks, the 
Phonorecords IV Board is likely to adopt a similar approach. This 
 
504 See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26387. 
505 See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1929. 
506 Id. at 1935. 
507 The Phonorecords III Board did not rely upon marketplace prevalence in adopting the 
mechanical floor. See supra notes 100–104 and accompanying text. 
508 See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
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may make it even more difficult for Copyright Owners looking to 
establish a per-play rate, who will at that point be swimming up-
stream against over a decades-worth of market organization around 
the percentage-of-revenue rate structure. On the other side, it pro-
vides an opportunity for Services to mount, in effect, a populist re-
volt against the uncapped TCC prong: presumably, if enough 
streaming services manage to convince publishers to enter into vol-
untary agreements without an uncapped TCC prong, the Board will 
look less favorably on reinstating this feature. 
The net effect of this dynamic is difficult to predict before seeing 
and dissecting the structural elements of the marketplace agreements 
that will inform the Phonorecords IV Board’s analysis on this point. 
Agreement Context and Participants. Both the Phonorecords III 
and Web IV Boards agreed that the context in which a benchmark 
agreement occurs can be relevant to the Board’s conclusion as to 
whether the benchmark is probative of “reasonable” rates. The 
Phonorecords III Board used the “context of litigation”—and its po-
tential to distort bargaining positions with transaction cost avoid-
ance—as a justification to ding a settlement benchmark in favor of 
a marketplace benchmark.509 The Web IV Board went a step further: 
it cited SoundExchange’s failure to consider the context and busi-
ness relationships that birthed a proffered voluntary benchmark 
agreement as grounds to wholly disregard it.510 The Phonorecords 
IV Board will likely feel empowered to take similar steps. 
Similarly, there is one recurring contextual argument that both 
the Phonorecords III and Web IV have uniformly rejected: the “ex-
perimental” agreement argument. The licensor parties have at-
tempted to make this case to invalidate both marketplace agree-
ments511 and CRB settlements.512 In each context, the Board has es-
sentially said the same thing: all agreements are experiments.513 
 
509 See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1935. 
510 See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26353. 
511 See supra note 255. 
512 See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
513 See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26371–72. While the Phonorecords III majority did not 
expressly respond to this argument, it declined to endorse it, leaving Judge Strickler to be 
more explicit in his dissent: “At a high level, all markets are not ‘mature,’ in the sense that 
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There is no reason to think that this argument will become any more 
compelling to the Phonorecords IV Board as streaming continues its 
climb from industry niche to industry overlord.514 
Finally, while the matter did not arise in Phonorecords III, the 
Web IV Board established that, in a willing buyer/willing seller con-
text, the participants themselves are relevant to a benchmark’s reli-
ability.515 In addition to its split baby regarding the Pandora/Merlin 
benchmark’s representativeness of the licensor market at large,516 
the Board also examined whether Pandora was representative of the 
licensee market at large. Did Pandora’s market share afford it too 
much market power for its negotiated rates to be representative of 
the market at large? In answering this question, the Board set forth 
a guiding legal principle: market power in a bilateral marketplace 
agreement is not a product of the licensee’s percentage share of its 
own market, but rather the percentage of the licensor’s revenue that 
is derived from the licensee’s business.517 Thus, Pandora’s irrefuta-
bly expansive share of the noninteractive music market was trumped 
by the relatively insignificant 5% of Merlin member revenue it  
 
they are dynamic and thus subject to change, making all rate structures ‘temporary,’ if not 
‘experimental.’” Phonorecords III, supra note 27, at 2000 (Strickler, J., dissenting). 
514 See Sarah Perez, TechCrunch: Streaming Services Accounted for Nearly 80% of All 
Music Revenue in 2019, RIAA (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.riaa.com/techcrunch-
streaming-services-accounted-for-nearly-80-of-all-music-revenue-in-2019/ 
[https://perma.cc/9BPY-3NU8]. The ever-refreshing supply of new streaming entrants 
should ensure that Copyright Owners are never entirely bereft of arrows in their 
“experimental” quiver. See, e.g., Anne Freer, TikTok Secures Licensing Deal with Major 
Music Publishers, BUS. OF APPS (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.businessofapps.com/ 
news/tiktok-secures-licensing-deal-with-major-music-publishers/ [https://perma.cc/4T 
PW-BJAQ]; Dami Lee, Snap Is Looking into Licensing Music for Users to Embed in Posts, 
VERGE (May 24, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/24/18638984/snap-snapchat-
music-licensing-copyright; [https://perma.cc/F8TR-G57S]; Cherie Hu, Unbundling The 
Song: Inside The Next Wave Of Recorded Music’s Disruption, FORBES (May 13, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/cheriehu/2018/05/13/unbundling-the-song-inside-the-next-
wave-of-recorded-musics-disruption/#645ca6109cae [https://perma.cc/3QT3-4FB4]; Jon 
Blistein, Twitch Licenses Music Now. But the Music Industry Says It’s Skirting the Rules, 
ROLLING STONE (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.rollingstone.com/pro/ 
features/twitch-soundtrack-licensing-sync-1069411/ [https://perma.cc/2WUK-S2DQ]. 
515 See Web IV, supra note 73. 
516 See supra notes 253–255 and accompanying text. 
517 See supra note 255. 
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accounted for: Pandora was not too powerful to be representative of 
other licensees.518 
This issue’s Phonorecords III absence is noteworthy. Like non-
interactive streaming, interactive streaming has a few dominant 
players: for interactive audio-only streaming, Spotify has a large 
plurality market share,519 and for interactive video music streaming, 
YouTube is dominant.520 While the percentage of each licensor’s 
revenue that each streaming service accounts for is, of course, pro-
prietary, streaming revenue as a whole accounted for nearly 80% of 
all recorded music revenue in 2019.521 It stands to reason, then, that 
for at least some of the licensors—either publishers, or especially 
record labels—who were party to the Spotify and YouTube volun-
tary agreements that the Copyright Owners offered as benchmarks 
in Phonorecords III,522 Spotify or YouTube would have  
accounted for significantly more than the 5% of revenue that the 
Web IV Board ruled was insufficient to constitute market power.523 
The Phonorecords IV Board may very well see a benchmark 
challenged on these grounds, likely to the benefit of the Copyright 
Owners. The fact that the Phonorecords III Board did not have to 
rule on whether Spotify or YouTube was representative of other, 
less powerful services was probably due to the fact that these bench-
marks were proffered by the Copyright Owners—the same party 
 
518 See id. 
519 See Stuart Dredge, Report: Spotify Has 36% Market Share of Music-Streaming Subs, 
MUSIC ALLY (Dec. 9, 2019), https://musically.com/2019/12/09/report-spotify-has-36-
market-share-of-music-streaming-subs/ [https://perma.cc/C2PZ-NQQ5]. 
520 YouTube reportedly accounts for 47% of all (not just video) on-demand music 
streaming. See Matt Binder, YouTube Accounts for 47 Percent of Music Streaming, Study 
Claims, MASHABLE (Oct. 10, 2018), https://mashable.com/article/youtube-47-percent-of-
on-demand-music-streaming/ [https://perma.cc/UQ33-G83S]. For the avoidance of 
confusion: interactive video streaming is not subject to the Section 115 compulsory license. 
See FAQs for YouTube Content Uploaders, ASCAP, https://www.ascap.com/help/music-
business-101/youtube-faq-uploaders [https://perma.cc/2LUP-NQGY]. See also Bruce 
Houghton, “YouTube is Becoming More Important to Music than Music is to YouTube,” 
says MIDiA’s Mark Mulligan, HYPEBOT (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.hypebot.com/ 
hypebot/2020/11/youtube-is-becoming-more-important-to-music-than-music-is-to-
youtube-says-midias-mark-mulligan.html [https://perma.cc/V6M2-5JNU]. 
521 See Perez, supra note 514. 
522 See supra Section II.A.4.a. 
523 See supra note 257. 
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who would have had the incentive to argue that Spotify/YouTube’s 
market power had depressed the benchmark rates—and not the Ser-
vices.524 That could easily change in Phonorecords IV. It is also pos-
sible that the Phonorecords III Board considered this entire issue to 
be more relevant in a willing buyer/willing seller context than an 
801(b) context—a matter more appropriate for Web IV (which en-
gaged with it) than for the pre-MMA Phonorecords III (which did 
not). If so, that will change in Phonorecords IV. The bottom line: 
any extent to which the Board finds marketplace benchmark rates to 
be anticompetitively depressed by streaming services’ market power 
can only help the Copyright Owners. 
 
IV. WHAT COMES NEXT? PROJECTING THE IMPACT OF THESE CHANGES 
Interested onlookers attempting to use the Phonorecords III and 
Web IV determinations to predict the MMA’s effect on mechanical 
royalty rates are apt to see what they want to see. There is enough 
pro-licensee material in the Phonorecords III decision that appears 
to have been influenced by the now-vanquished 801(b) factors to 
give licensors hope that Phonorecords IV will raise rates beyond the 
incumbent 44% increase—assuming it survives remand. Con-
versely, there is also enough pro-licensor material in Phonorecords 
III that appears to conflict with Web IV to give licensees hope that 
the willing buyer/willing seller may be less copyright-friendly than 
its advocates hope. 
In reality, the two decisions are more similar than they are dif-
ferent. Each undertook similar approaches, albeit with somewhat di-
vergent emphases: (1) each began with structural determinations, 
followed by (2) evaluating specific benchmarks and economic anal-
yses; (3) each then synthesized these data points into zones of rea-
sonableness before (4) selecting final rates.525 Both Boards placed 
special emphasis on competitive concerns.526 Finally, both Boards 
engaged in substantial market analysis, even where (in the case of 
 
524 See supra Section II.A.4.a. 
525 See supra Sections I.A–I.B. 
526 See id. 
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Phonorecords III) they were not expressly charged with setting  
market rates.527 
Of course, even subtle changes can have dramatic impact on 
songwriters struggling to scrape out a living in the new stream- 
ing economy, and on streaming services continuing their slow trek  
towards consistent profitability. And, to be sure, the two opinions  
contain a number of subtle—and less-than-subtle—differences.  
Together, the Phonorecords III and Web IV determinations stand  
for the proposition that songwriters should remain cautiously opti-
mistic that the willing buyer/willing seller rate standard will boost 
their rates. 
Part IV of this Comment explains why. First, Section A dis-
cusses the reasons for songwriter optimism—recapping and elabo-
rating upon the positive implications suggested by this Comment’s 
analysis of Phonorecords III and Web IV. Sections B and C then 
explain why that optimism should be tempered with caution—by, 
respectively, recapping and discussing the pro-service implications 
for the change to willing buyer/willing seller, and finally by catalog-
ing the many points of uncertainty. 
A. Pro-Songwriter Implications 
A side-by-side comparison of Phonorecords III and Web IV il-
luminates several points of optimism for songwriters. This is not, in 
and of itself, particularly surprising: the switch to willing buyer/will-
ing seller was pushed for by rightsholders, not licensees, after all. 
But even beyond the consensus, conclusory feeling that a mandate 
to set market-based rates will result in higher songwriter compensa-
tion than past rate standards, there are specific granular matters from 
within the two Board’s reasonings that suggest further rate increases 
may be on deck. 
Most notably, the Copyright Owners have never been better 
equipped to pursue their coveted per-play rate. First, the absence of 
801(b) factor A—the “availability” factor that the Board construed 
as regulating pro-service demand considerations, rather than pro-
songwriter supply considerations—removes the most explicit per-
 
527 See id. 
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play obstacle cited in Phonorecords III.528 While Web IV demon-
strates that the absence of Factor A will not preclude the Board from 
considering the downstream competitive effects that ultimately dis-
suaded it from adopting a per-play rate, it also shows that, in the 
willing buyer/willing seller context, the Board is perhaps more ame-
nable to other factors trumping downstream competitive effects.529 
Second, per-play advocates may also rejoice in the post-MMA ab-
sence of 801(b) factor D (industry disruption), which the Board sim-
ilarly linked to its decision not to adopt a per-play rate.530 Third, in 
a world in which the Board has declared itself bound by something 
close to stare decisis, and just recently imposed a per-play rate on 
its most contemporary willing buyer/willing seller rate determina-
tion (Web IV), it may feel some pressure to allow its newly unified 
inputs (i.e. rate standards) to yield unified outputs (i.e. rate struc-
tures).531 Finally, these per-play hopes are only further bolstered by 
the Phonorecords III Board’s express statement of preference for 
simplicity: there is, of course, no simpler structure than a straight-
forward per-play rate.532 
Even in the absence of a per-play rate, the Copyright Owners 
should also feel relatively confident that the structural protections 
they currently do approve of are not (for the most part) in any par-
ticular danger. Nothing in Web IV forecloses any of the reasoning 
the Phonorecords III Board used to arrive at a mechanical floor or a 
TCC prong—both of which activate when diminished service reve-
nue would otherwise lead to reduced royalties.533 Here, songwriters 
may take extra solace in both the Web IV and Phonorecords III 
Board’s insistence that they are in no way obligated to protect any 
specific service’s business models, nor ensure anyone’s profitabil-
ity.534 This should continue to foreclose the Services from effec-
tively weaponizing low-revenue services—for whom these alter-
nate, non-revenue-based prongs might pose a hardship—in order to 
 
528 See supra Section III.B.2 
529 See id. 
530 See supra Section III.B.6.  
531 See supra Section I.A.4. 
532 See supra Section I.B.3. 
533 See generally supra Part II.  
534 See supra Section III.B.4.   
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convince the Board to abandon these protections in the name of pro-
tecting these fledgling services. 
Beyond structure, songwriters may also reasonably feel opti-
mism regarding the future numerical rates themselves. Fundamen-
tally, the absence of the 801(b) factors relieves the Board of its for-
mer “legislative discretion,” which allowed it to maintain—at least 
in songwriters’ estimation—below-market rates wedged into song-
writer-hostile structures.535 Whether or not those assessments are  
accurate, it is undeniably true that the post-MMA Board no longer 
has the discretion to stray from market-based rates.536 Where the 
Phonorecords III Board was permitted—indeed required—to enter-
tain economic analyses across the fair market/free market spectrum, 
the Phonorecords IV Board will only be permitted to consider anal-
ysis that at least purports to model a free market.537 While the parties 
will no doubt submit widely divergent analyses that each purport to 
imitate a free market, it is significant that no party—particularly the 
Services—will be able to factor in non-market values and principles. 
In the end, the removal of the 801(b) factors as available Shapley 
inputs may be the most consequential change of all. 
The resulting upward pressure on rates should work in tandem 
with the Phonorecords IV Board’s likely renewed emphasis on 
Shapley analyses. First, there is a real possibility that the statutory 
text itself may forestall the use of marketplace benchmarks alto-
gether.538 Even if they are permitted, they will likely be deempha-
sized relative to the Shapley analyses that the Phonorecords III 
Board already revealed itself to be partial to.539 For rightsholders 
convinced that benchmark rates derived from within the Section 115 
marketplace are inherently shaded downwards by the statutory 
“shadow,” this would be a welcome development.540 
To the extent that the Board does rely upon marketplace bench-
marks—which did of course figure prominently into the Web IV 
Board’s construction of the willing buyer/willing seller rate 
 
535 See supra Section I.A.5. 
536 See id. 
537 See id. 
538 See supra Section I.D.1. 
539 See supra Section I.C.2. 
540 See supra notes 440–461 and accompanying text. 
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standard541—Web IV does provide at least one beacon of hope for 
songwriters. After ignoring the issue in Phonorecords III, the Web 
IV Board showed itself willing to evaluate whether certain Service 
benchmarks reflected market power on behalf of the contracting  
service.542 For a streaming industry that is certainly not getting any 
less concentrated, this may give Copyright Owners some cause  
to believe that their benchmark arguments in Phonorecords IV  
may fare better than in the past.543 It may also afford them a plausi-
ble counter to the Phonorecords III and Web IV Boards’ insistence 
that interactive streaming sound recording rates are inflated by  
major label market power.544 Fundamentally, anything the Copy-
right Owners can do to link their rates to those much higher sound 
recording rates is a win for songwriters. Finally, next time around, 
the Copyright Owners should be able to at least attempt to substan-
tiate their claims that “safe harbor” depresses both sound recording 
and composition rates from YouTube, giving their YouTube bench-
mark (a favorable benchmark for songwriters in Phonorecords III) 
a fighting chance.545 
B. Pro-Service Implications 
While many of the implications of the new rate standard tend to 
cut against the Services’ interests, the Services certainly benefit 
from the inertia suggested by the similarities between Phonorecords 
III and Web IV. For one—perhaps most importantly to the Ser-
vices—the Web IV Board’s competition-driven approach is entirely 
consistent  with the Phonorecords III Board’s emphasis on the per-
fectly complementary nature of mechanical and performance 
streaming rights, and its resulting decision to renew the all-in rate 
structure.546 The all-in rate structure allows the CRB to effectively 
cap the Services’ obligations to songwriters (in the U.S.): sure, they 
must still negotiate with the PROs, and go to rate court where  
necessary, but anything that comes out of their left pocket will 
 
541 See supra Section I.B.3. 
542 See supra notes 516–518 and accompanying text. 
543 See supra notes 521–523 and accompanying text. 
544 See supra Section III.D.3.b. 
545 See supra notes 478–479 and accompanying text. 
546 See supra notes 303–306 and accompanying text. 
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ultimately be credited to their right pocket anyway.547 Second, Web 
IV also offered Copyright Owners no additional ammunition in their 
fight to show that the services effectively suppress royalty rates 
through revenue deferral, “loss-leading,” revenue displacement, and 
other business practices and models.548 The Phonorecords III Board 
proved itself fairly resistant to these arguments, and the Services 
will be happy that the Web IV Board avoided discussing them alto-
gether.549  They will also, no doubt, be grateful that the Board views 
the record companies as an oligopoly—and therefore any inflated 
benchmark rates involving record company negotiations as inher-
ently suspect—regardless of which rate standard it is applying.550 
Further, while Web IV does supply new market-based ammuni-
tion for the Copyright Owners’ per-play crusade, it also appears to 
hinder their ability to leverage several non-market arguments. First, 
to the (limited) extent that Phonorecords III may have left the door 
open for the Copyright Owners to re-run their “inherent value”  
argument, the Web IV Board’s conspicuous silence on all equity 
matters seems to confirm that such arguments have no place in a 
willing buyer/willing seller landscape.551 
Of even greater consequence: while the Board did not expressly 
allow these songwriter-wellbeing arguments to inform its interpre-
tation of the 801(b) factors, it did invoke these concerns in its 801(b) 
discussion, and ultimately expressly tied them to its conclusion that 
mechanical royalty rates should be significantly increased from their 
2012 levels.552 Thus, even if the Services believe that the switch to 
willing buyer/willing seller may increase the chances of a modest 
rate increase in Phonorecords IV, they will no doubt be heartened 
that much of the evidence that the Phonorecords III Board most di-
rectly mobilized in its decision to enact a significant rate hike is no 
longer relevant to the new rate standard. 
 
547 See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text. 
548 See supra notes 379–387389 and accompanying text. 
549 See id. 
550 See supra 481–483 and accompanying text. 
551 See supra notes 347–355 and accompanying text. 
552 See supra notes 360–367 and accompanying text. 
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C. Uncertain Implications 
In some respects, the differences between Phonorecords and 
Web IV yield more questions than answers. For one, there is the en-
tirely unsettled issue surrounding the role (or possible lack thereof) 
of marketplace benchmarks under the new Section 115.553 The Web 
IV Board devoted by far more time to evaluating benchmarks than 
it did to any other portion of its analysis. If it is unable to do the 
same in Phonorecords IV, then it may be impossible for willing 
buyer/willing seller to truly embody the “unified” rate standard 
trumpeted by both Congress and the Copyright Office.554 Nor is it 
possible to confidently predict what the effect of such an outcome 
would be on royalty rates. While licensors may hope that the uncer-
tainty around benchmark admissibility will help them escape the 
statutory “shadow”—and it certainly may—its most likely outcome 
is an increase in outcome variance, which could ultimately swing 
either way (or back-and-forth over time, depending on the makeup 
of any particular triumvirate of judges). 
Second, the heightened statutory emphasis on substitution and 
promotion effects adds an extra layer of volatility.555 All that is cer-
tain is that substitution and promotion effects will factor promi-
nently into the Board’s analysis.556 What remains entirely unclear is 
which side this will benefit. For one, as discussed supra, both sub-
stitution and promotion effects operate opposite to themselves de-
pending on whether they are discussed in the benchmark context, or 
outside of it.557 Thus, their import is directly linked to the uncer-
tainty surrounding the role of benchmarks. And even if, as seems 
likely, the Board ends up entertaining promotion and substitution 
arguments primarily outside of the benchmark context, both the 
Copyright Owners (stressing, in this context, substitution) and the 
Services (countering, in this context, with promotion) will have 
plausible arguments in support of their respective positions. In the 
end, the Board will simply have to choose a narrative it prefers. The 
only thing that is certain about this choice is that the statute now 
 
553 See supra Section III.D.1.  
554 See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
555 See supra Section III.D.3.c.  
556 See id. 
557 See id. 
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expressly provides that the Board should afford this tug-of-war  
significant attention.558 
A similar —albeit, unanointed by the statute—uncertainty exists 
surrounding the import of extra-statutory functionality contem-
plated by prospective benchmarks559 and of the prevalence of certain 
features in the marketplace: it is impossible to know which way 
these factors will cut until the parties have actually furnished these 
putative benchmarks.560 It is entirely plausible that both services and 
publishers alike will have sought to score CRB points by ensuring 
that any voluntary agreements entered into tend to conform to struc-
tural features they hope to see reflected in future CRB determina-
tions. Finally, it is difficult to predict the role that the context sur-
rounding future proffered benchmarks will play without knowing 
what those benchmark agreements are, and when and how they were 
entered into. For example: were the parties on the verge of infringe-
ment litigation, or in the purgatory period between the MMA’s pas-
sage and the date its effective sunsetting of service liability became 
active, etc.?561 And finally, once again, how probative of a bench-
mark will Phonorecords III itself—a hugely litigious, controversial, 
statutorily-mandated ruling, applying a defunct rate standard—
prove to be?562 
Meanwhile, lurking beneath all of this will be the absence of 
801(b) Factor D (industry disruption).563 To be sure, as discussed 
supra, the upshot of this change does skew songwriter-friendly.564 
But apart from that general leaning, Factor D’s disappearance un-
locks something else: instability. While the Phonorecords III Board 
did not view Factor D as sufficiently imposing to preclude a 44% 
increase, that does not necessarily mean Factor D did not act as a 
governor on the Board’s ultimate wishes. For one, it may be the case 
that the majority actually wished to impose a greater rate increase, 
but felt barred from doing so under Factor D. In any event, it 
 
558 See supra notes 484–486 and accompanying text. 
559 See supra Section III.D.3.c.   
560 See id.  
561 See id.  
562 See supra notes 429–431 and accompanying text. 
563 See supra Section III.B.6.  
564 See supra note 532 and accompanying text. 
2021] SOMETHING OLD/SOMETHING NEW 691 
 
certainly is the case that the Board felt that it had to delay the full 
effect of its rate increase over a half-decade purely out of deference 
to Factor D.565 
There are a few other potential wild cards. For example, struc-
tures and proposals not considered in either Web IV or Phonorecords 
III may arise for the first time in Phonorecords IV. One proposal 
that has gained some widespread support is the notion of “user-cen-
tric” royalty accounting, whereby streaming services would pay 
rightsholders—particularly labels, but also potentially publishers, 
subject to CRB adoption—rates prorated by user, rather than by 
overall stream count.566 In other words, a user paying $10/month 
who only streams one song that month would see all $10 of their 
user fee (less Spotify’s share) paid through to rightsholders for that 
one song, rather than have their one stream lumped into a general 
fund paid out pro rata, treating all streams as equal. 
Finally, regardless of whether the uncapped TCC that was struck 
down on appeal re-emerges on remand in Phonorecords III-2, the 
concept of an uncapped TCC prong is likely to reprise its role as a 
hot button item in Phonorecords IV. Importantly, the D.C. Circuit 
made its ruling on procedural, not substantive, grounds, leaving the 
door open for future Boards to explore this structure again—pro-
vided they give the parties sufficient notice and opportunity to liti-
gate the point.567 If and when TCC comes up in Phonorecords IV, 
the ticking time bomb that is the major label oligopoly could very 
 
565 See supra Section II.A.5.  
566 See Mark Mulligan, Creator Support: A New Take on User Centric Licensing, MIDIA 
(Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.midiaresearch.com/blog/creator-support-a-new-take-on-
user-centric-licensing/ [https://perma.cc/YW78-EXLV]; cf. Victor Luckerson, Is Spotify’s 
Model Wiping Out Music’s Middle Class?, RINGER (Jan. 16, 2019, 5:30AM), 
https://www.theringer.com/tech/2019/1/16/18184314/spotify-music-streaming-service-
royalty-payout-model [https://perma.cc/7T7G-UJCB]. See also Joseph Dimont, Note, 
Royalty Inequity: Why Music Streaming Services Should Switch to A Per-Subscriber 
Model, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 675, 694 (2018). 
567 Johnson v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 969 F.3d 363, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (clarifying that 
“because we have vacated the rate structure devised by the Board for lack of notice, we 
need not address” the Services argument that the Board’s decision to adopt an uncapped 
TCC prong was arbitrary and capricious, but that “[s]hould the Board on remand provide 
notice that it is again contemplating such a scheme, the Streaming Services can present 
their concerns to the Board”). 
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well compel the Board to reconsider tying publishing rates directly 
to what the Board itself believes to be undue label market power. 
 
CONCLUSION 
While the differences between the Phonorecords III and Web IV 
determinations certainly tend—generally, if not at all uniformly—
to shade in favor of songwriters, the two proceedings’ similarities 
suggest that the distance between the old 801(b) standard and the 
new willing buyer/seller standard for Section 115 licenses may not 
be quite as pronounced as either the MMA’s rightsholder champions 
hope, or its detractors fear. Indeed, the Phonorecords III Board  
itself, in effect, made this point when it noted that 801(b) rates  
and market rates were not mutually exclusive.568 Under both rate 
standards, the Board is guided by competition considerations, exer-
cising broad discretion and flexibility in choosing both rate struc-
tures and numerical rates. Licensors hoping that the new rate stand-
ard will reinvigorate their favorite arguments—service revenue  
deferral, the statutory “shadow,” synchronization as free market  
bastion, and “experimental” benchmark invalidity—are likely to be  
disappointed. 
Furthermore, to the extent that Phonorecords III and Web IV  
do highlight some real, operative differences between the two rate 
standards, these differences also unlock a significant degree of  
volatility. In other words, while songwriter’s may on average expect  
to benefit from the new rate standard, they should also steel them-
selves for an even broader spectrum of possible outcomes—in both 
directions. 
Still, the median value within that broadened spectrum does ap-
pear to be more songwriter-friendly under willing buyer/willing 
seller than it was under 801(b). Songwriters have perhaps never had 
a better shot at a per-play rate, nor more structural avenues to de-
emphasize statutorily “shadow”-ed benchmarks—even if the sub-
stantive “shadow” critique itself is unlikely to fall on friendlier ears 
post-MMA than was the case pre-MMA. More fundamentally, their 
fate is now in the hands of a tribunal with neither the “legislative 
 
568 See supra Section III.A.3.  
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discretion” nor the “public interest” mandate to do anything other 
than attempt to approximate market rates. And so there is certainly 
cause for songwriters and publishers to bask in the promise of the 
new rate standard they fought for. Nonetheless, they would do well 
to temper their optimism with a significant dose of caution, even as 
they prepare to aim “impossibly high” in the “all-out war” that is 
soon to come.569 
Only one thing is certain: the distance between the final buzzer 
for Phonorecords III and the opening tip-off for Phonorecords IV 
will be, at most, a few months. 
 
569 See Ingham, supra note 38. 
